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ABSTRACT 
 
Concrete Futures presents a history of colonial construction technologies and their 
postcolonial afterlives in Morocco. During the French Protectorate (1912-1956), cities such as 
Casablanca underwent a series of profound transformations. On the one hand, famine, unrest, 
epidemics, scarcity, rural migration, industrialization, an influx of European settlers, the 
reorganization of the land tenure system, and a host of other factors prompted experts, colonial 
officials, and local observers to articulate the problems facing urban Morocco in terms of an 
emerging “crisis.” On the other, new technologies of housing construction, designed to address 
particular understandings of this “crisis,” remade urban environments across the Protectorate. 
These technologies—from types of reinforced concrete construction to protocols for demolition 
and new strategies of housing finance—not only changed the way Moroccan cities were built, 
but also rearranged relations of authority between different communities of experts, officials, 
workers, and residents. During the final years of the Protectorate, the colonial administration 
deployed these crisis technologies in response to a range of perceived threats—from epidemics 
to anti-colonial revolt—emanating from Casablanca’s urban slums. Decolonization in Morocco 
provided opportunities for urban experts to work crisis technologies into the modernizing 
programs of the postcolonial state. Officials adapted cinder-block constructions and 
microfinancial methods to the imperatives of disaster response in the wake of a catastrophic 
earthquake in the southern city of Agadir in 1960. In late 1960s and early 1970s, postcolonial 
 xii 
architects and administrators blended these technologies with new international definitions of the 
“environment” in the search for a sustainable, culturally appropriate architecture.  
Crisis technologies, however, did not always perform in the ways that engineers, 
planners, and architects intended. Moroccan elites, workers, and artisans also participated in 
colonial modernization projects. At times, their participation disrupted the harmonious visions of 
planners and troubled the grand projects of engineers. At others, Moroccan forms of skill and 
labor were inscribed within crisis technologies and made to serve the aims of colonial 
governance. This dissertation argues that crisis technologies embedded colonial conceptions of 
crisis—with all of their contradictions—into the material form of Moroccan cities and the 
institutional structures inherited after independence in 1956. By considering how officials, 
experts, workers, and residents strategically shifted between different approaches to materiality 
in their efforts to remake the built world, this project uncovers the forms of political contestation 
and technological labor at the heart of colonial modernization schemes. Following colonial 
construction technologies and their postcolonial deployments, this account links together core 
concerns in urban environmental history, Science and Technology Studies, histories of 
architecture and urban planning, and studies of development and modernization. This dissertation 
also traces the long legacies of modernist failures in Morocco—failures to produce the well-
ordered, multi-racial landscape that colonial planners imagined. These failures continue to 
resonate today. Contemporary forms of urban renewal draw on Protectorate-era strategies and 
arguments to displace residents, and present-day popular protests foreground demands for access 
to housing and infrastructure.   
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
To be modern is to build with modern materials…. it is a way of expressing material and 
economic as well as intellectual success. “I build with bricks and concrete slabs.” And 
when the weather becomes too hot, he is going to go to his grandfather’s house. 
—Abdelilah Laslami, August 14, 2017.
 
 What makes a building Moroccan? Contemporary scholars and experts might, with a few 
caveats, answer this question in much the same way as the architects, planners, and colonial 
officials of the French Protectorate (1912-1956), by looking to the mudun (old cities) of Fez and 
Marrakesh, the earthen qusūr (fortified villages) of the Draa Valley, or perhaps even the qaryan 
or bidonvilles (slums) of Rabat and Casablanca. It is less probable that they would consider the 
single-story, 8x8m cinder-block dwellings of the rebuilt Carrières centrales (Hay Mohammadi) in 
the 1950s or the concrete satellite city of Tamesna—constructed to rehouse former slum dwellers 
displaced by the most recent round of urban renewal in the kingdom. Still less likely that they 
would turn to the late capitalist dreamworlds of La Marina Morocco in Sala or the future 
financial district of Casa-Anfa. Yet, all of these structures are bound together by more than their 
geographic location. They are Moroccan because the technologies used to build them are 
Moroccan.   
Today cities like Rabat, Tangier, and Casablanca are awash with global real estate capital 
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and spectacular urban megaprojects. They are also being transformed by state-led, internationally 
funded slum clearance programs that have pushed precarious residents further and further to the 
urban periphery. Planners and state officials in Morocco have positioned these two arms of urban 
renewal as responses to different forms of “crisis.” “Crisis” here refers not only to the financial 
crisis of 2008, but also to more deeply rooted forms of urban marginalization that supposedly led 
to the 2003 Casablanca bombings and have played a role in provoking popular mobilization 
against the state in the form of the February 20th Movement and more recently the Hirak al-Rif. 
Concerns over climate change and sustainability as well as efforts to preserve and protect 
Morocco’s architectural heritage have similarly been enfolded within this language of crisis.1 
Projects like the Cities Without Slums initiative—established in 2004 with funding from the 
World Bank and the Agence française de développement—address urban inequalities through the 
“eradication” of “highly precarious structures, shacks made from sheet metal and other salvaged 
materials.”2 The program then facilitates former residents’ access to relatively low-interest loans 
for the purchase of apartments in new developments like Tamesna. In spite of their resonance 
with neoliberal spatial projects across the globe, these programs too, and the notions of “crisis” 
they put forward, are also distinctly Moroccan.  
 
1 For discussions of “heritage” discourse and debates about architectural preservation in the contemporary Maghrib 
see Justin McGuinness, “Political Context and Professional Ideologies: French Urban Conservation Planning 
Transferred to the Médina of Tunis,” The Journal of North African Studies 2, no. 2 (September 1997): 34–56; Karim 
Rouissi, “Housing for the Greatest Number: Casablanca’s Underappreciated Public Housing Developments,” The 
Journal of North African Studies  (November 2019): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2019.1692411; Diana 
Wylie, “The Work of Historic Preservation: Saving Oran’s Fort Santa Cruz, and More: An Interview with Abdeslem 
Abdelhak, Bel Horizon Member and Guide,” The Journal of North African Studies (November 2019): 1–13, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2019.1692409; Diana Wylie, “Defying the Bulldozers: The Practice of Historic 
Preservation,” The Journal of North African Studies (November 2019) 1–3, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2019.1692402; Susan Slyomovics, “Is Patrimoine ‘Good to Think With’?,” The 
Journal of North African Studies (August 2019): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2019.1644887; Susan 
Slyomovics, “Dismantling a World: France’s Monumental Military Heritage in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Algeria,” The 
Journal of North African Studies (August 2019): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2019.1644901. 
2 Agence française de développement, “Maroc : Programme d’action pour la résorption de l’habitat insalubre et des 
bidonvilles,” adf.fr, January 2011, http://www.afd.fr/home/projets_afd/villes/projets-cld/lutte-contre-
exclusion/maroc-habitat-insalubre. 
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Moreover, contemporary technologies of housing construction and present-day 
approaches to crisis are not only Moroccan, they are also rooted in the colonial past. Their 
origins lie in the French Protectorate—a colonial venture that lasted from 1912 to 1956 and 
provoked dramatic transformations of state and society in Morocco. During this period, 
Casablanca emerged as the country’s largest city and became a model for urban experiments 
across the French empire. Casablanca also became the flashpoint of various “crises” that plagued 
Moroccan cities under the Protectorate—crises of housing, labor, unemployment, public health, 
and anticolonial unrest.  
Crisis Arguments 
This dissertation centers around colonial deployments and definitions of Morocco’s urban 
crisis, a crisis that at its height in the late 1940s and early 1950s included housing shortages, 
unemployment, famine, epidemics, and urban revolt. The term “crisis” implied the need for rapid 
interventions to resolve critical urban problems. And yet, Morocco’s urban crisis was not 
confined to a single set of issues, or even to a single decade. The term crisis was used flexibly 
and consistently in state records from WWI to the 1970s. After WWII, growing urban unrest, 
continuous housing shortages, and reduced colonial budgets inspired Protectorate engineers, 
planners, and financiers to adopt a novel set of strategies for managing crisis, a crisis that they 
treated as a permanent fact of urban life in Morocco.      
The strategies that experts and officials adopted in the postwar period—what I refer to as 
crisis technologies—included materials like cinder blocks, forms of worksite organization like 
small-scale housing cooperatives, protocols for demolition and indemnification, and financial 
mechanisms such as state-backed, low-interest mortgages. Colonial officials developed these 
crisis technologies in the context of continued scarcity and anti-colonial revolt. They aimed to 
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create not only new types of pacified urban subjects but also a new kind of securitized urban 
environment. Crisis technologies connect a nexus of past and present-day urban problems—rural 
migration, densification, corruption, and toxic landscapes—to the long afterlives of colonial 
strategies for managing land, labor, and environments.   
I argue that taken as a whole, crisis technologies of construction, demolition, and 
financialization remade relations between states and subjects, bodies and environments, labor 
and capital in Morocco. This project is a history of colonial technologies for managing crisis and 
the urban environments, the forms of authority and vulnerability that they left behind after 
Morocco’s independence in 1956. This includes the ways that postcolonial experts adapted crisis 
technologies to the imperatives of disaster response in the wake of decolonization after a 
catastrophic earthquake struck the southern city of Agadir in 1960. It also involves tracing how 
postcolonial officials combined crisis logics with new international definitions of the 
“environment” in late 1960s and early 1970s. In Morocco today, crisis technologies, though often 
inserted into supposedly novel urban initiatives like the Cities without Slums program, continue 
to form the material and conceptual backdrop for everyday life—structuring possibilities for 
construction, destruction, and inhabitation.  
Throughout the period in question, from the beginning of the Protectorate in 1912 to the 
mid-1970s, I consider “crisis” primarily as an actor category—a concept connected to particular 
professional communities and conjoined with certain forms of technopolitical practice.3 This is 
not to discount the epidemics, overcrowding, controversies, and overt violence that plagued 
 
3 I use the term “technopolitical” in this dissertation in the sense proposed by Gabrielle Hecht to describe the 
“strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals.” Gabrielle Hecht, 
The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2009), 56-57. 
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Moroccan cities such as Casablanca from the first decades of the Protectorate onward.4 The 
question, however, is how a range of seemingly related, but highly complex and multi-causal 
issues—from the scarcity of cement to Morocco’s rural exodus—came to be grouped together 
under the heading of “crisis”? “Crisis,” moreover, did not simply exist in the rhetorics of colonial 
officials. It was, in the language of historians of technology, stabilized through the practical 
activity of expert communities and embedded within the material form of Moroccan cities.5 
Crisis left textual traces—an archive that I have worked to reassemble from 
administrative reports, technical journals, oral histories, legal codes, and literary sources read 
along and against the archival grain. Crisis also has material afterlives. The technologies that are 
the main focus of this dissertation operated by inscribing arguments about whose authority, 
whose vulnerability, whose knowledge and labor mattered into reinforced concrete foundations 
and cinderblock walls, lead pipes and public lighting, construction codes and mortgages, 
 
4 The sociologist, Abderrahmane Rachik, has shown in stark detail how the major urban interventions in 
Casablanca’s history were formulated in response to moments of collective violence, epidemics, and generalized 
uncertainty. Rachik refers to the development of an “urbansime de l’urgence,” an “emergency urbanism” composed 
of formal structures, concepts, and practices targeted at the management of Morocco’s urban crises. While Rachik 
usefully highlights how new policies and spatial forms coalesced as reactions to various emergencies, he tends to 
focus on the cyclical return of the notion of “emergency” at particular moments such as 1913-1914, 1937-1938, 
1952-1955, and 1981-1983. I emphasize instead the ways in which crisis, as opposed to emergency, was defined by 
a fundamental and ongoing temporal uncertainty. The language of crisis echoes throughout the colonial (and 
postcolonial) archive, cropping up at unexpected moments and in no way restricted to the periods of emergency that 
Rachik analyzes. By design, crisis had no definitive end point in Morocco. This is because Morocco’s urban crisis 
was above all a crisis of authority and of agency—a concept aimed at determining and restricting whose knowledge, 
skill, and labor had the capacity to reshape the urban environment. Abderrahmane Rachik, Casablanca: 
L’urbanisme de l’urgence (Casablanca: Imprimerie  El Jadida, 2002), 186. 
5 The question of how certain practices, technologies, concepts, etc. are rendered durable or are re-opened for debate 
has been a central question for Actor Network Theory (ANT) in particular. For only a few concise examples see 
John Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion,” in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Trevor 
Pinch (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012), 105–27; Bruno Latour, “Technology Is Society Made Durable,” in A 
Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology, and Domination, ed. John Law (London: Routledge, 1991), 
103–31; For other definitions of stabilization that relate more specifically to technical artifacts see Wiebe E. Bijker, 
Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995); Others such as Thomas Gieryn have challenged Latour’s notion that objects “move along a gradient of 
stabilization” arguing instead for the forms of ongoing “boundary work” necessary for expert communities to lay 
claim to epistemic territory. Thomas F Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 20. 
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institutions and environments.6  
To suggest that crisis was constructed, fabricated, or invented might give the mistaken 
impression that it somehow resided exclusively within the frameworks for speech and action 
held by colonial officials. In contrast, scholars in a variety of fields—Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) in particular—have suggested that such concepts be considered in their materiality 
(a notion to which I will return in the following sections). Broadly this line of argument asserts 
that an object or idea that might previously have been discussed in terms of social construction is 
in fact literally constructed—built into infrastructures, environments, codified sets of practices, 
etc.7 This dissertation was composed in the aftermath of this shift from a social constructivist 
framework to what has been referred to as the material (or sometimes the ontological) turn. This 
project is indebted to the theories and methods that have brought about this renewed interest in 
the material dimensions of knowledge production. While I would be loath to treat “crisis” as 
 
6 The notion of “inscription” here, drawn from Madeleine Akrich, refers to the act of building particular “scripts” 
(visions or narratives about use, reception, or impact) into technical artifacts. This process is carried out not only by 
designers but also by other sets actors who engage in the process of making technology work in the world. In 
contrast to Akrich’s account of this process, I do not find it useful to separate these actors into “designers” and 
“users” of technology, but instead consider the various shades between these two poles—the working and reworking 
of technologies by a host of engineers, laborers, officials, and residents. Madeleine Akrich, “The De—Scription of 
Technical Objects,” in Shaping Technology/Building Society, ed. Wiebe E Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1992), 205–24. 
7 My approach to “crisis” bears an analytic resemblance to the ways historians and science studies scholars have 
recently approached a category such as race. That is to say, as assertions about the “social construction” of race have 
become intellectually and politically less useful (if what social construction implies is a kind of ephemeral 
fabrication), one interpretative thrust has become to look at how race is materially constructed. This is the case, for 
instance, in studies that consider how race is made bodily through racializing practices of biomedical health care, 
how race is materially built into cities through formal segregation and red lining, or how the same practices 
construct race as a feature of real estate markets or environmental exposures. For only a few examples that signal 
this shift see Kyla Schuller, The Biopolitics of Feeling: Race, Sex, and Science in the Nineteenth Century (Durham: 
Duke University Press Books, 2017); Elizabeth Roberts, “Assisted Existence: An Ethnography of Being in 
Ecuador,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19 (2013): 562–80; Sally Markowitz, “Pelvic Politics: 
Sexual Dimorphism and Racial Difference,” Signs 26, no. 2 (2001): 389–414; Lundy Braun, “Spirometry, 
Measurement, and Race in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 60, no. 
2 (2005): 135–69. On environmental racializations see Dorceta E. Taylor, Toxic Communities: Environmental 
Racism, Industrial Pollution, and Residential Mobility (New York: New York University Press, 2014); Linda 
Lorraine Nash, Inescapable Ecologies a History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006); Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of DES (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010). 
 7 
merely conceptual (i.e. immaterial), however, the research process led me to consider not only 
the materiality of discourse but also discourses of materiality. In other words, debates about what 
matter is, what it does, and who decides how it behaves are inseparable from the ways a concept 
like crisis is built into urban environments, real estate markets, and individual bodies. Against the 
division between discursive construction and material making, I oppose the concept of 
technological labor. Technological labor encompasses not only the manual manipulation of 
matter but also the use of “literary technologies” for defining what matter is and who can manage 
it.8 Since at least the 1980s, historians of science and technology have developed methods for 
describing how work with technology is directed toward defining not only who can act but also 
who can speak.9 The question of whose authority matters—and whose vulnerability—is central 
to this study of how crisis became embedded into everyday urban life in Morocco.  
An Urban Environmental History of Colonial Construction Technologies 
This dissertation presents an urban environmental history not of a particular place—
Morocco or even Casablanca, which remains the focus of most of the chapters—but of the 
becoming Moroccan of a set of technologies. The technologies in question—such as cinder 
blocks and loan packages—are perhaps not obvious objects for environmental history.10 Yet, 
thinking with construction technologies, broadly defined, opens up a number of core concerns 
that scholars in the field of environmental history have been systematically grappling with for the 
 
8 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
9 For an early example, consider for instance Shapin and Schaffer’s discussion of the literary technologies Robert 
Boyle uses to regulate who can intervene in the determination of “scientific facts.” Shapin and Schaffer, 60. 
10 I number of recent urban environmental histories, particularly within the African context, have singled out the 
importance of debates over building materials and urban technologies. See for instance Emily Brownell, Gone to 
Ground: A History of Environment and Infrastructure in Dar Es Salaam (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2020); Tasha Rijke-Epstein, “Architectures of Belonging: Moral Economies of Urban Place-Making in Mahajanga, 
Madagascar” (PhD, University of Michigan, 2017); Matthew Gandy, “Planning, Anti-Planning and the 
Infrastructure Crisis Facing Metropolitan Lagos,” Urban Studies 43, no. 2 (2006): 371–96. 
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past three decades.11 These technologies did not simply shape urban ecologies, they enrolled 
non-human entities into colonial modernization schemes. Concrete, for instance, combined local 
sands, local water, and industrially produced cement into a complex, hybrid object—a product of 
colonial labor regimes and imperial ecologies. Limestone and clay extracted from nearby 
quarries and processed at the Roches Noires cement plant in Casablanca circulated across the 
whole of the French Protectorate finding their way into rural roads and regional outposts. Matter 
from the local environment of one city produced national territory in the service of colonial 
military expansion. While no straightforward urban history can account for these movements and 
transformations, environmental history offers a powerful framework.  
This dissertation builds on a core, but not undisputed, contribution of environmental 
history: the assertion that all environments are “hybrid,” that is, made up of irreducible 
entanglements of humans, natures, and technologies.12 Over the course of the past decade 
scholars in the field have confronted the implications of this principle while also grappling with 
its constraints and the analytic impasses that accompany it. For instance, once all environments 
 
11 For foundational texts in urban environmental history see Martin V. Melosi, “The Place of the City in 
Environmental History,” Environmental History Review 17, no. 1 (1993): 1–23; William Cronon, Nature’s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los 
Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998); Martin V. Melosi and Joseph A. 
Pratt, Energy Metropolis: An Environmental History of Houston and the Gulf Coast (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 2007); Martin V. Melosi, “Humans, Cities, and Nature: How Do Cities Fit in the Material 
World?,” Journal of Urban History 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 3–21; Christine Meisner Rosen and Joel Arthur Tarr, 
“The Importance of an Urban Perspective in Environmental History,” Journal of Urban History 20, no. 3 (May 
1994): 299–310; Joel Arthur Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective 
(Akron: The University of Akron Press, 2011). 
12 As Paul Sutter has suggested, the so-called “hybrid turn” in environmental history has so far failed to provide a 
model for usefully distinguishing hybrid environments from one another or describing how they distribute agency 
unequally among humans and nonhumans.⁠ Paul Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental 
History,” Journal of American History (June 2013), 97; For examples notable examples of this “hybrid turn” see 
Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: 
Toward Reinventing Nature (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995); Brett Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of 
Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010); Martin V. Melosi, “Humans, Cities, 
and Nature: How Do Cities Fit in the Material World?,” Journal of Urban History 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 3–21; 
Matthew Gandy, Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). 
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are acknowledge to be hybrid what methods exist for distinguishing between them or accounting 
for their distinct historical trajectories—indeed for delimiting what counts as an “environment” 
at all.13 In the meantime, environmental history’s methods have themselves been hybridized—
joined together with the history of technology in the study of “envirotechnical systems,” fused 
with approaches to the production of space and capital accumulation born of political ecology, 
and reoriented toward the galvanizing, interdisciplinary, and at times all-encompassing concept 
of the Anthropocene.14  
These are welcome shifts that helped to form much of the conceptual backdrop of this 
dissertation. I have chosen, however, to take a somewhat different tack. Rather than beginning 
with a complex ecology or a hybrid environment, I started by following specific materials such 
as concrete. Concrete, as noted above, brings the environment inside while also changing the 
environment outside.15 It is a hybrid object that in turn hybridizes everything it touches, 
including institutions and financial practices. The history of crisis technologies in Morocco 
undoubtedly belongs to the Anthropocene, but it is a “bottom-up” vision that reveals how 
sometimes minute political disputes gave rise to distinct forms of hybridity. And the hybrid 
 
13 Paul Sutter provides a lucid exposition of these questions. Sutter, 97. 
14 Sara B. Pritchard, “An Envirotechnical Disaster: Nature, Technology, and Politics at Fukushima,” Environmental 
History 17 (April 2012): 219-43; Erik Swyngedouw, Liquid Power: Water and Contested Modernities in Spain, 
1898-2010 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2015); Matthew Gandy, Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New 
York City (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002); Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the 
Accumulation of Capital (New York: Verso, 2015); Roderick P. Neumann, “Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale,” 
Progress in Human Geography 33, no. 3 (2009): 398–406; Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, Violent 
Environments (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Molly A. Warsh, “A Political Ecology in the Early 
Spanish Caribbean,” The William and Mary Quarterly 71, no. 4 (2014): 517–48; Clive Hamilton, Christophe 
Bonneuil, and François Gemenne, eds., The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis: Rethinking 
Modernity in a New Epoch (London; New York: Routledge, 2015); Julia Adeney Thomas, “History and Biology in 
the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale, Problems of Value: History and Biology in the Anthropocene,” The American 
Historical Review 119, no. 5 (2014): 1587–1607; Will Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical 
Perspectives,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 369, no. 1938 (2011): 842–67, 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2010.0327. 
15 Cf. Latour’s description of the “laboratory.” Bruno Latour, “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” 
in Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, eds. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay 
(London: SAGE, 1983), 141–70. 
 10 
environment that emerged from modernization schemes in Casablanca was also a distinctly 
colonial one.16 Within it, racialized divisions between categories of residents were rendered 
stable features of the local ecology and the built world—shaping their access to resources and 
forms of bodily comfort, their exposure to hazards, and their capacity to engage technologically 
with the surrounding world.                  
By considering the role of construction technologies in the production and maintenance 
of such racialized environments, this dissertation engages with environmental justice, 
environmental histories of empire, and work on envirotechnical systems.17 The result is an urban 
environmental history of colonial construction technologies narrated from the ground up by 
attending to deployments and debates about matter and crisis.  
 
16 Environmental histories of colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East have analyzed colonial imaginaries 
and how these interacted with material ecologies. In relation to this literature, I argue that crisis technologies—
technologies that were inscribed with both sociotechnical imaginaries and material ecologies—demonstrate how the 
environment and knowledge of the environment are coproduced. See for instance Diana K. Davis and Edmund 
Burke III, eds., Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2011); Diana K. Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion 
in North Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Adam Guerin, “Disaster Ecologies: Land, Peoples and the 
Colonial Modern in the Gharb, Morocco, 1911-1936,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 59, 
no. 3 (2016): 333–65; Alan Mikhail, ed., Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North 
Africa (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013); Alan Mikhail, “Unleashing the Beast: Animals, Energy, 
and the Economy of Labor in Ottoman Egypt,” The American Historical Review 118, no. 2 (2013): 317–48; Spencer 
D. Segalla, Empire and Catastrophe: Decolonization and Environmental Disaster in North Africa and 
Mediterranean France since 1954 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020). 
17 Lyn Schumaker, “Slimes and Death-Dealing Dambos: Water, Industry and the Garden City on Zambia’s 
Copperbelt,” Journal of Southern African Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 823–40.; Nancy Joy Jacobs, Environment, 
Power, and Injustice: A South African History (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012); 
Allen F. Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa 
and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965-2007 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013); Warwick Anderson, The 
Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health, and Racial Destiny in Australia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); 
Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001); Richard Harry Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 
“Improvement” of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Tom Griffiths and Libby Robin, eds., 
Ecology and Empire: Environmental History of Settler Societies (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 
1997); Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of 
Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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Colonial Urban Histories 
Framing this account as an urban environmental history represents a departure in form 
and method from previous work on colonial urbanism. I draw extensively from the deep and 
empirically rich scholarship on Morocco’s urban history produced by architectural historians, 
sociologists, scholars of colonialism, and others. These groups have long approached 
Protectorate urbanism through a series of dualities: Moroccan madīna and European ville 
nouvelle; the symbolic reinforcement of traditional authority and the expansion of new 
techniques of statecraft; cultural preservation and the fetishisization of difference on the one 
hand, modernist transformation and capitalist appropriation on the other.18 These dualities 
worked not in opposition but alongside one other, remaking urban forms and forms of life across 
the country. During the first three decades of the Protectorate, the early industrialization of cities 
such as Casablanca, the steady inflow of rural migrants fleeing famine and displacement, the 
outbreak of epidemics and hygienic interventions fundamentally transformed urban life. At the 
same time, the “colonial city” became an object of analysis and practice—a figure designating a 
distinct kind of social and spatial reality—for planners, engineers, and officials as well as artists, 
labor organizers, and residents.     
Casablanca, the largest city and economic capital of the Protectorate, became the 
emblematic site of these urban transformations in spite of its exceptional status among Moroccan 
cities. Numerous architectural and urban histories have charted the city’s unique trajectory 
 
18 For only a few examples of how these dualities are put to work in older and more recent scholarship see Daniel 
Rivet, Lyautey et l’institution du Protectorat Français Au Maroc, 1912-1925, 3 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998); 
Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991); Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1989); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); 
Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds., In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in 
Morocco (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca: 
Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2002). 
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including the creation of its relatively large European colony, its rapid industrial development, 
and its role as a central hub of investment and accumulation.19 In older accounts of colonial 
urbanism, two parallel processes molded the city into a testing ground for urban forms and 
legislation in the French Empire as a whole. First, Resident General Hubert Lyautey and Henri 
Prost, his chief urbanist from 1913 to 1923, established a system of formal segregation between 
the European ville nouvelle and the Moroccan madīna accompanied by a series of architectural 
directives that prohibited major modifications to homes and historic buildings in the latter. After 
less than a decade, the European city had enveloped Casablanca’s relatively small and now 
overpopulated madīna.20 Unable to find housing in the old city, migrants from the Moroccan 
countryside settled in the qaryan, slums on the outskirts, often near the small but rapidly 
expanding industrial zone.21 The second process was the transformation of the land tenure 
system in Morocco and the gradual dispossession of many local residents.22 The French regarded 
lands legally belonging to the Sultan and property administered by the Ministry of Religious 
Endowments (ḥubūs or awqāf) as public land that could be leased and later auctioned off to 
members of the settler community. Income generated from the rental and sale of such 
properties—where Moroccan residents had previously exercised rights of occupancy—would go 
to finance public works projects that disproportionately serviced the European city.23  
Michel Écochard’s tenure as the Protectorate’s chief urbanist from 1946 to 1952 often 
 
19 For one early example see André Adam, Casablanca: Essai sur la transformation de la société marocaine au 
contact de l’Occident (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1972). 
20 Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism, 52-52. 
21 The term qaryan in Moroccan Daija, which refers to slums or bidonvilles in French, most likely comes from the 
name of one of Casablanca’s first informal settlements that formed in the Carrières centrales during the 1920s. 
Carrières centrales likely took their name from the nearby power station. Susan Slyomovics, The Performance of 
Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 105. 
22 For a discussion of capitalist dispossession and disaster in the Gharb see Adam Guerin, “Disaster Ecologies: 
Land, Peoples and the Colonial Modern in the Gharb, Morocco, 1911-1936,” Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 59, no. 3 (2016): 333–65. 
23 Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco, 160-166. 
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serves as a point of rupture in this narrative. Against Prost’s dualistic urbanism of neglected old 
cities and radial villes nouvelles, Écochard promoted a transition to linear planning and an 
ideology of “housing for the greatest possible number.”24 At the same time, Écochard’s postwar 
urban interventions—inspired by the principles of Le Corbusier’s Athens Charter and the 
International Congresses of Modern Architecture (CIAM)—constituted a paradigmatic “failure” 
of modernist planning, grossly underestimating the future housing requirements of cities such as 
Casablanca and “[reinforcing] the spatial separation of Europeans, [Muslim] Moroccans, and 
Jews.”25 Ongoing housing shortages in Casablanca—a major focal point of the first two 
chapters—also pushed many lower-status European workers—often Spanish or Italian—to seek 
lodging in the city’s expanding slums alongside migrants from the Moroccan countryside. In 
spite of their “failures,” the urban imaginaries of Prost and Écochard as well as later postcolonial 
officials like M’hamed Douiri and Hassan Zemmouri left behind not only maps, designs, and 
other visual supports for modernist fantasies but also a material archive—a colonial and 
postcolonial built environment inscribed with all the compromises and contradictions of 
modernization schemes.  
Recent scholarship on colonial urbanism in Morocco has shifted from broad strokes 
characterizations of “segregation” or “urban apartheid” to polyvalent accounts that emphasize 
the contradictions of French urban experiments. New approaches have explored the ways that 
different categories of Moroccan city-dwellers drew upon Protectorate strategies and 
institutions—such as municipal councils and public health programs—to articulate their own 
claims.26 Others have demonstrated the necessity of focusing on broader conceptions of 
 
24 Cohen and Eleb, Casablanca, 303-304. 
25 Rabinow, French Modern, 4. 
26 See for example Ellen J. Amster, Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in 
Morocco, 1877-1956 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013), 111-112; For an account of the gendering of 
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territoriality alongside narrowly urban interventions.27 A general turn in much recent work has 
been away from older visions of a bifurcated or segregated colonial city toward a heightened 
appreciation of forms of hybridity, métissage, and cultural exchange.28 Finally, new sites and 
objects have emerged as vantage points for the study of Moroccan urbanism including built 
infrastructures, bodies, spirits, and food.29  
Building upon this work, I want to suggest that the most lasting legacy of colonial 
urbanism lies in the domain of the “technical,” the “material,” and the “environmental.” 
Examining day-to-day disputes over regulation and construction reveals the subtle ways in which 
colonial practices of neglect, segregation, and clientism were literally built into the urban 
environment—less through explicit policies than through the flexible, often informal, application 
of regulatory measures and the calculated delay of infrastructure and housing projects. These 
practices are key to understanding how the modernist fantasy of a manageable, multi-racial urban 
landscape both depended upon and was ultimately undermined by the technological affordances 
 
colonial urban space see Driss Maghraoui, “Gendering Urban Colonial Casablanca,” in Gendering Urban Space in 
the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, eds. Martina Rieker and Kamran Asdar Ali (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan US, 2008), 17–43. For a guide to archives of local perspectives on colonial urbanism see Stacy E. 
Holden, “Constructing an Archival Cityscape: Local Views of Colonial Urbanism in the French Protectorate of 
Morocco,” History in Africa 34 (2007): 121–32. 
27 Hassan Radoine, “French Territoriality and Urbanism: General Lyautey and Architect Prost in Morocco (1912-
1925),” in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa, ed. Fassil Demissie (New York: Routledge, 2012), 11–31; 
Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2016); Abel Albet-Mas et al., “Géographie, aménagement du territoire et colonialisme espagnol au Maroc,” 
Cahiers de géographie du Québec 39, no. 106 (1995): 43–59. 
28 See for example, Diana Wylie, “Moroccan Urbanism: A Case Study in Colonial and Post-Colonial Métissage,” in 
Multicultural Urban Fabric and Types in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, eds. Maurice Cerasi et al., Beiruter 
Texte Und Studien 102 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007), 225–39; Susan Gilson Miller et al., eds., 
The Architecture and Memory of the Minority Quarter in the Muslim Mediterranean City (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Graduate School of Design, 2010). 
29 Stacy E. Holden, The Politics of Food in Modern Morocco (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015); 
Amster, 110-141; Carmen Ascanio-Sanchez, Miguel Suárez Bosa, and Juan Carlos Almeida Pérez, “Tradition and 
Modernity: The Water Sector in Morocco during the French Protectorate (1912–1956),” African Historical Review 
51, no. 1 (2019): 67–86. In a contemporary context, Emilio Spadola considers how different forms of spiritual and 
technological work with jinn mediate relations between social classes in urban Morocco. Emilio Spadola, The Calls 
of Islam: Sufis, Islamists, and Mass Mediation in Urban Morocco (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2014). 
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and the environmental excesses of modernization schemes. This involves questioning the 
supposedly “bipolarized” nature of Moroccan cities under the Protectorate, to consider how the 
material core of urban modernization—concrete construction—was from the very beginning 
entangled with the skills, labor, and lifeworlds of local residents. 
Put another way, tracking construction technologies historically provides a vantage point 
for examining the creation of one particular colonial, racialized environment, where 
segregationist logics were only one facet (and often the least important) in the production of 
urban space. Following Sherene Razack, I take racialization to be a spatial and historical process 
that builds up in material forms.30 Segregation was not synonymous with racialization. During 
the later years of the Protectorate forms of “flexible planning” that aimed to enhance the 
mobilities of racialized bodies through urban space became just as, if not more, instrumental to 
colonial governance.31  
While this dissertation is primarily concerned with colonial and postcolonial urban 
history, it cannot ignore the lasting resonance of precolonial structures, laws, regulations, and 
practices within the projects of planners and the strategies of residents. The first chapter delves 
briefly into Morocco’s urban history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I largely 
sidestep debates over the nature or the existence of an “Islamic Urbanism” or a “Muslim City,” 
 
30 Sherene Razack, “When Place Becomes Race?,” in Race and Racialization: Essential Readings, eds. Tania Das 
Gupta et al. (Toronto: Canadian Scholars, 2018), 113–26. 
31 France’s colonial venture in North Africa was fundamentally predicated on the category of race and the 
production and reproduction of racialized distinctions between colonial subjects, whether these were conceptualized 
in biological, psychological, environmental, cultural, or other terms. Moreover, racializing policies and programs in 
North Africa were also about defining race in the metropolitan context. Richard C. Keller, Colonial Madness: 
Psychiatry in French North Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Abdelmajid Hannoum, Violent 
Modernity: France in Algeria (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University Press, 
2010); Patricia M. E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2014); Richard Standish Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the 
French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Osama Abi-Mershed, Apostles of 
Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2010). 
 16 
however, opting instead to look at how European and Moroccan actors under the Protectorate 
mobilized politically charged understandings of the precolonial past to argue over the legitimacy 
of particular approaches to managing colonial cities.32 The literature that I draw upon to 
characterize urban life prior to 1912 is largely specific to Morocco—as opposed to making wider 
claims about Middle Eastern or Muslim cities in general.33 
One thread running through the first three chapters of this dissertation concerns the 
encounter between French attempts to manage matter in the colonial city and deeply rooted 
Islamic ways of providing and provisioning within urban settings. This involves examining the 
links between the colonial construction economy and the precolonial system of religious 
endowments—waqf, or ḥubs as it is typically known in the Maghrib—which served as a socio-
legal framework for distributing a variety of different services and resources to urban residents. 
Like the question of technology transfer, I consider this encounter not as a mere imposition or 
grafting of the colonial onto the precolonial, but rather as a dynamic and asymmetrical 
interaction over the course of which a set of institutions, practices, and concepts unique to 
 
32 In the Moroccan context, Said Ennahid has described practices of urban regulation in medieval Fez and 
Muhammad Zaliji has provided a legal history of architectural regulation and security in the country. This includes 
an account of the references to construction techniques and materials within the Qur’an and Hadith, Roman law, and 
French legal codes. Said Ennahid, “Access Regulation in Islamic Urbanism: The Case of Medieval Fès,” The 
Journal of North African Studies 7, no. 3 (2002): 119–34. Muhammad Zaliji, Al-ḥaq fī al-ḍimān al-mimārī (Oujda: 
Maṭbaʿa al-jusūr, 2011), 23-28. 
33 That said, scholars such as Besim Hakim—sometimes accused in debates over the “Islamic City” of adopting a 
Neo-orientalist perspective (AlSayyad 37)— have developed what I consider compelling arguments about how law 
comes to be embodied in built forms. Hakim argues that law—in the Tunisian context Maliki jurisprudence 
specifically—constituted a cohesive system of urban regulations. This system developed in relation to both textual 
sources—the Qur’an and Hadith as well as the existing corpus of Maliki fiqh itself—and to fluctuating social norms 
and historical circumstances. Hakim convincingly demonstrates that fiqh—not an isolated textual tradition but a 
form of historically responsive social praxis—defined certain key principles and problems for urbanism. These 
consisted of 1) the nature and placement of public thoroughfares, “2) locational restrictions of uses causing harm, 
such as smoke, offensive odour, and noise; 3) overlooking issues, including visual corridors generated by doors, 
window openings, and heights; 4) walls between neighbors….5) drainage of rain and waste water….” (Hakim 81). 
The question remains, however, how exactly these core urban issues in Maliki fiqh translated into built forms and 
what kinds of conflicts and tensions accompanied this process. Besim S. Hakim, “Law and the City,” in The City in 
the Islamic World, eds. Salma Khadra Jayyusi et al. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 71–92; Nezar AlSayyad, Cities 
and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
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Morocco (though resonant across the Maghrib) emerged. While shifts in the status and function 
of ḥubus property under the Protectorate are not the focus of this dissertation, these changes were 
of central importance to the European and Moroccan actors whom I follow. When colonial 
officials sought to shore up their support among religious leaders by providing cement for 
Qur’anic schools, when Moroccan nationalists invoked notions of piety and corruption in 
discussing the built environment, or when planners created institutional structures for 
transforming Muslim notables into model capitalists, each of these groups engaged notions about 
how an Islamicly grounded precolonial urban order had operated.34 Whether or not these 
conceptions reflected accurate readings of Morocco’s history is of secondary importance. The 
precolonial past—a constantly reanimated point of reference—was a vital part of the colonial 
and postcolonial urban environment.35 
Technology and Culture in Colonial Morocco  
Histories of colonial urbanism in Morocco, as well as histories of the Protectorate more 
generally, have yet to grapple effectively with the concept of technology and its relationship to 
colonial projects. One reason has been a tendency in both colonial sources and in historical work 
on the Protectorate to separate the seemingly technical aspects of the Protectorate’s 
modernization efforts from their cultural and social impacts. For instance, while a scholar such as 
Daniel Rivet considers in detail the importance of port, road, and rail construction to Lyautey’s 
vision for the Protectorate, he does not assign the everyday conflicts and technical minutiae 
 
34 One might ask in the tone and spirit of Shahab Ahmed, “What is Islamic about Moroccan concrete?⁠” Shahab 
Ahmed, What Is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
35 Recent scholarship has emphasized how an ideologically diverse spectrum of actors from colonial officials to 
nationalists mobilized particular periods of Moroccan history in the formulation of their own projects. See Eric 
Calderwood, Colonial Al-Andalus: Spain and the Making of Modern Moroccan Culture (Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2018). 
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involved in the construction of such projects any particular significance.36 Similarly scholars of 
Moroccan intellectual history have situated technology and modernization largely as discursive 
reference points in the works of prominent Muslim intellectuals without considering their 
relationship to the on the ground experiences of living and working with urban technologies.37   
I do not intend to emphasize technology at the expense of culture, politics, or society in 
narrating the history of Morocco’s colonial encounter and its afterlives. Rather, I draw on 
categories from the history of technology to follow objects and practices that ceaselessly traverse 
any supposed boundaries between these domains. I consider sociotechnical arrangements of 
institutions, artifacts, and people as well as the technopolitical projects that aim to reformat these 
arrangements to restrict or extend the agency of particular actors.38 The supposed separation 
between technology and culture was itself the outcome of sustained political work. Specifically, 
colonial experts during the Protectorate deployed this imagined division to justify the colonial 
project itself—casting Europeans as bears of technology, Moroccans as bearers of culture. It is a 
dichotomy that continues to resonate today—demarcating practices, objects, and materials that 
are considered authentically Moroccan from those that originated in colonial projects. Scholarly 
 
36 Daniel Rivet, Lyautey et l’institution du Protectorat français au Maroc, 1912-1925, vol. 3 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1998), 131-135. 
37 In Ahmed Idrissi Alami’s reading of eighteenth and nineteenth century Moroccan travel writers such as 
Muhammad as-Saffar, “technology” largely appears to serve as a marker for “Western modernity,” something 
foreign that Moroccans must chose how and when to appropriate. Ahmed Idrissi Alami, Mutual Othering: Islam, 
Modernity, and the Politics of Cross-Cultural Encounters in precolonial Moroccan and European Travel Writing 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2013), 48. 
38 I use the term sociotechnical arrangements here rather than sociotechnical systems to emphasize the ad hoc and 
continuously renegotiated nature of these forms of organization. Constant technopolitical work is required to 
maintain such arrangements—for instance the colonial construction economy—in place. I find Sheila Jasanoff and 
Sang-Hyun Kim’s discussion of “sociotechnical imaginaries” as “collectively imagined forms of social life and 
social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects,” 
especially useful for framing how visions of proper relations between different kinds of colonial subjects were 
embedded within modernization schemes in Morocco. Sheila Jasanoff, “Introduction” in Dreamscapes of 
Modernity : Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, eds., Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim 
(Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 14. See Hecht’s definition of technopolitics referenced 
earlier. Hecht, The Radiance of France, 56-57. 
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approaches emphasizing the “hybridities” produced by the colonial encounter end up preserving 
this dichotomy to the extent that the concept of hybridity is used to suggest the combination of 
two distinct worlds. I focus instead on a set of materials that were instrumental in the 
composition of a shared world in colonial Morocco—materials that came, after much conflict 
and debate, to form the unquestioned background of urban everyday life.39 
Concrete—though it is not the only technology (or cluster of technologies) that I 
consider—occupies a central place within this dissertation. This is due in part to its ubiquity 
within the colonial archive and its material omnipresence in contemporary Moroccan cities. 
Other construction materials such as brick and steel make occasional appearances within the 
chapters that follow and could arguably have constituted alternative poles for exploring a similar 
set of questions. Aside from its general pervasiveness, concrete also presents a number of unique 
problematics that justify its prominence in this study. The cement used to make concrete was the 
product of a complex industrial process through which colonial labor relations took shape. The 
aggregate and water mixed with cement to make concrete brought questions about the local 
environment into every facet of the construction process. As an object of knowledge for 
engineers, architects, and builders, concrete’s precise properties and ideal uses were subject to 
constant “boundary work” by competing communities of experts.40 Symbolically, concrete’s 
status as the signifier for modernization itself makes it an unavoidable object of analysis. In the 
 
39 For colonial administrators in Morocco, technology—especially construction technology—was also the means of 
mediating between the supposedly distinct domains of “society” and “economy.” I aim to bring together the work of 
Paul Rabinow and Timothy Mitchell on these two concepts. At key moments in this account, “society” and 
“economy” were invented, imagined, and constructed in relation to one another, and often colonial officials 
imagined “the technical” as the bridge between them. Rabinow, 11; Timothy Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy,” 
Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (1998): 82–101. 
40 “Boundary work” in Thomas Gieryn’s usage is “the adjudication of competing truths and rival reality…[that is] 
accomplished in and through provisional settlements of the boundaries of science.” The term “technology” or rather 
“technoscience” can be easily substituted for “science” here. Thomas F Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: 
Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 2. 
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chapters that follow, I demonstrate that concrete—like forms of housing finance and other crisis 
technologies that enter in chapter three—was not a European technology imposed on Morocco at 
the beginning of the Protectorate, but rather a product of different intersecting networks 
including embodied practices, forms of labor organization, regulatory institutions, and ecologies 
in which various groups of Europeans and Moroccans participated, albeit asymmetrically.  
As is hopefully clear, this is not a straightforward history of technology transfer in which 
sociotechnical objects traversed the Mediterranean to be ascribed with new meanings in a 
colonial context.41 Nor is it a history of local knowledges and techniques that remained outside 
of European influence.42 Instead, this dissertation takes concrete—as well as housing finance, 
cement production, and series of others nodes in the country’s construction economy—as sites of 
conflict, negotiation, and creativity where Moroccans and Europeans built a new backdrop for 
urban life. Construction, moreover, encompasses not only the process of building, but also the 
work of demolishing and maintaining.43 Practices of repair and demolition were, like building, 
 
41 I draw a distinction here with histories of empire that frame the relationship between colonialism and technology 
as one of “technology transfer.” While drawing extensively on studies of colonial technology, this project aims to 
show not only how colonial technologies remade local environments or social relations, but also how they were 
remade by them. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 
1850-1940 (Oxford University Press, 1993); Libbie Freed, “Networks of (Colonial) Power: Roads in French Central 
Africa after World War I,” History and Technology 26, no. 3 (2010): 203–223; Jiat-Hwee Chang, A Genealogy of 
Tropical Architecture: Colonial Networks, Nature and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 2016); On Barak, On 
Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Joshua 
Grace, “Heroes of the Road: Race, Gender and the Politics of Mobility in Twentieth-Century Tanzania,” Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute 83, no. 3 (2013): 403–25. 
42 Clapperton Mavhunga’s work has productively engaged with local forms of knowledge and practice to push for a 
wider, more encompassing definition of “technology” as “means of living and being alive” that are integrated into 
social and material life. Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, Transient Workspaces Technologies of Everyday 
Innovation in Zimbabwe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2014), 15; Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, 
The Mobile Workshop: The Tsetse Fly and African Knowledge Production (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2018). 
43 In contrast to recent work in the history of technology on repair and maintenance that emphasizes how these 
practices have been marginalized at the expense of innovation, I show how maintenance and repair were at times 
central to the political priorities of colonial officials. See chapter two of this dissertation especially. For ways of 
analyzing repair and demolition in relation to wider political shifts see Steven J. Jackson, “Rethinking Repair,” in 
Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality and Society, eds. Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo 
Boczkowski, and Kristen Foot (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014); Gastón Gordillo, Rubble: The Afterlife of 
Destruction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Francesca Russello Ammon, Bulldozer: Demolition and 
Clearance of the Postwar Landscape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). Andrew L. Russell and Lee 
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marked by the imperatives of crisis, while also revealing the contradictory projects and programs 
of different sets of actors involved in construction work.  
I will argue that Morocco’s urban crisis—a crisis composed of shifting elements, but 
which always remained a crisis of authority and of agency—was materialized and reproduced 
through particular technologies. The history of urban crisis in Morocco and of crisis technologies 
are co-constitutive with the history of concrete construction. Concrete, moreover, did not just 
remake Morocco, it was remade as Moroccan. Just as concrete became embedded within 
everyday life—into the walls, pipes, and poles that composed the urban fabric of cities like 
Casablanca—it was also inscribed with competing projects (the colonial visions of French 
urbanists and the anticolonial programs of nationalists), knowledges (of French structural 
engineers and Moroccan muʿallimūn), discourses (understandings of modernism as liberatory or 
oppressive), socioenvironmental relations (the organization of cement plant and economies of 
resource extraction), and a range of other oppositions. Moroccan concrete is a difficult object for 
the history of technology because of how it dissolves the division between “users” and 
“designers,” the symbolic and the material, high and low tech, infrastructure and environment. 
This formulation raises another set of questions, however: what exactly is Moroccan 
about Moroccan concrete? For whom is concrete Moroccan? When and under what conditions? 
If cement imported to Casablanca from a Belgian factory in the 1930s, is mixed with local 
aggregate and poured by Andalusian workers under the watchful eye of a Genovese foreman to 
construct an apartment building designed by a French architect and inhabited exclusively by 
Europeans in what sense is this process “Moroccan”? One approach to these questions would be 
to discuss the Protectorate and the first decades of Morocco’s independence in terms of 
 
Vinsel, “After Innovation, Turn to Maintenance,” Technology and Culture 59, no. 1 (May 2018): 1–25. 
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concrete’s gradual becoming Moroccan, as locally produced cement replaced imports, Moroccan 
factory and construction workers as well as engineers and architects replaced Europeans, and 
more and more Moroccan city-dwellers came to reside in structures in which concrete was the 
key structural component. My intention, however, is to assert that from the very beginning of the 
Protectorate concrete was made Moroccan. It was entwined with notions of the precolonial urban 
order, with embodied forms of knowledge and skill possessed by Muslim workers, with the 
aspirations and political projects not only of European designers but also of Moroccans at every 
stage of the construction process from extraction to inhabitation. To be made Moroccan also 
meant that the particularities of Moroccan environments—from the aridity or humidity of the 
local climate to the salt content of Moroccan rivers and the chemical composition of Moroccan 
limestones—were inseparable from the construction process. Colonial engineers in the country 
were well aware—and risked potential disaster if they failed to remember—that Moroccan 
concrete was a fundamentally different material than French concrete. Nor were they ignorant of 
the fact that these differences stemmed in part from the political economy of the colonial 
situation itself. Far from producing a standardized and homogenized urban built environment, 
everywhere they went, colonial materials like concrete produced new contradictions, 
heterotopias, excesses and impasses for experts, officials, and others to reckon with.   
A project attuned to these varied deployments of  materials cannot avoid contending with 
the rise of a particularly problematic category—namely the notion of materiality.44 While 
historians of technology have produced an expansive empirical and theoretical literature on the 
relationships between matter and social order, much new historical and anthropological work on 
materiality bypasses this field entirely, drawing instead on studies of material culture or vitalist 
 
44 For a useful critique of the concept of “materiality” itself see Tim Ingold, “Materials against Materiality,” 
Archaeological Dialogues 14, no. 1 (2007): 1–16. 
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philosophical traditions.45 From a somewhat reductive perspective, there are broadly two 
dominant concepts of materiality circulating in contemporary scholarship: 1) materiality as a set 
of affordances; 2) materiality as excess, as the quality of things that resists. The first definition 
considers materiality as the property of a technology, object, or infrastructure that enables it to 
accomplish particular forms of work—whether cultural, social, political, or “purely” technical.46 
The second takes materiality to be nearly the opposite, the characteristic of matter that disrupts 
its smooth functioning within a wider network, the properties that escape mastery within 
technological systems.47  
While these two notions—which I gloss as materiality as affordance vs. materiality as 
excess—can be distinguished in recent scholarship, they certainly do not constitute the only 
poles for debates over matter.48 Rather than adopting a systematic definition of materiality, I 
 
45 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). The 
tendency of “vitalist” visions of matter to “depoliticize” has been much critiqued of late. See for example, Kyla 
Schuller, The Biopolitics of Feeling, 11; Angela Willey, “A World of Materialisms: Postcolonial Feminist Science 
Studies and the New Natural,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 41, no. 6 (2016): 991–1014. As Chris Otter 
notes, scholarship on the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) has long demonstrated that matter is always 
historical mediated. Chris Otter, “Locating Matter: The Place of Materiality in Urban History,” in Material Powers: 
Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn, ed. Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 44. Tim Ingold has also critiqued the emphasis within studies of material culture on finished 
artifacts as opposed to properties and qualities. Tim Ingold, “Toward an Ecology of Materials,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 41, no. 1 (2012): 427–42. 
46 For an example, that emphasizes “the distinctive kinds of effecivity that material objects and processes exert,” see  
Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce, “Material Powers: Introduction,” in Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History 
and the Material Turn, eds. Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 5. For another 
collection that broadly focuses on questions of effectivity and affordance see Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost, 
eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2010). 
47 Examples emphasizing “excess” include Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 1–22; 
Bennett’s discussion of “thing-power” also tends to focus on the qualities of matter that exceed their position in 
various assemblages. Bennett, xvi-xvii. 
48 Two contemporary versions of “material semiotics” mark another bifurcation in terms of how to approach 
materiality. John Law has articulated an ANT take on the question in the following terms:  “semiotics…tells that 
entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities…actor-network 
theory may be understood as a semiotics of materiality.” John Law and John Hassard, Actor Network Theory and 
After (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), 3-4; This approach, with its emphasis on how material things take shape 
and form in relation to other material things—for example, how any given technology only performs work through 
its relations to a wider socio-technical assemblage—stands in contrast to the materially grounded semiotics of 
Charles Peirce. Unlike the ANT approach, new iterations of Peircean semiotics call attention to how the material 
properties of things are bound up in processes of meaning making. In the example of “redness” discussed by Webb 
Keane, it is the fact that redness is materially embodied within, for instance, an apple, that the quality of redness 
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propose to study how historical actors craft and strategically shift between different notions of 
the material.49 Colonial engineers under the Protectorate for instance constantly alternated 
between differing theories of matter in their treatment of concrete. At times they referred to it as 
an inert object with knowable properties, at others as a vital and unpredictable substance. At 
times engineers cast concrete’s properties as a neutral, purely technical question, at others they 
openly recognized that the very make-up of concrete was culturally and socially mediated. This 
is to say nothing of Moroccan masons, laborers, construction workers, and others who brought 
their own theories of matter to bear on the finished product that was Moroccan concrete. Actors, 
even those most often accused of treating matter as inert, consistently deployed and adapted 
differing theories of materiality to suit changing historical circumstances. Any concept of the 
material that responds to the complex and strategic ways that matter matters needs to encompass 
both dead and vibrant matter, affordance as well as excess. This means attending to the conflicts, 
debates, and contradictions that arise in historically situated attempts to describe what matter is 
and what it does.  
Development, Neoliberalism, Modernization  
The chronological core of this dissertation—the post-WWII period to the beginning of 
the years of lead in the mid-1970s—is a period associated in Morocco with CIAM-influenced 
 
becomes linked to other qualities (shape, weight, smoothness) through a process of “bundling.” In this approach, its 
not simply that material things take on meaning in relation to one another, but that their meanings, associations, and 
qualities take shape in reference to their materialities through such processes of bundling. Webb Keane, “Semiotics 
and the Social Analysis of Material Things,” Language & Communication 23 (2003), 414; Krisztina Fehérváry, 
Politics in Color and Concrete: Socialist Materialities and the Middle Class in Hungary, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2013), 7-12. 
49 Andrew Barry suggests the necessity of considering how “information” about materials is produced in the first 
place, how their properties are bound up with wider controversies. Andrew Barry, Material Politics: Disputes Along 
the Pipeline (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 12. Angela Willey also argues that new materialist scholarship 
needs to systematically account for the forms of power bound up with knowledge claims (specifically those of 
experts) about what matter is and how it performs. Willey, 991. These two insights have strongly guided my 
methodological approach throughout this project. 
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urban planning, technical standardization in engineering, and colonial and postcolonial 
ideologies of developmentalism. This temporal framing calls attention to processes and practices 
that spanned the process of formal decolonization and Morocco’s independence in 1956. 
Continuities between the colonial and the postcolonial period were at once aesthetic, 
institutional, and technopolitical—embodied in projects such as the reconstruction of Derb Jdid 
in Casablanca and the city center of Agadir after the 1960 earthquake. Colonial corporations such 
as the Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine (CIFM) would adopt more palatable 
postcolonial titles such as the Compagnie immobilière et foncière marocaine (CIFM), while 
maintaining the same acronyms. Yet important and sometimes forgotten points of rupture existed 
as well, such as the postcolonial state’s singling out of “home ownership” as a central part of the 
nationalist project. Other significant breaks took place years after formal independence such as 
the gradual “Moroccanization”—the hiring of Moroccans to replace Europeans—of the 
administration and major companies in the country. But bridging the postcolonial divide is only 
one temporal aim of this dissertation. The other involves uncovering new lines of connection 
between this thirty-year period, from approximately 1945 to 1975, and the present.  
In Morocco today neoliberal megaprojects have garnered a great deal of scholarly 
attention both for their rapid and spectacular capacity to transform urban space and their 
supposed novelty vis-à-vis early formers of urban governance.50 Koenraad Bogaert’s recent study 
 
50 Scholars, critical geographers in particular, have explored transformations of space and society in Morocco, 
dubbed “neoliberal,” through a wide range of mediums from cinema to urban planning to resistant forms of 
dwelling. Diana K. Davis, “Neoliberalism, Environmentalism, and Agricultural Restructuring in Morocco,” The 
Geographical Journal 172, no. 2 (2006): 88–105; Koenraad Bogaert, “New State Space Formation in Morocco: The 
Example of the Bouregreg Valley,” Urban Studies 49, no. 2 (February 2012): 255–70; Koenraad Bogaert, “The 
Problem of Slums: Shifting Methods of Neoliberal Urban Government in Morocco,” Development and Change 42, 
no. 3 (2011): 709–31;William E. Kutz, “Financing Demand-Side Urbanism: Lessons from the ‘Spatial Fix’ in 
Tangier, Morocco” (PhD, Clark University, 2013); William Kutz, “Financialization Interrupted,” City 22, no. 4 (July 
2018): 568–83; Mona Atia, “Refusing a ‘City without Slums’: Moroccan Slum Dwellers’ Nonmovements and the 
Art of Presence,” Cities, March 26, 2019. On new infrastructural and logistical techniques for managing global 
flows through Morocco see Janell Rothenberg, “The Social Life of Logistics on the Moroccan Mediterranean Coast” 
(PhD, Los Angeles, UCLA, 2015). On new neoliberal aesthetics in Moroccan cinema see Jamal Bahmad, “From 
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has been one of the most comprehensive.51 Bogaert divides the Moroccan experience of 
neoliberalism into two periods—the “roll-back” phase of the 1980s following the country’s 
acceptance of a structural adjustment package and the cutting of myriad state services and social 
programs, followed by the “roll-out” phase of the 1990s and 2000s which saw the creation of 
initiatives designed to wring new forms of value from the urban social fabric. Among these new 
projects, the 2004 Cities Without Slums program was the most wide-ranging—provoking 
demolition campaigns and the construction of new low-cost housing across the country. Adopted 
in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the program is only the most recent iteration 
in a long history of state officials favoring slum clearance and rehousing as a means of managing 
popular dissatisfaction. While these recent developments fall beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, Morocco’s neoliberal present constitutes a constant point of reference, in part 
because of the ways that its critics have persisted in misreading the developmentalism of the 
mid-twentieth century.  
The Cities Without Slums program and others like it, are not novel neoliberal impositions 
but, in many ways, a return to colonial-era strategies of urban governance. The neoliberal 
consensus that took hold in state ministries and offices beginning in the 1980s was planted in 
fertile soil—layers of institutional, practical, and conceptual sediment left behind by the 
Protectorate. While Bogaert acknowledges that state developmentalism in Morocco was never 
totalizing in practice, he overlooks the links between the policies and projects of the late colonial 
and early postcolonial periods.52 Colonial and postcolonial urban interventions in Morocco were 
 
Casablanca to Casanegra: Neoliberal Globalization and Disaffected Youth in Moroccan Urban Cinema,” Middle 
East Journal of Culture and Communication 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 15–35; Jamal Bahmad, “Mapping Moroccan 
Neoliberalism: Melodrama and Realist Aesthetics in the Films of Hakim Noury,” The Journal of North African 
Studies 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 108–15. 
51 Koenraad Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism: Megaprojects, Slums, and Class Relations in Urban Morocco 
(Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2018). 
52 Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism, 63-69. 
 27 
not the dirigiste fantasies they are often imagined to be. Instead colonial urbanism in Morocco, 
especially during the late 1940s and 1950s bequeathed a set of techniques and conceptions to 
urban officials that laid the groundwork for practices of neoliberalism in the 1980s and in the 
contemporary world. As Stephen Collier suggests, the study of “neoliberalism” cannot only be 
concerned with the general principles of a minor tradition in economic thought but must also 
come to terms with the vast and at times contradictory set of practices and policies 
uncomfortably grouped under its mantle.53 This involves considering how reformers attached 
neoliberal ideas—about privatization, the creation of entrepreneurial subjects, the precise role of 
the state, the nature of debt and ownership—to preexisting infrastructures and institutions. 
Taking the prehistory of neoliberalism seriously requires more than a simple adjustment 
to the periodization of state policy. In the Moroccan context, I argue instead for an approach that 
highlights the technopolitical continuities between colonial modernization, the nationalist, 
developmentalist state, and the neoliberal present.54 It is not only that contemporary 
megaprojects and slum removal efforts in Morocco build upon Protectorate-era urban strategies 
and conceptions, it is that the conflicts and tensions they engender stem in part from the 
afterlives of colonial projects as well as from more recent shifts in the global political economic 
order. In other words, the history of late colonialism needs to be read back into the history of late 
capitalism. None of this is to suggest that the contemporary neoliberal moment in Morocco was 
in any sense a natural or inevitable result of colonial and postcolonial responses to urban crisis. 
Neoliberalism in Morocco could not flourish to the extent it has, however, without grafting onto 
 
53 Stephen J. Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 9-12. 
54 Cf. Collier’s discussion of how certain socialist values, embedded within the infrastructures of mid-sized Soviet 
cities, constituted an obstacle and a determining factor in the programs of market-oriented reformists of the 1990s in 
Russia. Collier, Post-Soviet Social. 
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the practices, structures, and infrastructures of the Protectorate.   
My aim is not to suggest that present-day practices of urban renewal in Morocco are 
somehow neocolonial. The point is not just to trouble the temporal arc neoliberalism’s rise, but 
also to call into question its essential placelessness. When historical accounts approach 
neoliberalism as a set of concepts and practices that originated in departmental offices at the 
University of Chicago or conference rooms of the World Bank and then spread outward, by 
force, to reshape political economies and social contracts in Latin America, postcolonial Africa, 
the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia, they overlook a fundamental question. That is, how the 
architectures and infrastructures left behind by colonial modernization projects already worked—
by design and by accident— to render certain categories of subjects and citizens precarious by 
limiting and channeling their capacity to reshape the urban environment. What was distinct about 
these colonial techniques and conceptions, what made them effective and long lasting, was how 
they allowed elites, officials, and experts to manage conflict within the urban order 
by reallocating technological agency among different groups of actors. These reallocations, 
moreover, were not about restricting the abilities of most Moroccan residents to shape their 
worlds through technology in any simplistic fashion. Instead the “crisis technologies” that I 
discuss in this dissertation were about regulating how and under what conditions local forms of 
skill and labor could be brought into the project of “modernization.” 
What exactly did “modernization” entail in the postwar period? To answer this question, I 
have sought to bring an STS attunement to expertise and materiality to bear on discussions of 
colonial political economy and its divisions between intellectual and manual labor. In early 
twentieth-century Morocco, the muʿallim—a skilled Moroccan craftsman—was the figure against 
whom French architects, engineers, and others positioned their own interventions into the urban 
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environment. For French commentators, muʿallimūn signified the prior unity of manual and 
intellectual labor. And yet, the aim of colonial officials in Morocco was not to render muʿallimūn 
obsolete but rather to capture and redirect their skills toward the “modernization” of the 
construction industry in the Protectorate. “Modernization”—as I will emphasize throughout this 
dissertation—did not correspond to the rationalization, standardization, or homogenization of the 
building process. It was not a flattening of the world to render it more legible.55 Modernization 
was instead the process of cultivating spaces of limited excess, illegibility, heterogeneity, and 
neglect—spaces for containing and appropriating the forms of skill the muʿallim supposedly 
embodied. In the definitions and practices of French experts in Morocco—who commonly 
understood themselves to be working in the tradition of the Protectorate’s first Resident General, 
Hubert Lyautey—”modernization” was always a matter of creating reserves of supposedly non-
modern skill and labor that could be tapped and put to the service of the colonial project.   
Asserting that construction technologies were made Moroccan also inverts a key colonial 
narrative about the country’s presumed entrance into modernity. Namely, French witnesses 
described how peasants, tribal members, and the forms of knowledge they brought with them 
were transformed by an encounter with capitalist modernization in the city (Casablanca is 
typically the model in such accounts). Observers imagined that the homogenizing and 
disenchanting features of this capitalist modernization rewrote the material and symbolic worlds 
of new city dwellers. Numerous scholars have demonstrated how the urban and social policies 
created under Lyautey were designed to manage this supposed transition.56 There remains a risk, 
 
55 Cf. James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
56 Daniel Rivet, Lyautey et l’institution du Protectorat français au Maroc, 1912-1925, 3 vols. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1998); Paul Rabinow, “Governing Morocco: Modernity and Difference,” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 13, no. 1 (1989): 32–46. 
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however, of imputing far too much efficacy to modernist fantasies. As regards colonial 
capitalism, its genius lay less in submitting all Moroccans to identical forms of work-discipline 
than in giving rise to new forms of extraction that became embedded within Moroccan social 
worlds as well as, of course, in finding ways to exploit the racialized differences of the colonial 
system. Once modernization is understood as a heterogenous set of projects that not only 
tolerated but depended upon Moroccan labor, skills, and environments, rural migrants appear as 
actors with the capacity to shape the direction and outcomes of these projects. 
According to their explicit criteria, most colonial modernization schemes failed, but their 
failures still informed the ways in which postcolonial officials and residents envisioned the good 
life. Full housing, full employment, and home ownership for all—these aims remained central to 
the imaginaries of planners and the demands non-elite Moroccans throughout the first decades of 
independence and beyond. It is arguably only in the most recent phase “roll-out” neoliberalism 
that new “class-projects” have even begun to chip away at underlying arguments behind these 
forms of claims-making.57 It is not in spite of, but because of their failures that modernization 
projects, in their colonial and postcolonial, nationalist incarnations, continue to offer such 
powerful frameworks for the everyday demands and desires of so many people in Morocco. The 
infrastructures and the materialities that these projects left behind—whether they crack, collapse, 
deteriorate, or decay—provide a point of reference, a vehicle, and a pathway for articulating 
notions of the good life. Borrowing a metaphor from the seismologists who studied the Agadir 
earthquake, this project is in essence an attempt to follow the concentric circles of damage and 
desire that ripple out like isoseismal lines from the epicenters of colonial and postcolonial 
failures. 
 
57 Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism, 18-19; 54-58. 
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A central claim of this dissertation is that colonial and postcolonial modernization 
projects were to a large extent designed to fail. Had French experts truly been able to master and 
manage the colonial city they would have confronted a host of new obligations and 
responsibilities for which they were epistemologically and financially unequipped. “French 
modern” may have existed as a kind of regulatory ideal, but colonial officials recognized that it 
was often ill-suited to the daily demands of governance.58 Instead, a dual logic guided colonial 
modernization schemes in Morocco. On the one hand, a boldly articulated vision for the gradual 
improvement of the country through hygienic, infrastructural, and scientific endeavors coupled 
with a paternalistic approach to preserving Moroccan culture—a vision most commonly 
associated with Lyautey’s legacy. On the other, a sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit 
acknowledgment that the fruits of modernity—access to hygienic infrastructures, stable housing, 
regular employment—could not and should not extend to all. There were always kernels of 
austerity in the grand visions of the Protectorate’s architects—a fact sometimes overlooked in 
histories of the period. In many cases, these failures were not the result of misreading local 
environments or social relations or anything recognizable as resistance. Had techno-
modernization schemes gone “according to plan” they would have undermined the foundational 
asymmetries of the colonial system. This point will be obvious to scholars of colonialism—
though perhaps less so to historians of science and technology working in Euro-American 
contexts. A difficult question remains, however. How did colonial “modernization” for all its 
apparent contradictions, failures, and much critiqued inequities continue to constitute such a 
powerful, indeed nearly inescapable framework not only for postcolonial officials but also for 
postcolonial publics? This question leads to other lines of inquiry, about the stakes, nature, and 
 
58 Rabinow, French Modern. 
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sources of decolonization.     
Sources and Methods of Decolonization  
There is longstanding debate in the historiography of colonial North Africa about how to 
use the mostly French language sources of the colonial archive, broadly defined. Studies of 
colonial anthropology, for instance, have examined the entanglement of ethnographic knowledge 
and state power in French writings about North Africans—accounts that revealed the aims and 
anxieties of colonial governance.59 Part of the issue stems from how language itself—whether 
French, Arabic, or Tamazight—became an intensely charged form of symbolic capital during the 
creation of what Jonathan Wyrtzen, adopting Bourdieu’s terminology, refers to as the “colonial 
political field”—a set of commonly held rules and positions where “notions about and 
relationships among politics and identity formation were fundamentally transformed.”60 Just as 
the “colonial political field” rendered linguistic identity a central pole for political praxis in 
Morocco, scholarship on the Protectorate has also tended to equate a source’s language of 
expression with its proximity or distance to the exercise of colonial power. 
The “problem” with reading certain types of French language sources produced about 
Morocco during the Protectorate—whether these are read against or along the archival grain—is 
often presented in terms of misrecognition.61 I take as a given that documents produced within 
the Protectorate’s local and centralized bureaucracies misrepresent fundamental aspects of the 
 
59 Edmund Burke III, The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2014); For a comparative example from the Spanish Protectorate see Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste 
and José Luis Villanova, “The Interventores of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco,” Cahiers d’études africaines 
211, no. 3 (2013): 595–624; On the Algerian case see George R. Trumbull IV, An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, 
Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
60 Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2016), 5. 
61 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form,” in Refiguring the 
Archive (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), 83–102; Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and 
Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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daily lives of Morocco’s local communities. I remain uncomfortable though with any easy 
distinction between “colonial” and “local” sources—in part because of the ways that this division 
mimics the work of French officials in the Protectorate to firmly demarcate their civilizing 
mission from the products of “local culture.” Part of the problem stems from the notion of 
representation itself—more specifically the assumption that colonial documents are ever mere 
representations as opposed to socio-political and material artifacts produced by multiple scales of 
circulation and types of labor. Some critiques of using “colonial sources,” unconsciously import 
liberal notions of a subject that can be either encumbered by or free of biases, assuming the 
individual authorship of documents that are produced in complex institutional settings. Even 
when the origins of colonial representations are problematized, the question remains whether 
“representation” is indeed a productive way of framing the textual traces of the archive.62 
While French officials in Morocco, may have exercised at certain moments a near 
exclusive right to represent urban modernization projects—the labor, skills, and knowledges of 
Moroccans were fundamentally imbricated with all such projects. Approaching colonial 
architecture, for example, as a set of representations crafted by French designers has the 
consequence of rendering the participation of Moroccan workers in the production of this 
architecture illegible—a problem that present-day heritage organizations like the Casamémoire 
Association have been working to rectify for years. At the same time, attempting to trace and 
theorize the presence of Moroccan forms of technological labor within colonial constructions 
forecloses other interpretative possibilities. Once representations are no longer the focus, there is 
no straightforward method available for clearly disentangling what was “local” from what was 
 
62 Stoler’s suggestion that the archive shows “how practices were historically congealed into events and made into 
things” is a helpful corrective here. Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the 
Form,” 83–102. 
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“colonial” in, for instance, a one-story, 8x8m cinder-block home in the Hay Mohammadi 
neighborhood of Casablanca. How can power and exploitation be accounted for in such a 
reading? The same issues extend to textual sources. While “authored” by colonial officials, 
documentary records of modernization projects were inscribed, albeit asymmetrically, with the 
agencies of actors outside of the institutions where these sources were produced. I therefore treat 
archival records as analytically equivalent to concrete constructions in that both constitute 
material traces. To be material means to be the product of a process of circulation that exposed 
these traces to the contradictory projects and programs of different sets of historical actors.63 
A related, but more profound criticism of using colonial sources to write histories of 
places like Morocco is that such a move effectively perpetuates the silencing of other 
epistemological traditions—subjugated knowledges that offer alternative modes of reasoning and 
world making.64 This is a very real danger. But this danger is accentuated by ignoring how actors 
who participated in colonial projects engaged in radically different ways with the forms of skill 
and knowledge they encountered.65 In Morocco, the technological know-how of Moroccans was 
not eradicated but put to work by engineers—subjugated yes, but also woven into the very fabric 
of modernization projects. At times colonial actors undoubtedly “silenced” Moroccans, but at 
others they attempted to amplify and make use of Moroccan perspectives and approaches in 
ways that were at least as troubling, damaging, and essential for the perpetuation of colonial 
 
63 I draw here on Matthew Hull’s discussions of how the material qualities of paper bureaucracy open documents up 
to additional forms of mediation. Matthew Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban 
Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
64 The notion of “subjugated knowledges” as alternative regimes of truth that have been confined, in some cases 
literally, by dominant forms of knowledge was developed by Michel Foucault and expanded by Patricia Hill Collins. 
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage, 1980). 
65 Following Gayatri Spivak, this project maintains that attending to technology and the various actors who stabilize 
it is one way to “undo the often unexamined opposition between colonizer and colonized….” Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 46. 
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projects—perhaps especially after the legal process of decolonization.  
This dissertation will suggest that one of the most lasting foundations of colonial racism 
resides not in a particular vision of Morocco or Moroccans, but rather in a notion of 
French/European/Western technical prowess that has proven impossible to dislodge despite 
anticolonial critiques. This notion remains difficult to disrupt due in part to the ways it was built 
into the urban environment itself. Today technologies designed with contextually specific 
political aims in mind no longer appear “colonial” but have come to form the unquestioned, 
concrete background of the present. The question then is what it would mean to decolonize these 
material traces and by extension to decolonize crisis. In this approach, the “thing” to be 
decolonized is neither a place nor a set of subjectivities, neither the “global south” nor the 
“global north,” but rather a collection of technoscientific practices that have produced a single, 
hybrid and asymmetrical world.66  
One version of this project in recent scholarship has been based on a reinvestment in 
local ways of knowing and non-Western technologies and epistemologies vis-a-vis Eurocentric 
understandings of science and technology.67 While I have found these approaches compelling 
and empirically rich in many cases, I have also been struck by how discussions of “local 
knowledge” tend to reify and to extricate the “local” from supposedly “non-local” practices. As 
with “representation,” the problem here lies with the concept of “knowledge” itself, when it is 
 
66 In reflecting on decolonization in Morocco, I am indebted to early theorists of decolonization, to the originators of 
postcolonial theory, and to the growing field of postcolonial science studies. Fanon Frantz, The Wretched of the 
Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sandra G Harding, 
Sciences from below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Kim 
Fortun, “From Latour to Late Industrialism,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4, no. 1 (June 23, 2014): 309–
29; Warwick Anderson, “Postcolonial Technoscience,” Social Studies of Science 32, no. 4 (2002): 643–58; Ruha 
Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code, (Medford, Mass.: Polity, 2019). 
67 See in particular contributions to Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, ed., What Do Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Mean from Africa? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2017). 
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treated as a kind of resource or pre-existing body of work that can be put to use, rather than an 
ongoing process of coordinating actions and beliefs.68 This concept of knowledge as resource 
was also central to colonial and postcolonial experts who imagined “local knowledge” as 
something that could be tapped, exploited, and used to legitimate certain strategies of rule. 
Before and after Morocco’s independence, the work of French architects and engineers to 
valorize the “local knowledge” of Moroccan builders paved the way for new forms of extraction 
and new technologies of surveillance all while justifying the systematic neglect of the actual 
demands and desires of communities for greater access to basic infrastructures. In such a context, 
decolonization cannot mean a simple return to an always necessarily reductive understanding of 
the “local.”  
Though I consider in chapters three, four, and five what “decolonization” meant to 
different groups of actors in Morocco, historical definitions of decolonization that restrict it to 
moment in time or a single domain are not the primary focus here. Decolonization in this project 
is neither an actor nor an analytic category but rather a horizon of possibility. Not a return, but 
the potential for the creation of something new—a “paradigm shift” that could displace even 
most fine-grained technologies of urban construction.69 There are moments in this dissertation 
where Moroccans sketched the contours of this sort of shift—Casablanca’s urban insurgents who 
armed themselves with cinder blocks in acts of anticolonial protest or the leftist critics of 
Agadir’s reconstruction who saw in concrete a collusion between neocolonialism and the 
postcolonial politics of return. Even today—as the space for interventions that question the 
benefits of techno-modernization in Morocco has narrowed—popular protest movements 
 
68 Peter Galison, “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief (1998 abridgment)” in The Science Studies Reader, 
ed. Mario Biagioli, 137-160 (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
69 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 66. 
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manage at times to sidestep nationalist frameworks centered around identity in order to demand 
access to basic infrastructures and call for a redistribution of resources at a systemic level. 
More practically, the sources for this project come from approximately eighteen months 
of archival and oral research conducted in France and Morocco. I relied to a large extent on state 
records in French and to a lesser extent in Arabic from the colonial and postcolonial period. I 
collected these materials primarily at the French Diplomatic Archives in Nantes and the National 
Archives in Rabat. I also consulted records at the French National Library, the Moroccan 
National Library, the Scientific Institute in Rabat, the Library of the Moroccan Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Politics, the Archives of Twentieth-Century Architecture in Paris, the Service 
Historique de la Défense in Vincennes, the Library of the Casamémoire Association, materials 
complied by the Forum Izorane N'Agadir, and the Library of the King Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud 
Foundation for Islamic Studies and Social Sciences in Casablanca. I gathered a great deal of 
published material including newspapers and technical journals from the founding of the 
Protectorate to the mid-1970s. I also conducted interviews and oral histories with long-term 
residents of Casablanca and Agadir, former Moroccan officials, architects, and former cement 
plant workers.   
Structure of the Dissertation 
Following a brief discussion of precolonial Moroccan urbanism, chapter one considers 
how crisis and concrete—a concept and a construction technology—became intertwined during 
the first decades of the French Protectorate. I argue that “crisis” was in this early period a way 
for communities of urban experts to ward off challenges to their authority from other segments of 
colonial society and that concrete served as a means of stabilizing a set of sociotechnical 
relations between different categories of city-dwellers, workers, technicians, and officials. Yet 
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concrete—a complex technopolitical object inscribed not only with the designs of colonial 
engineers but also with the labor and skills of Moroccan workers and the uncertainties of 
Moroccan environments—also introduced forms of instability into the early Protectorate’s urban 
modernization projects. This chapter also examines how Moroccan residents, primarily of middle 
class and elite backgrounds, contested colonial policies for distributing resources in 
Casablanca—organizing in ways that challenged French approaches to managing the city 
through crisis. These contestations revolved around the management and maintenance of 
mosques and rental practices on land held as part of religious endowments or ḥubus. They drew 
implicitly on precolonial norms for distributing urban resources—articulating an ethics of piety 
and repair as well as nascent nationalist arguments to level criticism against the colonial state.     
Chapter two is concerned with anti-colonial unrest, debates about housing and built 
infrastructure, and systems for rationing scarce materials in Casablanca during the 1940s and 
1950s. Focusing on one particular construction material, I argue that the distribution of cement 
within institutions, infrastructures, and housing projects embedded practices of neglect and 
clientism into Casablanca’s urban environment. At the same time, cement’s presence within 
black markets, informal housing, and urban protests transgressed the boundaries that Protectorate 
officials attempted to erect—disrupting colonial policies and categories. Following the flow of 
cement from concrete pipes and collapsed homes into the cinder blocks thrown by protesters 
during the 1952 uprising in Casablanca, this chapter considers how attending to the materials of 
urban construction offers insight into the links between “fast” and “slow” forms of colonial 
violence in the postwar period.  
Overlapping chronologically with the previous chapter, chapter three analyzes new 
construction methods, housing finance strategies, and forms of worksite organization after WWII 
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and into the process of decolonization. New crisis technologies such as prefabrication, state-
backed, low-income mortgages, and housing cooperatives allowed colonial officials to navigate 
the end of French rule by imagining alternative political futures for urban Morocco. I argue that 
these different approaches to managing Morocco’s urban crisis endeavored to create 
entrepreneurial and indebted subjects with new technical and financial dependencies on state 
experts and Muslim urban elites. Crisis technologies that spanned the period of decolonization 
also aimed to harness forms of dwelling, knowledge, and labor that Protectorate planners and 
engineers had previously considered threatening.        
Chapter four draws upon scientific and engineering reports, archival material from 
postcolonial survivors’ organizations, and a series of oral histories carried out with survivors and 
former officials who lived through the city of Agadir’s reconstruction after an earthquake in 
1960.70 This chapter considers how postcolonial planners and engineers adapted crisis 
technologies such as cinder blocks and housing cooperatives to fit the imperatives of disaster 
response. It first examines how international teams of experts fashioned a notion of “seismic 
risk” out of data from seismographs, isoseismal maps, witness accounts, geological studies, and 
direct observations of destruction following the 1960 earthquake. Rewriting Agadir as a 
seismically vulnerable space and connecting the city to other sites through a global 
conceptualization of seismic susceptibility, these experts adjudicated between various 
interpretations of earthquake causality—sometimes separating, sometimes subtly combining the 
human, the natural, and the technological. The earthquake not only enabled unprecedented levels 
of direct administrative oversight but also provided an opportunity for recasting the relationship 
 
70 Chapter four is based in part on an article I published in 2017. Daniel Williford, “Seismic Politics: Risk and 
Reconstruction after the 1960 Earthquake in Agadir, Morocco,” Technology and Culture 58, no. 4 (2017): 982–
1016. 
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between experts—especially foreign ones—and the postcolonial state in Morocco. At the same 
time, the chapter attempts to tease out the lived experience of recovery and rebuilding for 
survivors and others enrolled in the reconstruction effort.   
The fifth and final chapter connects transnational arguments about conservation and 
pollution in the 1970s to a renewed interest among Moroccan architects and engineers in local 
construction methods and materials as “environmentally appropriate” solutions to the problem of 
low-cost housing. Rural renovation campaigns such as the one in the Draa Valley became test 
sites for aligning late colonial crisis technologies with new practices of “sustainable 
development” in a context of expanding state networks of surveillance and security in the run up 
to the “years of lead” under Hassan II. As part of this process, the Centre d’expérimentation, des 
recherches et de formation (CERF) sought to systematize local knowledge about construction in 
Morocco with the aim of remaking both urban and rural landscapes. This chapter’s conclusion 
will reflect on the limits of environmental framings of Morocco’s urban problems. The 
conclusion that follows will consider how the materiality of the built world remains central to 
conflicts over urban knowledge and authority in the present era of neoliberal megaprojects and 
continued slum removal.  
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CHAPTER 1 
CRISIS AND CONCRETE IN THE EARLY PROTECTORATE
 
 
 
Figure 1: CCM Plant, Casablanca, 1916, “Vu du bas du four montrant l’extraction,” in Charles 
Dantin, “Fabrique de ciment et de chaux hydraulique à Casablanca (Maroc),” Le génie civil 8 
(April 29, 1916): 1–16. 
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Figure 2: Derb Ben Djedia, Casablanca, 1939, "Le problème du recasement: Trois cités indigènes 
seront créés à Casablanca, Elles permettront de loger dans d'excellentes conditions d'hygiène et de 
confort près de quinze mille habitants,"Le petit marocain, February 27, 1939 in E0831, AM. 
 
Two images—scenes of opposing but intimately related laborscapes in colonial 
Casablanca—frame this chapter. The first, from 1916, shows a European and a Moroccan laborer 
standing across from one another at the bottom of the shaft kiln of Casablanca’s only cement 
plant.71 Originally featured in an engineering journal alongside diagrams and schematics, the 
photograph is striking in its raw simplicity. Rather than directly showcasing the plant’s technical 
prowess, the scene was meant to underscore the fact that only a few unskilled laborers were 
necessary at this phase of the production process. The suggestion that European and Moroccan 
workers could be used interchangeably and that industrial cement—the essential ingredient for 
mixing concrete to build modern ports, bridges, and buildings—could be manufactured under 
such relatively low tech conditions was a key argument among colonial engineers for the plant’s 
importance to France’s colonial venture in Morocco. The second photograph appeared in a 
French language newspaper in 1939, at the height of the first large scale demolition campaigns in 
 
71 “Vu du bas du four montrant l’extraction,” in Charles Dantin, “Fabrique de ciment et de chaux hydraulique à 
Casablanca (Maroc),” Le génie civil 8 (April 29, 1916): 1–16. 
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the city’s history.72 In it, residents of Derb Ben Djedia, a settlement of around three thousand six 
hundred in Casablanca, dismantle homes targeted for demolition by the municipality.73 Many of 
the structures taken apart during these campaigns were composed of “light” materials, discarded 
sheet metal or wood. The partially destroyed white wall to the right, however, belongs to a house 
built en dur, from permanent materials. It is ambiguous from a distance whether this wall was 
constructed using concrete or simply stone masonry (this ambiguity is itself significant). 
Concrete is an absent presence in both images.  
During the twenty-year period separating the photographs, Casablanca had grown rapidly, 
from 56,000 residents in 1913 to nearly 300,000 by 1936.74 In the process, the city’s urban 
environment had been transformed as much by the unintended consequences of concrete 
construction as by the ambitious designs of colonial urbanists. This transformation was 
accompanied by an ever-expanding notion of “crisis”—a term that French commentators 
deployed liberally to describe a diverse range of conditions afflicting the colonial city. Officials 
cast interventions like the demolitions in Derb Ben Djedia as responses to crisis—attempts to 
contain public health concerns while assuaging opposition to colonial rule on the part of the 
city’s increasing mobilized Muslim residents. As a concept, “crisis” came during this twenty-year 
period to encompass both the on-the-ground material conditions of urban life and the responses 
of Casablanca’s inhabitants to those conditions.  
Following a brief discussion of precolonial Moroccan urbanism, this chapter considers 
how crisis and concrete—a concept and a construction technology—became intertwined during 
 
72 Demeure, "Le problème du recasement: Trois cités indigènes seront créés à Casablanca, Elles permettront de 
loger dans d'excellentes conditions d'hygiène et de confort près de quinze mille habitants,"Le petit marocain, 
February 27, 1939 in E0831, AM. 
73 Contrôleur Civil, Chef de la Région de Casablanca to Ministre Plénipotentiaire, "Répercussion sur l'état d'esprit 
des indigènes de Casablanca, de l'évacuation des derbs insalubres," August 25, 1938, E0831, AM. 
74 Paul Puschmann, Casablanca: A Demographic Miracle on Moroccan Soil? (Leuven; Den Haag: ACCO, 2011), 
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the first decades of the French Protectorate while generating forms of contestation. I argue that 
“crisis” was in this early period a way for communities of urban experts to ward off challenges to 
their authority from other segments of colonial society and that concrete served as a means of 
stabilizing a set of sociotechnical relations between different categories of city-dwellers, 
workers, technicians, and officials. Yet concrete—a complex technopolitical object inscribed not 
only with the designs of colonial engineers but also with the labor and skills of Moroccan 
workers and the uncertainties of Moroccan environments—also introduced fundamental forms of 
instability into the Protectorate’s urban modernization projects. This chapter also examines how 
Moroccan residents, primarily of middle class and elite backgrounds, contested colonial policies 
for distributing resources in Casablanca—organizing in ways that challenged French approaches 
to managing the city through crisis. These contestations revolved around the management and 
maintenance of mosques and rental practices on land held as part of religious endowments or 
ḥubus. They drew implicitly on precolonial norms for distributing urban resources—articulating 
an ethics of piety and repair—as well as nascent nationalist arguments to level criticism against 
the colonial state.  
Urban and architectural historians have discussed concrete’s role in colonial town 
planning but have focused on its importance as a medium for Casablanca’s Neo-Moroccan 
architecture.75 In contrast, this chapter follows the technical debates, industrial systems, and 
popular conflicts that concrete engendered during and after Hubert Lyautey’s ambitious tenure as 
the first Resident General of Morocco. Lyautey, his chief urbanist Henri Prost, and his director of 
 
75 Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural Ventures (New York: The 
Monacelli Press, 2002); Hassan Radoine, “French Territoriality and Urbanism: General Lyautey and Architect Prost 
in Morocco (1912-1925),” in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa, ed. Fassil Demissie (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 11–31; Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
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Arts Indigènes, Prosper Ricard, were each fascinated with preserving and promoting Moroccan 
architectural and craft production.76 This fascination extended to the “authentic” local materials 
used in “traditional” forms of masonry, tilework, and carpentry. Given the primacy of 
preservation during the early Protectorate, the point of centering concrete construction is not 
simply to assert, as others have, that a dual system of preservation and modernization existed. 
Instead, I suggest that making “modern” concrete structures relied upon making concrete 
Moroccan. This process was the result of engineering practices for containing and redeploying 
the skills Moroccan workers and the indeterminacies of Moroccan environments—forms of 
technological labor and material excess that undermined the dichotomy between modernity and 
tradition.77 
My focus then is not colonial architecture or urban planning as such but rather the politics 
of matter that undergirded both. This politics involved arranging and allocating technological 
labor and agency to different categories of residents within the colonial city. Debates about 
concrete—about what happened to concrete in the process of becoming Moroccan—were by no 
means merely technical. Concrete lay at the center of a vibrant “sociotechnical imaginary” for 
colonial modernization projects—visions of a hygienic colonial city with harmonious relations 
between European and Moroccan workers, experts, and residents.78 This vision, and its failure to 
 
76 For studies of colonial arts education involving Prosper in particular see Hamid Irbouh, Art in the Service of 
Colonialism: French Art Education in Morocco 1912-1956. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); James Mokhiber, “‘Le 
Protectorat dans la peau’: Prosper Ricard and the Native Arts’ in French Colonial Morocco, 1899-1952,” in 
Revisiting the Colonial Past in Morocco, ed. Driss Maghraoui (London: Routledge, 2013), 257–84; Ashley V. 
Miller, “Making Moroccan ‘Heritage’: Art, Identity, and Historical Memory in the Early French Protectorate of 
Morocco (ca. 1912 - 1931)” (Ph.D., Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 2017); Stacy E. Holden, The Politics of 
Food in Modern Morocco (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 102-105. 
77 By engineering practices, I mean work with technologies like cement kilns, regulatory strategies, and rhetorical 
efforts to define and demarcate “crisis.” 
78 Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim define “sociotechnical imaginaries as “collectively held, institutionally 
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social 
life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.” Jasanoff, “Future 
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 46 
materialize, was also inextricably linked to notions of Casablanca’s perpetual urban crisis. Before 
elaborating these arguments, however, it is first necessary to offer a partial view onto the shifting 
nature of precolonial urban society and the ways that the early French Protectorate drew upon 
and transformed already existing strategies of urban governance by elaborating a new politics of 
matter. 
A Brief History of the Early Protectorate 
Precolonial Moroccan cities were not the static, ossified urban centers often imagined by 
French colonial writers. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the emergence and 
development of new urban forms in coastal towns and the interior. Old urban centers like Fez 
and Marrakesh and newer ones such as Essaouira underwent profound levels of social change as 
a result of state-building processes pushed forward by the makhzan, the governing apparatus 
surrounding the Sultan, as well as by European capitalist penetration.79 Most scholars of 
precolonial Morocco have suggested that the social and economic transformation of the country 
was a gradual process, guided as much by internal dynamics as by integration into the world 
economy.80 Urban areas, the focus of much scholarly attention, also remained somewhat 
marginal in a world where rural politics and revenue still predominated. 
Moroccan cities in the nineteenth century were not simply exemplars of an abstract 
model for the “Islamic city.”81 Precolonial urbanism dynamically adapted to changing political 
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situations, migrations, and external pressures. The management of religious and ethnic difference 
through spatial separation was a central feature of cities in most of the Muslim Mediterranean. 
The “minority quarter”—in Morocco typically the mallah, the walled-off Jewish section of the 
city—was one example, but neighborhoods were also divided according to geographic origin and 
sometimes tribal or kin affiliation.82 The darb, or neighborhood, often centered around residents 
belonging to a single saintly lineage or a particular region, was a basic organizing unit for urban 
social life.83 Enslaved black soldiers, ʿAbīd al-Bukhārī, were typically housed in separate areas 
of the city and free blacks sometimes inhabited their own quarters as well.84 The strict 
demarcation of difference in urban space, however, was not an ahistorical principle but rather a 
fluctuating characteristic of Moroccan cities. At times, minority quarters were sites for the 
emergence of hybrid socialities and transgressive behaviors.85 Often Jewish Moroccans, for 
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instance, were not explicitly confined to minority quarters. At other moments, such as reign of 
Mulay Sulayman (1766-1822), Jewish residents in coastal towns were banned from living 
outside of the mallah.86 Rather than reading precolonial Moroccan cities as spaces of either 
hybridity or segregation, it is more accurate to consider these as two poles along a historically 
shifting continuum.87 The fact remains, however, that precolonial Morocco was a polity in which 
various forms of difference and affiliation were expressed through the production of urban space.  
Urban property in precolonial Morocco was divided into three categories, mulk or private 
property, amlāk al-makhzan or land held by the makhzan, and religious endowments known as 
ḥubus (awqaf outside of Maghrib), which by the end of the nineteenth century were indirectly 
administered by the Sultan as well.88 Makhzan property had the dual function of generating 
revenue for Sultan’s administration through rent, and in many cases of providing housing for 
allies, supporters, or representatives. In his study of the partially planned city of Essaouira, 
Daniel Schroeder discusses how even the most successful Jewish merchants in town continued to 
live as tenants on makhzan property in the casbah.89 These official merchants, who in many 
cases possessed the exclusive right to trade with Europeans, were also deeply indebted to the 
Sultan, who extended lines of credit as a means of maintaining tight control over foreign trade. 
For these official Jewish merchants, the tujjār as-Sulṭān, the overlapping roles of debtor, renter, 
and dhimmi embodied a particular form of statecraft. Tenancy and debt—strategies for managing 
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the movement of people and the movement of capital—were the key vehicles for precolonial 
authorities attempting to negotiate Morocco’s relationship to the world economy while dealing 
with the realities of internal instability and continuous challenges to the Sultan’s authority. In a 
much later period, French colonial officials in Morocco would draw on a similar set of strategies 
for provisioning housing while maintaining indebtedness—techniques aimed at containing real 
estate speculation and the threat of anti-colonial protest alike. 
The makhzan’s own growing indebtedness to European powers during the late-nineteenth 
century—aggravated by unsuccessful military conflicts with Spain and costly attempts at 
military reform and centralization—provoked an accelerating series of challenges for the Sultan 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. In early 1907, the French general Hubert Lyautey 
crossed the Algerian border into Morocco to seize the eastern city of Oujda in response to the 
killing of a French doctor, Émile Mauchamp in Marrakesh.90 That summer, a civil war erupted 
between supporters of the current Sultan, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, and his brother, the khalifa of 
Marrakesh, ʿAbd al-Hafiz. At the same time, members of the growing European colony in the 
small port city of Casablanca were attacked by locals in the Chaoui, prompting an invasion of the 
city by a French expeditionary force. While ʿAbd al-Hafiz eventually managed to seize power, he 
was never able to fully reestablish the makhzan’s authority over the revolting tribes of the 
Middle Atlas or mount any tangible challenge to France’s territorial aggression. After an 
agreement in 1911 in which Germany abandoned its opposition to a French occupation, ʿAbd al-
Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez establishing a French Protectorate in Morocco with Lyautey as the 
country’s first Resident General.91  
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The first decade of the Protectorate was indelibly marked by Lyautey’s idiosyncratic 
colonial vision for the gradual reform and partial preservation of local society as well as by the 
continuous resistance of urban and rural Moroccans to French rule. The French military 
occupation of the country was itself a gradual process, punctuated by moments of temporarily 
successful revolt such as ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi’s rebellion in the Rif from 1921 to 1926. 
Lyautey, however, appeared to value modernization over military success. A staunch 
conservative with a profound appreciation for the technological fruits of modernity, he imagined 
benevolent colonial technocrats at the top of clearly defined social hierarchy. His experiences in 
Indochina, Madagascar, and Algeria had led Lyautey to formulate a critical stance toward 
France’s previous colonial ventures. In Morocco, he crafted a state structure aimed at propping 
up the symbolic authority of the old order, protecting local society from the unchecked 
rapaciousness of settlers and colonial capitalists, and governing through the expansion of 
infrastructures in rural areas. 
Colonial urbanism in Morocco—while shaped by intellectual debates and technical 
developments in the metropole—was also very much the product of an asymmetrical encounter 
with the pre-existing built forms and histories of Islamic urbanism in the Mediterranean.92 
Lyautey’s vision for colonial urbanism in Morocco has been the focus of in-depth scholarly 
attention. Daniel Rivet has suggested that at its most basic level, the Resident General’s program 
was centered around three poles: 1) the strict separation of European and indigenous cities, 2) the 
protection and restoration of the Moroccan madīna, and 3) the encouragement of technical and 
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aesthetic experimentation in the ville nouvelle.93 The architect and urbanist charged with 
executing this vision, Henri Prost, had a profound impact on most of Morocco’s major cities, 
especially Casablanca and Rabat with their relatively large European populations.94 One of 
Prost’s most lasting legacies was the creation of a legal framework for urban planning—
embodied in the 1914 dahir, which administratively separated new cities from indigenous cities 
and established a basis for expropriations and a variety of spatial regulations.95 It was Rabat, the 
new administrative capital, that served as Prost’s main “laboratory,” however, not Casablanca 
with its boom and bust cycle of real estate speculation.96  
From the chaotic urban interventions that followed the initial French occupation in 1907 
to Prost’s systematic elaboration of the principles of colonial urbanism at the Congrès 
international d’urbanisme aux colonies in 1931, an urban order coalesced in colonial 
Casablanca.97 Protectorate officials were not simply concerned with managing the bodies of 
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Moroccan residents—as vectors for disease or sources of unrest—but were instead focused on 
regulating the capacity of colonial subjects to reshape the city itself. This order—the product of 
zoning laws, municipal ordinances, labor migrations, and real estate machinations—was less a 
system of spatial segregation, I emphasize, than a form of technological re-allocation.98 I 
interpret the urban experiments of the French Protectorate not as attempts to restrict the 
movement of bodies in space, but as strategies for altering the access of different categories of 
residents to the technologies, forms of skill and knowledge, and materials required to build, 
demolish, and repair. In this urban order, built structures were primarily identified as “Muslim,” 
“Jewish” (israélite), or “European” not only, as some historians have suggested, through 
architectural forms, but also through their material makeup. At its core, the definitions of crisis 
proposed by European experts in the first decades of the Protectorate revolved around questions 
of whose labor could count as technological—who could be trusted to manage and manipulate 
materials in the colonial city.   
Lyauety’s vision of a colonial society led not by politicians—like the settler elite of 
French Algeria—but by technicians brought a host of architects, planners, and engineers to 
Morocco’s Atlantic coast. Engineers in particular constituted a distinct community whose 
members followed similar professional pathways, read the same journals, and often shared the 
experience of military or colonial service. Morocco’s Public Works Administration privileged the 
applications of veterans and also sought out candidates with some abilities in spoken Arabic. 
Engineers employed by the state applied via a competitive exam and once hired where typically 
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deployed across the territory. While some trained in engineering programs, many others simply 
rose through the ranks of the Public Works Administration.  
The later was the case for individuals like Louis Morère who, in addition to his long 
career as a site manager, was also an accomplished painter who composed Orientalist scenes of 
urban and rural life in Morocco. Born in the Haute-Garonne in 1885, Morère began his career in 
military service, first in Tunisia then in Morocco.99 From 1914 to 1925, he worked on a 
succession of public works projects in Mazagan (El Jadida), Azemmour, and eventually 
Marrakesh. Initially a foreman with no formal engineering degree, he oversaw concrete 
formwork and pouring for bridges, canals, and housing.100 His superiors noted, however, that 
through these projects, Morère had acquired enough “theoretical training” to be recommended 
for a promotion to the rank of assistant engineer.101 In Marrakesh, he managed a state-run 
workshop and warehouse and conducted regular visits to track the progress of construction 
projects underway in the High Atlas.102 While on these site visits, Morère painted visions of a 
timeless, static traditional world in both landscapes and portraits of Moroccan figures—a world 
that the colonial public works projects he directed were rapidly transforming. A relatively low-
ranking individual within the administrative hierarchy of the Protectorate, Morère nonetheless 
belonged to the class of technicians at the center of Lyautey’s vision, and the contradictions of 
his dual career as a painter and site manager captured the tension between modernization and 
preservation at the core of Lyautey’s project.      
Morère’s relatively quiet career as a painter and site manager contrasts with the trajectory 
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of Édouard Joyant (1872-1954). Trained as an engineer des Ponts et Chaussées—France’s civil 
engineering corps—Joyant served as the assistant director of public works from 1913 to 1919, 
then as the director from 1928 to 1932.103 Unlike many Protectorate officials at the time, Joyant 
expressed a degree of skepticism about the long-term future of the preservationist project in 
Morocco.104 As Prost’s counterpart in engineering, he produced a series of published works 
laying out a vision for colonial urbanism from a technical perspective.105 At a time when the 
École des Beaux-Arts and the École des Hautes-Études Urbaines in Paris were the only two 
institutions in the French world providing designated training in urban planning, Joyant lamented 
the fact that technical schools in France had yet to introduce planning principles into their 
curricula.106 He composed his Traité d’urbanisme in part to address this gap for colonial 
engineers, officials, and other technicians.107 In some respects, Joyant’s Traité resembled an 
engineering manual, with mathematical formulas provided to calculate, for example, the 
necessary width of a traffic circle as a function of the width of the connected streets or the height 
of the pavement in relation to the amount of circulation on a road.108 In a context where urbanism 
continued to be associated with the artistic visions of idiosyncratic planner-architects, Joyant’s 
manual suggested that by diffusing standardized principles and calculations town planning could 
become the purview of even low-ranking, colonial engineers.   
Compared to their colleagues in engineering, architects held a slightly more prestigious 
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position under the Protectorate, especially during its early years. Lyautey himself expressed 
reservations about handing urban and aesthetic matters over to engineers who were often trained 
through military schools—selecting architects like Prost from the École des Beaux-Arts 
instead.109 There were far fewer architects active in the Protectorate as a whole and they were 
more concentrated in Casablanca and Rabat.110 While some, like Auguste and Gustave Perret, 
only sojourned in Morocco for the duration of a few projects, others, such as Edmond Brion and 
Marius Boyer, worked in the Protectorate long term.111 Many were deeply committed to the 
project of adapting and valorizing local building practices.112 Auguste Cadet, for instance, who 
arrived in Morocco in 1918 and established an office in the new madīna of Casablanca, devoted 
his career to the study and adaptation of Islamic architecture in Morocco. Cadet was responsible 
for some of the most iconic Neo-Moroccan works in the city including (with Brion) the Quartier 
des Habous and the Mahakma du Pacha. Potentially apocryphal present-day accounts of Cadet’s 
life and work practices describe him dressing in Moroccan garments, eating alongside laborers 
on his work sites, speaking fluent Arabic, and eventually marrying a Moroccan woman after 
converting to Islam.113 While seemingly an exceptional case, the carriers of colonial architects 
like Cadet have been subject to far more scholarly attention and contemporary interest than the 
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supposedly more mundane and anonymous work of colonial engineers.114 While both professions 
attempted to present their disciplines as central to France’s colonial project, engineers were 
ultimately more successful at positioning their labor as the technological backbone for the 
everyday work of modernization. They did so in part by attaching their expertise to a particular 
set of objects, “crisis” and “concrete,” through a process that the following two sections will 
explore in more detail.    
Moroccan workers constituted yet another professional category—the one most 
intimately involved in the urban construction process. In journalistic accounts, state reports, and 
many histories of urban Morocco these workers figured as an urban mass—an amorphous but 
often unruly supply of labor. If architects were the most highly individuated actors in the colonial 
construction economy, local laborers were the least. Yet archival materials on various public 
works projects under the Protectorate provide a partial view into the nature of their work. 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Moroccan laborers in Casablanca’s construction industry were 
likely to be recent migrants to the city. Many came from the Chaouia, the region surrounding 
Casablanca, while another large contingent arrived from the Sous and the Marrakesh region. 
Initially rural migrants settled in Casablanca’s increasingly dense madīna, but as the city’s 
population ballooned from 63,000 in 1912 to 120,000 in 1927, many sought informal housing in 
the growing bidonvilles to the east or in the neighborhood of Derb Gallef.115  
Moroccan workers in Casablanca were by no means a homogeneous group. While some 
were recent rural migrants with little experience in the building trades, others belonged to a class 
of well-established professional artisans known as muʿallimūn. The racialized figure of the 
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muʿallim—an artisan who could be educated into a skilled worker—served an intermediary 
function within French visions of culturally sensitive modernization.116 Protectorate officials like 
Prosper Ricard separated artisans from Moroccan workers in general by introducing protective 
measures for guilds, while at the same time “urban hygiene regulations contributed to the erosion 
of the economic viability of Moroccan guilds.”117 Preservationist rhetoric aside, the actual labor 
of muʿallimūn was fundamentally necessary and, at times threatening, to state-sponsored 
building projects.118   
The racialized nature of these professional hierarchies—the firm divide between 
European technicians and Moroccan laborers—was also troubled by the presence of Spanish and 
Italian workers in colonial cities and on colonial construction sites. Drawn to Casablanca’s 
booming construction economy, migrants from southern European were at times a source of 
alarm for the French administration, at others a necessary solution to labor shortages. During a 
meeting of Casablanca’s municipal commission in 1919 at the height of the city’s housing crisis, 
members argued that “procuring shelter for Italian and Spanish workers is a relatively simple 
task, but we must do better for the French by building low-cost housing as soon as possible.”119 
The question of housing for Moroccan workers was not even mentioned in the commission’s 
final report. The municipality’s variable attitudes toward French, southern European, and 
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Moroccan residents—ranging from concern, to disregard, to outright neglect—also paralleled the 
hierarchical organization of Casablanca’s factories and construction sites. Settlers from Italy, 
Spain, Greece, and Corsica tended to occupy positions as skilled workers and intermediaries 
between French managers and Moroccan laborers.120 In some cases, they inhabited separate 
neighborhoods such as the Spanish enclave in Maarif, but many southern European settlers were 
pushed by necessity into closer proximity with Moroccan residents on the outskirts of 
burgeoning bidonvilles. With the rapid uptick in immigration after the end of WWI, these 
working-class southern Europeans found themselves at the center of a new set of concerns shared 
by French high officials and low-level technicians alike—anxieties that came to be grouped 
under the label of “crisis.”  
Defining Crisis 
Gradually over the course of the 1920s, the relations between each of these racialized 
professional categories—engineers, architects, skilled workers, and laborers—as well as their 
imagined role within colonial society as a whole became entangled with an emerging debate 
about the causes and the shifting nature of Casablanca’s urban “crisis.” The “crisis,” to which 
colonial urban experts referred was not quite a “crisis” in Reinhart Koselleck’s sense of “an 
epochal concept pointing to an exceptionally rare, if not unique, transition period.”121 It did bear 
some resemblance to Janet Roitman’s notion of crisis as a kind of “epistemological impasse,” a 
meeting place between “Calculable forms of indeterminacy (risk) versus non-calculable forms of 
indeterminacy (uncertainty),” and thus a space from which to make claims about alternative 
forms of possibility.122 I want to suggest, however, that risk and uncertainty were not opposed in 
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Protectorate-era Morocco. Instead, the language of crisis flourished in a colonial situation where 
the very boundary between risk and uncertainty was constantly being renegotiated. In other 
words, “crisis” enabled colonial planners to extend the domain of calculability in new directions 
while simultaneously preserving zones of non-knowledge.123 And non-knowledge—calculated 
ignorance about the skills and desires of Moroccan workers or the transgressions of European 
speculators and landlords—was not obstacle to but a defining technique of colonial governance. 
In many cases, allusions to “crisis” under the Protectorate were more about staving off action 
than promoting interventions.124  
The term “crisis” began to appear in administrative sources from Casablanca around 1919 
after the end of WWI and the rapid uptick in the number of colons disembarking for Moroccan 
shores.125 Early official references to “crisis” tended to cluster around two poles—housing and 
labor.126 In the 1920s, discussions of crisis among municipal officials in Casablanca revolved 
around the housing shortages provoked by rapid European migration during and after WWI.127 
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European workers living in close proximity to the Industrial Quarter in substandard housing were 
a central source of concern. Many early colonial public health interventions targeted the bodies 
of European workers rather than, or in addition to colonial subjects.128 Municipal officials in 
Casablanca complained of “hovels [taudis] devoid of all hygiene where [European] workers 
lived in a state of formidable promiscuity, not only in terms of their physical and moral health, 
but for public health in general….”129 Echoing a long history of metropolitan anxieties about the 
hygienic habits of the French working class, officials in Casablanca supported low-cost housing 
projects for European workers that were embedded with notions of moral uplift. One project 
proposed in 1921 by the Comptoir Industriel des Bois included plans for three hundred 
“temporary” wooden structures installed over concrete foundations with a large community 
garden at the center of the development.130 The local municipal inspector feared, however, that 
“workers will have neither the means nor the leisure to properly manage gardens…these empty 
spaces, quickly transformed into a dump for materials and heterogeneous objects…will quickly 
turn the future neighborhood into a hotbed of infections and epidemics.”131  
Housing shortages in Casablanca provoked intense real estate speculation along with 
steadily rising rents. In the early 1920s, French architects and urbanists complained of chaotic 
and unregulated constructions in the European quarters.132 Urban officials portrayed European 
settlers as active and dynamic, but also rapacious and potentially disruptive to the aims of 
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colonial governance. Speculators and property owners were a continuous source of concern in 
part because of the political mobilization that their pursuit of profit provoked among less well-off 
European migrants. Casablanca’s police officials closely monitored the activities of a “Renters’ 
League” organized by settlers in the 1920s to protest the government’s urban policies and to 
create their own network for keeping track of the worst abuses by the city’s landlords.133 Such 
organizations challenged the ability and the authority of urban professionals to effectively 
regulate the urban property market. 
Lyautey’s departure in 1925 spurred reevaluations of French urban policies while his 
immediate successors Theodore Steeg (1925-1928) and Lucien Saint (1929-1933) left the 
Protectorate’s basic institutional structure largely unchanged.134 During this period, the 
preservationist paradigms of Prost’s urbanism came under increasing criticism from observers 
who remarked on their total incapacity to deal with the influx of rural migrants. One article in the 
journal Travaux publics reprinted Prost’s 1917 observations on Casablanca’s chaotic urban 
development and his plans to reform it under the heading “examen de conscience.”135 Another 
article in the French press, described the “aesthetic crisis” created on the one hand by Prost’s 
overly rigid plans, on the other by their messy and impractical application.136 
While densities continued to rise in the strictly delimited indigenous old city, European 
speculators planted scattered housing developments across Casablanca’s urban periphery with 
little official oversight. Architects concerned about the frenetic pace of building sought to shore 
up the boundaries of their professional community and to protect its members from criticism and 
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legal action. After two catastrophic collapses of apartment buildings under construction in 
Casablanca in 1921—buildings that received authorizations from municipal officials but whose 
designs were later found to contain structural flaws—one professional journal laid the blame on 
the administration for failing to provide adequate technical surveillance. The journal called on 
the municipality to take “emergency measures” to assure that building authorizations would only 
be given to plans that had been signed and certified by a licensed architect who would oversee 
their execution as well.137 The administration did not fully respond to these calls until 1931, 
when the city issued a municipal ordinance that revised the process for issuing building 
permits.138 This ordinance also established a formal set of procedures for building inspectors to 
follow when verifying the progress of various construction projects. Further formalizing 
inspections and requiring certifications by licensed practitioners were ways of shoring up the 
authority of engineers and architects over a varied yet interrelated series of problems that the 
administration was gradually compiling under the label of “crisis.”  
For instance, Casablanca’s housing shortages and rising rents were cyclically related to 
what Protectorate officials referred to as a labor “problem” and at times a labor “crisis.”139 The 
need to construct new housing for the waves of Europeans arriving in the city after WWI 
produced an elevated demand for skilled and unskilled construction workers. The influx of 
workers from abroad to participate in the construction industry aggravated the already existing 
housing deficit. Simple, temporary welcome centers for new arrivals along the rue d’Anfa and 
the rue Larache were quickly transformed into multi-family housing with “scandalous hygienic 
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conditions.”140 Casablanca’s expanding industrial zone also lacked laborers. In a speech from 
July of 1929, Saint, described measures already taken to secure both skilled and unskilled labor 
for Casablanca’s factories and on Morocco’s extensive work sites. These included prohibiting 
Moroccan workers from leaving the country and cracking down on “clandestine departures,” as 
well as creating services for luring European workers to the Protectorate and housing them upon 
arrival.141 The Residency also crafted policies to support the mechanization of the building 
industry—such as removing tariffs on machine importations—to help deal with labor 
shortages.142  
By the mid-1930s, however, official concern over the scarcity of jobs supplanted 
anxieties about the scarcity of labor.143 The effects of the global depression were not felt in 
Morocco until 1931, but they gradually slowed urban construction and the pace of European 
migration to the Protectorate.144 As with housing, French officials initially defined the “crisis” as 
one of European unemployment exclusively. Throughout the 1930s, road building served as 
cheap means for providing out-of-work settlers with temporary jobs. In 1936, the government in 
Rabat announced a large-scale program of road construction, hydraulic works, and slum 
improvement designed to relieve the pressures of unemployment.145 Infrastructure building in 
rural areas—a means of gradually extending the French military’s presence into unoccupied 
zones of Morocco —constituted a sort of safety value for providing European settlers with 
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temporary work.146 Even after the country’s completed “pacification” in 1934, road construction 
in the countryside continued to offer a stop-gap solution for European chômeurs. The French 
army maintained this strategy, for instance during the completion of the road from the Taliouine 
to Ouarzazate in 1937, despite recognizing that the presence of Europeans considerably slowed 
the pace of road construction. Since European workers on the project were paid thirty francs per 
day—far more than the average Moroccan—the army laid off around three hundred local 
laborers to accommodate just fifty Europeans.147 Unemployment programs also focused on 
maintaining and repairing hydraulic infrastructures in rural areas, such as a series of projects near 
Meknes that employed both European and Moroccan workers to repave a local séguia (irrigation 
channel) using concrete.148  
For Moroccan workers, infrastructural projects that prioritized the hiring of settlers 
offered little reprieve. During the 1930s, the development of capitalist agriculture in the 
countryside coupled with droughts and other environmental disasters provoked a series of 
famines that drove increasing numbers of Moroccans to seek work in cities where jobs were 
already scarce.149 Casablanca’s slums expanded rapidly, housing perhaps half the city’s 
Moroccan population by 1934.150 Public health campaigns came for the first time to target not 
just European, but also Moroccan housing in the city. Explicit references to bidonvilles and other 
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forms of precarious dwellings were gradually enfolded within the language of crisis during this 
period. Casablanca’s municipal officials also referred to the “struggle” against noualas, derbs, 
and bidonvilles. The precise form of a nouala was the subject of much debate among urban 
officials, but it was generally considered a sort of hut made from natural materials—a rural form 
imported into the city. Bidonvilles on the other hand were associated with discarded industrial 
debris, sometimes wood and sheet-metal or metal from containers known as bidon. Throughout 
the 1920s such forms of habitation proliferated across Casablanca, cropping up on vacant lots 
and in proximity to construction sites as “temporary” shelter for local laborers. Horrified by this 
situation and hoping to contain fears of contamination from Moroccan bodies after the outbreaks 
of typhus in 1920-21 and 1928-1929, the municipality banned noualas and baraques from the 
interior of the city in 1932. This led to a relocation of residents to what became Casablanca’s 
second largest bidonville, Beni Msik.151  
The emergence of the city’s largest slum, the Carrières centrales was tied less to public 
health than to industrial expansion. The Industrial Zone created to the east of Casablanca 
included a sugar refinery (COSUMAR), a modernized slaughterhouse, the country’s first cement 
plant, a power station (Centrale Thermique Électrique), and a number of other smaller industrial 
installations. Early experiments with worker housing projects (the Société des Chaux et Ciments 
which will be discussed in the following section was the first to construct a cité ouvrière) fell far 
short of supplying adequate shelter for all Moroccan laborers and their families. Around 1922, 
workers and their families began to gather in a large informal settlement surrounding the power 
station, a slum that by the time of its reorganization in 1953 would include almost 57,000 
residents. The Carrières centrales was not only a hygienic threat to French experts. The 
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bidonville would also become the nexus of the country’s labor movement toward the end of the 
1930s in spite of a 1936 dahir that prohibited Moroccan subjects from joining unions.152 
Moroccan industrial workers, and the illicit forms labor organization they engaged in, 
represented a troubling and often unstated manifestation of crisis for colonial officials. The mere 
task of keeping track of Moroccan workers—in documenting workplace accidents, for 
example—proved a difficult task as inspectors struggled even to implement a standardized 
orthographic system for transliterating Arabic names.153 
The notions of crisis deployed by colonial officials also came to encompass new forms of 
urban political unrest. In 1930, widespread popular mobilization following the issuing of the 
Berber Dahir led to the rise of an urban nationalist movement in Morocco.154 Street protests and 
the organizing successes of nationalists caused Protectorate officials to worry about the extent to 
which Muslim elites could exercise authority over the urban masses. When nationalist activists 
published the Plan of Reforms in 1934, they couched calls for the reorganization of the 
Protectorate system in critiques of the county’s “crisis.”155 In the Plan’s opening sections, its 
mostly Fasi authors made clear that the “Moroccan crisis” was not simply a product of the wider 
global economic crisis.156 Morocco’s internal crisis was first and foremost a product of colonial 
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governance and the Protectorate’s racialized policies.157 The plan cited the near total neglect of 
public education for Moroccans, the use of urban legislation to dispossess locals and benefit 
colons, and the attempted attack on the country’s “Arab culture” through measures like the 
Berber dahir as the worst offenses.158 Among the proposed reforms, the committee argued for 
creating Moroccan technical cadres who would occupy positions within the administration and 
for cultivating the technical knowledge of the population at large.159 This meant building a higher 
education system, creating opportunities for future engineers to study in France, and expanding 
vocational training in Moroccan primary schools.160 The plan also put forward a number of 
measures aimed at improving the living and working conditions of Moroccan laborers and 
specialized artisans.161 In spite of its systemic critiques of the colonial system, the document 
signaled how the first generation of Moroccan nationalists had taken up both the language of 
crisis, and, fundamental assumptions about the necessity of a sociotechnical hierarchy between 
workers and experts. At the same time, the plan reveals how the precise contours of “crisis”—its 
origins and solutions—and the composition of the Protectorate’s technical hierarchies—whether 
or not these would include a class of Moroccan technicians—remained open to debate.162 
To counter these nationalist visions of a reformed sociotechnical order, French officials 
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and industrialists sought to rely on the professional relationships and personal connections 
supposedly created between French technicians and local laborers. Supplying housing and (as 
will be discussed in the following chapter) construction materials to Moroccan residents 
represented one measure taken by an anxious administration to win the assent of Muslim 
workers. New Moroccan housing built near the Industrial Quarter in the late 1930s aimed to 
create not just physical structures but also new links between the administration, technicians, and 
locals. One measure adopted by the municipality was to prioritize the hiring of Moroccan 
contractors and laborers for the construction of “indigenous housing.” In protest, the Chambre 
Syndicale des Entrepreneurs Français, the local Chamber of Commerce, issued a report 
celebrating, “the collaboration that French entrepreneurs are and will always be able to bring to 
all France’s endeavors and to French architects in particular, in order to strengthen and develop, 
in a direct and necessary union with the Moroccan working population, French influence in 
Morocco.”163  The report noted the administration’s recent preference for hiring Muslim 
muʿallimūn—skilled workers such as masons or specialists of traditional crafts—as opposed to 
French contractors who simply employed local laborers. According to the report, Muslim renters 
had never objected to the role of French entrepreneurs in constructing their future dwellings and 
were mystified by the replacement of French contractors by muʿallimūn.164 In opposition to the 
administration’s suggestion that the hiring of Muslim craftsmen was a political necessity, the 
French entrepreneurs touted their role as emissaries of and intermediaries between the 
Protectorate and Moroccan workers.  
Casablanca’s spectacular growth during the first two decades of French rule created a 
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situation in which architects, engineers, and other members of a class of technicians— the 
communities at the center of Lyautey’s vision for a culturally sensitive and paternalistic colonial 
technocracy—found their authority within the Protectorate called into question.165 In the face of 
an increasingly large and assertive European settler population in Casablanca, urban 
professionals—executors of Lyautey’s modernizing project—came under fire for collapsed 
structures, public health risks, and growing unrest in the suffocatingly dense old city. Architects, 
engineers, and planners struck back by identifying rampant and rapacious real estate speculation 
as the true culprit in an intensifying urban crisis. In the process, they defined themselves as the 
proper protectors of Morocco’s local population. This emergent language of “crisis” in urban 
Morocco was a way for these urban professionals to ward off challenges to their prestige and 
assert their authority over the project of technical modernization against other branches of the 
Protectorate state, against ambitious European settlers, and eventually against nationalist 
notables as well.   
“Crisis” gave colonial urban experts what Lyautey’s model could not: a way of grouping 
together urban conditions in such a way that only “technological” solutions would suffice. This is 
not to suggest that crisis planning was a means of “depoliticizing” conflicts over resources, 
governance, or urban space by casting them as merely technical problems. Rather, the urban 
experts who wove professional trajectories within and outside of the Protectorate administration 
expressed, for the most part, an awareness of the profoundly political nature of their work in 
Morocco. The varied references to “crisis” that emerge in French technical and administrative 
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sources from the late 1910s onward are better considered as a way of naming a particular politics 
of material distribution. Crisis was assembled as a multifarious object of knowledge by urbanists, 
architects, engineers, financiers, and industrialists and officials who relied on administrative data 
and direct observations to stage forms of urban struggle as arguments for emergency 
management. Rhetorically, arguments about crisis suggested containing and regulating the 
movements of European settlers—portrayed as active and rapacious—while designating local 
communities in Casablanca and elsewhere as fundamentally passive and in need of protection yet 
paradoxically a potential source of violence, contamination, and unrest.  
What gave arguments about crisis their longevity, however, was not such rhetorical acts 
of labeling, but the work of urban experts and others—including European and Moroccan 
laborers and residents of the bidonvilles—to conjoin crisis with a collection of materialities—a 
fully-fledged “sociotechnical imaginary” with concrete at its center.166  
Defining Concrete 
“Concrete is modern,” asserts the architectural historian, Adrian Forty. “This is not just 
to say that now it is here, when before it wasn’t, but that it is one of the agents through which our 
experience of modernity is mediated. Concrete tells us what it means to be modern.”167 In 
colonial Morocco concrete became inextricably intertwined, symbolically and materially, not 
only with grand visions of modernization, but also with the practical and peculiar everyday 
politics of the French Protectorate. In considering how concrete—along with its most socially 
and technologically complex component, cement—came to be the quintessentially “modern” 
material in colonial Casablanca, this section traces not concrete’s inevitable triumph, but the 
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conflicts, compromises, and forms of competition that wove it into the fabric of everyday life 
during the interwar years. Concrete and cement, however, are not singular or homogeneous 
objects, either metaphorically or materially. Nor are they simply “multiple” in the sense proposed 
by philosophers and anthropologists of science and technology—that is to say, enacted in 
ontologically complex and at times contradictory ways by distinct communities of 
practitioners.168 Rather groups of colonial experts and others have debated and divided the 
question of what counts as concrete while simultaneously multiplying its varieties, capacities, 
and affordances. Concrete had to be made multiple to serve as concrete. French engineers, for 
instance, worked diligently to ontologically separate their cement from the substance used by 
their counterparts in the U.S. by tweaking the technical specifications of the manufacturing 
process, adopting different measurements for its chemical composition, pioneering unique testing 
procedures, and seeking out distinct physical properties in the finished product.169 Concrete, the 
quintessentially modern material, and cement, a quintessentially modern industrial product, were 
also made Moroccan as they remade the built environment of Moroccan cities. To be made 
Moroccan meant to be mixed with Moroccan sands and water, manufactured by Moroccan 
laborers, handled by Moroccan masons, deployed in Moroccan construction projects. The 
anxieties that many colonial engineers expressed about this process of becoming Moroccan were 
key to how cement and concrete came to be positioned at the center of various crises for interwar 
urbanism in the country.  
Casablanca’s role as the economic capital of the Protectorate was from the very start 
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entwined with concrete. A series of geological and engineering studies carried out in 1912 on the 
eve of the treaty of Fez identified Casablanca as the ideal site for the country’s first cement plant. 
Its coastal location, proximity to zones of raw material extraction, and large European colony 
made the city an obvious choice.170 One year later, the Société des Chaux, Ciments et Matériaux 
de Construction au Maroc (CCM) was formed and embarked on the task of erecting one of the 
city’s largest factories. The engineer Charles Candlot was charged with installing the factory in 
“les Roches-Noires,” an area of Casablanca itself named for the qualities of its raw materials.171 
Candlot and his collaborator Perpignani had developed an industrial system for cement 
production that had already been tested in other colonial settings such as Algeria and 
Indochina.172 Charles’s father, Édouard Candlot was also an engineer specialized in cement 
manufacturing as well as a major investor and the one time chair of the company’s board of 
directors.  
While German engineering tended to dominate the design of cement plants in 
metropolitan France, in Morocco the manufacture of cement was conceived as a thoroughly 
French process.173 Limestone and clay— extracted from nearby quarries—passed first through 
the crusher (concasseur), and were then dried in one of the factory’s four silos before passing 
through two grinders (broyeurs) powered by Citroën engines. The now finely ground raw powder 
was stored again in a series of silos before being mixed with additional materials, compacted into 
bricks, and finally sent to the plant’s kiln. The central feature of Casablanca’s original cement 
plan, the single, fixed kiln (vertical shaft kiln) signaled a distinct technopolitical choice. Rotary 
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kilns had been displacing fixed kilns in Europe since their invention in the late 19th century. 
Though they burned twice as much carbon as their fixed predecessors, rotary kilns came to be 
seen as cutting edge technology, partially because they heated the material more evenly and 
because they allowed for the near total elimination of laborers from this stage of the production 
process.174 Coal, however, was costly and imported in Morocco at the time, and colonial 
entrepreneurs and administrators were devoted to keeping Moroccan labor cheap. Defending the 
technological choices of Casablanca’s cement plant, one engineer argued that:  
The advantages of the vertical shaft kiln are indisputable, and it is difficult to understand 
the infatuation for the rotating kiln in recent years. This [rotating] kiln is perfectly 
suitable in countries such as the United States where coal is cheap and labor is 
expensive…but we can affirm that in all of the cases where [the plant] is operated using 
the dry method and coal is relatively costly, adopting the vertical shaft kiln allows for 
significant savings vis-a-vis the rotating kiln.175 
It was colonial political economy—legal and institutional measures for keeping Moroccan labor 
cheap such as the prohibition of labor unions for indigenous workers—that rendered the vertical 
kiln an “obvious” technological choice for the country’s first cement plant. In addition to tending 
the kiln, Moroccan workers extracted clinker from the bottom of the shaft, transported it to 
another crusher, then a storage hangar, and eventually bagged the finished product. Meanwhile 
European engineers in the company’s on-site laboratory tested samples to verify the correct 
chemical composition of each batch.176 Technology like the vertical kiln not only produced the 
base material necessary for the creation of a colonial built environment in Casablanca, but also 
tied this built environment to the racialized division of labor at the heart of colonial industrial 
endeavors.  
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The nearby quarries that supplied the factory with raw materials together with the local 
power station that provisioned electricity to the plant’s grinders and crushers imparted a name to 
the surrounding neighborhood, the Carrières centrales. The “Palmier” brand hydraulic cement 
produced at the factory supported much Casablanca’s iconic new architecture including the 
slaughterhouse and the Hôtel Excelsior as well as roads, bridges, and railways constructed across 
the Protectorate.177 The plant’s production schedule was jump-started at the start of WWI due to 
an official ban on cement exports from the metropole, which had filled most of the Protectorate’s 
demand during its early years.178 While the importation of cement began again after the war’s 
end, officials and industrialists in Casablanca planned for the day when the local cement industry 
could supply the entire country. By the beginning of the 1930s, however, it had become clear that 
the Roches Noires plant could not possibly keep up with local demand or compete with 
increasingly cheap cements from Europe.179 The directors of the CCM complained in particular 
about the dumping of English and Belgian products on the Moroccan market.180 With the 
financial involvement of the Pavin de Lafarge group which merged with the CCM in 1930, the 
company set about constructing a new “modern” factory with rotating kilns and a much greater 
productive capacity.181 Competition with cheap foreign cements led Protectorate officials to 
insist again, however, that a major advantage of the local industry was the presence of “a cheap, 
abundant labor force, whose daily work load is not limited to eight hours, and for whom the 
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company is not compelled to provide (retirement, social security, etc…).”182 The local cement 
industry struggled to maintain profitability during this period, and the CCM called for official 
measures that would protect “Moroccan cement” from its European counterpart.183 This included 
requiring state-funded public works projects to use “Moroccan” as opposed to “foreign” cement 
in their execution.184  
Around the time of the new Lafarge plant’s construction, the company commissioned 
Edmond Brion—a frequent collaborator of Cadet’s—to design a housing project for the 
company’s workers, among the first of its kind in Morocco. Completed around 1932, the project 
included 142 dwellings as well as a mosque, collective fountains, and artisanal decorative 
features typical of the Neo-Moroccan style.185 Built to reproduce the atmosphere of a Moroccan 
madīna, the Lafarge project, as well as Brion’s more iconic cité COSUMAR, relied heavily on 
the labor of Moroccan masons and other artisans in their construction.186 A life-long resident of 
Casablanca, Hamid Berghout described growing up in the cité during a later period.187 After 
migrating from Taroudant, his father found work in the plant at a time when a large contingent of 
the factory’s workers came from Tashelhiyt-speaking parts of the Sous. After marrying, 
Berghouth’s father was given authorization to move from the nearby shantytowns into the project 
itself. The simple, single-story dwellings of the cité lacked individual connections to 
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Casablanca’s water and electricity grids, relying instead on a handful of fountains and a 
collective oven located in center of the project. Given the company’s anxieties about the mobility 
of their labor force—the frequent and seemingly spontaneous return of rural migrants in 
Casablanca back to their regions of origin—the project and its concrete structures, like other 
examples of worker housing in 1930s Casablanca, aimed to fix workers in place.  
 
 
Figure 3: Present-day Entrance of the Cité Lafarge, photo by author. 
 
During the first decades of the Protectorate, the consumption of cement was not limited 
to projects explicitly approved by architects, engineers, or Protectorate officials. Moroccan 
artisans, masons, and construction workers represented a distinct category of consumer. Local 
masons in Casablanca employed cement largely in repair and maintenance work as opposed to 
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new construction—presumably because of the prohibitions on building in the madīna during 
Henri Prost’s tenure.188 One cement importer, the Société Nantaise d'Importation au Maroc, 
argued during a moment of wartime rationing for keeping these masons well supplied so that the 
essential everyday maintenance work they carried out could continue.189 These concerns about 
provisioning Moroccan artisans, however, took place in a context where the French army had 
deemed the cement produced by CCM ill-suited for both maritime works and indeed all military 
constructions in reinforced concrete.190 On the whole, the forms of repair and daily maintenance 
work carried out by these Moroccan masons were a marginal portion of Casablanca’s 
construction industry.  
Cement was only one component of Casablanca’s booming construction economy. A 
fledging metallurgical industry, a number of building material importers, and a host of 
engineering firms employed a network of manufacturers, suppliers, builders, and engineers in the 
city. The first reinforced concrete structures in Morocco were likely designed by Hennebique—
the firm founded in 1896 by the engineer and entrepreneur François Hennebique who held the 
patent on the most widespread system for building with béton armé in the French-speaking 
world. Hennebique provided the plans for multiple Casablanca-based projects during the early 
years of the Protectorate. These included the Église du Christ-Roi and a number of industrial 
structures, including the 1926 extension and modernization of the Roches Noires cement plant.191 
Engineers in Casablanca exercised a virtually unquestioned epistemic authority over reinforced 
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concrete construction.192  As a professional class, engineers in both the public and private sector 
were largely recruited from France. For the Protectorate’s Public Works Administration, the 
largest public consumer of cement, French citizenship was a requirement for employment as an 
engineer.193 Technical hierarchies mapped rigidly onto colonial ones with Moroccan skilled 
workers effectively excluded from the category of the technicien. Even when they did provide 
for the limited vocational training, the paltry educational resources devoted the “public 
instruction” of Moroccan residents an Casablanca tended to track students into low-level 
technical positions.194 So entangled was the category of the engineer with notions of Frenchness 
that even decades later in 1948, the Director of Public Works could claim incorrectly that “there 
are no Muslim Moroccan engineers.”195 The Spanish Protectorate in the north presented a stark 
counterexample, where the administration would permit and even encourage Muslim subjects to 
pursue their engineering education in Cairo or Damascus. Some of these Moroccan engineers 
later returned and crossed into the French zone, where they became a source for concern among 
colonial police officials and eked out a living working on informal construction projects.196 
For the mostly French engineering community in Casablanca as well as for others 
involved in the building industry, professional journals provided a space for linking together an 
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imagined network of technicians and others concerned with concrete. Founded in 1921, La 
construction au Maroc was a major venue for debates among French-speaking urban 
professionals about the future of Morocco’s built environment. These ranged from minute 
technical disputes about the performance of different varieties of cement in the country’s coastal 
climate to contests over which modern forms and materials could best capture the essence of 
Islamic architecture. The founder  L.J. Durante saw the journal as an “organ for linking together 
all of the professions scattered across a vast territory, this army of engineers, architects, 
entrepreneurs, and industrialists who have set in motion the powerful organizations destined to 
make Morocco the most beautiful of French possessions.”197 Positioning the project within 
Lyautey’s lineage, Durante concluded the review’s first article with the Resident General’s 
saying that “a work site is worth a battalion.”198 The journal published articles about 
metropolitan and international advances in construction technology, including projects in other 
parts of the French empire. Engineers in Morocco who read the journal participated in their 
wider professional communities by tracking the spectacular progress of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority or commiserating about the difficulties of colonial construction work with colleagues 
in the Congo. While circulating studies conducted in France, the journal also printed articles 
cautioning against the direct application of metropolitan standards in diverse colonial climes.199  
 La construction au Maroc also celebrated the Protectorate itself as a key site of 
experimentation and technology transfer—where new concrete forms could be developed or 
adapted. In 1923, two Casablanca-based engineers, De Ziegler and Soulier reported on the 
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testing of a new kind of “hollow concrete flooring” composed of standardized blocks (Moellons 
Dux, produced by Compagnie Francaise du Nord Marocain) on a reinforced concrete frame.200 
The blocks, used in the building of several schools in Casablanca, were manufactured from a 
blend of cork and cement, which provided better thermal and acoustic insulation than poured 
concrete while requiring far less cement. The authors trumpeted the superiority of these methods 
over poured concrete and envisioned a future industry for producing standardized concrete 
blocks and precast slabs in Morocco en masse to “satisfy all demands.”201  
Professional journals were not only venue for diffusing the argument that a collection of 
construction technologies could serve as a practical solution to a diverse array of urban 
problems. A 1932 article in La vigie marocaine entitled “Moralités d’urbanisme,” typified how 
expert visions of crisis and concrete spread throughout the French language press. The article 
wove a portrait of rampant speculation, overcrowding in the madīna, patios turned into separate 
apartments, frequent collapses, and bodily and moral deterioration in the slums.202 In a context 
where the paper’s audience widely accepted slums as a permanent feature of urban life, new 
construction technologies appeared to offer a means of gradual ethical correction. The author 
clarified, “it is not that modern buildings are necessarily flawless, or that reinforced cement [sic. 
concrete] is always a guardian of virtue. But the clarity and the comfort of a dwelling purifies 
morals like the sun purifies bodies.”203 Drawing upon semiotic qualities of lightness and purity, a 
few architects in the early Protectorate produced work that foregrounded the aesthetic qualities 
of reinforced concrete. Auguste Perret, the French modernist whose career was perhaps the most 
intimately entwined with concrete and its materiality, designed a set of warehouses in Casablanca 
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with his brother Gustave.204 The structures’ thin, low-arching concrete vaults—5cm thick for a 
distance of around 7.5m—were a technical marvel at the time, and the Perret brothers replicated 
this feature for other industrial structures in city.205  
The Perrets’ technically ambitious work with concrete emerged in a context where 
colonial engineers were working to shore up the boundaries of their professional community and 
to distinguish themselves from their colleagues in architecture.206 Emphasizing concrete’s role as 
a construction technology—with properties that could be defined and redefined by adjusting its 
chemical composition—rather than an aesthetic vehicle was one means of laying claim to a 
technopolitical mandate that excluded architects.207 During the first decades of the Protectorate, 
it was architects not engineers who held pride of place in administration’s technical hierarchy. In 
1924, the civil engineer, Jean Raymond, presented a series of arguments in La construction au 
Maroc as to why the work of engineers could be considered “at least as important as that of the 
architect.”208 Raymond lamented that engineers had recently been excluded from urbanism, the 
privileged domain of architects like Prost, but also suggested that engineers were gradually 
entering the field of urban planning.209 In this vision, what distinguished engineers from their 
colleagues in architecture was their infrastructural expertise. Electricity, water, and gas as well as 
bridges, railways, and roads—these networks composed the urban fabric, and according to 
Raymond they fell unquestionably under the purview of the engineering community. This 
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infrastructural expertise rested first and foremost on engineers’ ability to master the material 
properties of concrete at a more fine-grained, precise level than other communities of urban 
professionals. In a context where timber was scarce and valuable cedar largely reserved for 
export to France, concrete filled many of the roles in infrastructure building that would have 
been reserved for wood in metropolitan construction projects.210 
Yet not all members of the engineering community agreed that concrete was necessarily 
the appropriate vehicle for advancing their professional interests. For engineers such as Haller, 
the problems of concrete construction in Morocco stemmed not from the material’s inflexibility 
but from the deficiencies of the Moroccan environment itself.211 In a 1921 article for La 
construction au Maroc, he invites his contemporaries to compare the “marvelous concrete made 
with the clean, crisp, and granny sands of the Marne and the gravels of the Seine…” with the 
“impoverish sands of the Roches-Noires, chalky, fine and full of shells and dirty water.”212 The 
inconsistencies of Moroccan sands translated into weakened structures. Even the water used to 
mix concrete, brackish and full of magnesium, supposedly threatened the reliability of the 
finished product. Powerful coastal winds and hot sharqis from the Sahara dried and damaged 
mortar on work sites. These descriptions of the Moroccan environment as ill-suited to the 
processes of modern construction work blended seamlessly with critiques of Morocco’s 
workforce as poorly skilled.213 In this vision, concrete—a mixture of cement, aggregate, and 
water—was literally imbued with the properties of the local environment and the imagined 
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characteristics of local laborers. Translated differently, the environment—from ambient humidity 
to the chemical composition of limestone extracted by Moroccan workers from quarries in 
Casablanca—was inscribed within the physical form of Moroccan concrete. This process of 
inscription lent an instability to concrete that troubled its smooth deployment within colonial 
modernization projects. However, the fact that concrete could be troublesome also served as a 
justification for the distinct importance of colonial engineers who were trained to manipulate its 
properties.214 
Arguments about the qualities of Moroccan concrete also played out against the backdrop 
of stylistic debates inherited from Lyautey’s tenure as resident general and administrative 
disagreements over which industries and forms of urban development to support. In the context 
of Casablanca’s demographic explosion, advocates of higher densities and increased verticality 
clashed with those who saw the continued adaption of Moroccan forms and methods to French 
construction practices as a way forward. This debate was not framed as matter of “modernity vs. 
tradition,” but rather of two competing visions of modernization—both of which mobilized 
reductive understandings of Islamic architecture and its principles. One key conflict during the 
early 1930s revolved around the possibility of promoting steel-frame architecture in the 
Protectorate. In the analysis of one Casablanca-based engineer, visions of an urban future cast in 
steel—and based on processes originating in the U.S.—would undoubtedly have a role to play in 
European metropolises, but were highly objectionable in Morocco.215 In contrast to the country’s 
embryonic metallurgical factories, “reinforced concrete is, so to speak, a local industry.”216 The 
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author argued that steel, moreover, was incompatible with the Neo-Moroccan style that had been 
developed by architects such as Prost, Cadet, and Brion since the early years of the 
Protectorate.217 Concrete undergirded the political aims of this Neo-Moroccan aesthetic—
described in detail by Gwendolyn Wright—semantically as well as materially.218 The semiotics 
of concrete—its distinguishing qualities as a material—appeared suited to the ethics of 
adaptation and association supported by many colonial officials and experts. The same 
anonymous engineer claimed that “‘standardized’ metals will never allow for the ingenuity, the 
flexibility, and the variety or be able to adapt to every architectural design in the same way as 
concrete, the flexible material par excellence.”219  The term “flexibility” itself (souplesse in 
French) held associations that where at once technical and moral—a physical property of things 
and a quality for describing forms of reasoning that many in the Protectorate saw as a means of 
assuring the stability of French rule in Morocco. 
To challenge concrete, advocates of steel-frame construction conjured a rival semiotics 
for their material of preference. In a piece from the early 1930s entitled “Steel and the Question 
of Skyscrapers,” Lionel Nosmas presented the case for enhanced verticality in Morocco. A career 
colonial administrator, Nosmas was a regular contributor to public works journals in Morocco 
and Algeria. In the article, he offered a history of the advent of steel by Henry Bessemer in the 
mid-19th century, the gradual development of skyscrapers in the United States, and their 
eventual triumph over critics who attacked new vertical constructions on the basis of safety, 
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public health, and aesthetics.220 After describing the “profound and organic beauty” of 
skyscrapers where “ornament and decor have been banished,” Nosmas questioned whether “this 
beauty is not the one sought after by Muslim architecture in its pure and clean sobriety? Is it not 
fitting for the ardent luminosity [of Moroccan architecture] and the wide arteries that scientific 
urbanism has opened and multiplied in our large cities?”221 Other advocates pointed out that the 
turn toward steel did not necessarily lead to fifty story American-style buildings marring 
Casablanca’s skyline.222 Instead, some architects contended that steel-frame constructions could 
be limited to twenty stories and adapted to the Neo-Moroccan aesthetic—citing, for example, 
projects in the Sidi Beylout neighborhood in Casablanca.223 Other architects claimed that 
“Moroccan folklore can easily accommodate the construction of skyscrapers of differing 
heights….constructing vertical islands [while] disseminating low-level structures in the 
periphery and the countryside. This is, moreover, the character of contemporary indigenous 
cities.”224 
Steel, however, was not the only rival to concrete’s rise in Casablanca. The material’s 
place in the framework of Neo-Moroccan structures was also contested by a group of architects 
who—motivated in part by cement’s continued scarcity—began to experiment with buildings 
requiring virtually no industrially produced components. During the 1930s and 1940s, Auguste 
Cadet in particular articulated a bold architectural vision that relied entirely on local construction 
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materials and drew heavily on the methods and skills of Moroccan muʿallimūn. At the center of 
the Habous neighborhood—the new Moroccan residential area built to house residents 
overflowing Casablanca’s original madīna—Cadet designed the Mahakama du Pacha which 
would not be completed until 1953.225 Due to wartime shortages, the courthouse was conceived 
without cement or steel. Instead the structural work was carried out entirely with stone and 
mortar extracted from nearby quarries in Casablanca and the surrounding region.226 Muʿallimūn 
from Fez and Casablanca provided tilework, carpentry, ironwork, and masonry for the project. 
The courthouse design was indicative not only of material scarcity, but also of a sociotechnical 
vision for proper relations between ranks within a colonial technical hierarchy. Cadet described 
the structure as a product of “direct collaboration between managers, artisans, and French and 
Moroccan workers…[realized] in a climate of cooperation and perfect professional harmony.”227 
Unlike other architects of the period, Cadet foregrounded the contributions of Moroccan skilled 
workers while nevertheless claiming the task of conception and design for himself and his 
colleagues. The lack of both concrete and of French engineering expertise in Cadet’s vision was 
also striking in a context of continued professional rivalry between the architects and engineers. 
In spite of such flagship projects and continued scarcity, concrete thoroughly dominated 
Casablanca’s construction economy during and after WWII. If anything, Cadet’s courthouse was 
an outlier by the postwar period as CIAM style modernism was beginning to reshape architecture 
and urban planning in the Protectorate. So hegemonic was concrete by this time that the 
Mahakama’s singularity as a project was defined the very absence of industrial cement in the 
completed structure.  
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Concrete’s success in Casablanca was neither inevitable nor, from the perspective of 
certain communities of residents, desirable. Its place as the premier construction material in the 
Protectorate was not the result of clear technical superiority but rather a complex set of political 
factors. The development of a cement industry in Casablanca supported Lyautey’s notions of rule 
through modernization while the technical specifications of the Roches Noires cement plant—
down to the design of the original shaft kiln—rested upon rendering Moroccan labor cheap and 
unskilled. Despite preferences for concrete among metropolitan construction firms at the time, it 
would be a mistake to read the concrete’s rise in Morocco as a simple a question of technology 
transfer. Some colonial engineers and even the French military complained bitterly about the 
qualitative and quantitative failures of Moroccan concrete—the composite of an unpredictable 
Moroccan environment and a supposedly suspect Moroccan labor force. Some Protectorate 
architects saw in steel a bolder vision for a modern Morocco while others such as Cadet 
suggested that local materials and methods—such as those used in the construction of the 
Mahkama du Pasha—could support both solid structures and forms of sociotechnical 
professional harmony under colonialism. Yet concrete triumphed over these alternative urban 
futures, due in part to how it enabled the management of colonial cities in “crisis.” As the 
preferred “hygienic” material, concrete was intertwined with all of the major public health 
interventions in the city. It facilitated rapid urban expansion and higher elevations, but at the 
same time required close technical surveillance—by engineers especially—if collapses were to 
be avoided. In its very materiality—a concept which encompass not just the properties of an 
object but also the political and financial relations that stabilize it—concrete secured not just 
physical structures but also the role of urban experts as crisis managers. In other words, concrete 
was a technological means of securing the authority of engineers over Casablanca’s built 
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environment—a means of restricting the technological agency of Moroccan builders and 
reigning in the speculative impulses of European settlers. 
 In some ways the early history of concrete under the Protectorate bears a resemblance to 
shifts in the construction economies of the U.S. and Europe during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries where concrete presented a means of deskilling labor, tightening professional 
hierarchies, and weakening the power of unions.228 In Morocco, however, concrete also had a 
distinct role to play in allowing experts to navigate tensions at the heart of the colonial encounter 
between universality and particularity. Engineers understood the local labor force and the local 
environment in racialized terms, and these particularities were embedded within Moroccan 
concrete itself—a construction technology that behaved differently than metropolitan concrete. 
Yet making Moroccan concrete was also a way of transforming Morocco into a colonial 
possession where French engineering expertise, French capital, and French notions of hygiene 
and bodily autonomy could flourish. Concrete made Casablanca a space in which colonial modes 
of extraction, labor organization, and technical hierarchy appeared necessary to keep the city 
itself standing. 
Ḥubus Property and Elite Protest 
The responses of Casablanca’s highly heterogeneous Muslim community to the expert 
alliance of crisis and concrete shifted over time. Periods of scarcity—whether of housing, 
 
228 Andrian Forty has gone to great lengths to explain the global impact of concrete’s rise on politics, labor-relations, 
and cultural production. In the U.S. context, Amy Slaton has shown through fine-grained analysis how reinforced 
concrete construction, far from an inevtiable technological choice, was intertwined with a complex set of political 
projects and cultural agendas. Perhaps the earliest systematic critic of reinforced concrete was the Brazilian 
architect, Sérgio Ferro, whose efforts to integrate Marxist political economy with architectural history led to the 
conclusion that concrete had served as a “weapon” in capitalist efforts to deskill construction work. Adrian Forty, 
Concrete and Culture: A Material History (London: Reaktion Books, 2016); Amy E. Slaton, Reinforced Concrete 
and the Modernization of American Building, 1900-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Sérgio 
Ferro, “Concrete as Weapon” with an Introduction by Silke Kapp, Katie Lloyd Thomas, and João Marcos de 
Almeida Lopes, trans. Alice Fiuza and Silke Kapp, Harvard Design Magazine 46 (2018): i-33. 
 89 
employment, or cement—rendered many Moroccan workers and artisans more directly 
dependent on the colonial municipal government or the various French companies active in the 
city. By the beginning of the 1930s, many Moroccan residents had gained access to cement for 
the construction and maintenance of their homes and businesses, whether through administrative 
channels, the formal market, or the black market. Structures built in Moroccan neighborhoods 
using concrete—but that subverted or eschewed the permitting process entirely—were a source 
of perpetual concern for colonial inspectors. Unlike bidonvilles, neighborhoods such as Derb 
Ghallef, occupied an intermediary position between permanence and impermanence, with homes 
that were durable but often illegally constructed [Chapter 2]. The following chapter examines in 
more detail how Moroccan residents negotiated colonial systems for the distribution of cement 
and other resources that were essential for maintaining and reshaping the built environment. This 
section considers how local Casaouis responded to colonial attempts to manage the city through 
invocations of return, acts of refusal, and alternative visions of materiality that revolved around 
ḥubus property. Like the 1934 Plan de Réformes, the protest movement that developed in Derb 
Ghallef in the spring of 1934 cast France’s presence in Morocco—more specifically French 
management of religious endowments—as itself a sort of crisis, one with material implications.  
Contests over the management of religious endowments (ḥubus) took place during a 
moment of heightened political unrest initiated by popular and elite responses to the Berber 
Dahir in 1930. Over the course of the 1930s, Muslim notables mobilized notions of equitable 
maintenance and proper provisioning to criticize France’s material neglect of Islamic affairs. For 
some Moroccan nationalists, French rule itself constituted a kind of ongoing, permanent crisis, 
and yet few called for the outright dissolution of the Protectorate during this period. Merchants 
and notables who participated in a protest movement against the Habous Administration in 
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Casablanca encountered the same urban conditions as French technicians. Yet, in their appeals to 
the Sultan and the central government, these locals framed scarce housing, high rents, and the 
delay of infrastructural attachment for Muslim neighborhoods as a distinct type of crisis: a matter 
of protecting Islamic practice in Morocco from corruption and decay.  
Following the founding of the Protectorate in 1912, the new French administration had 
begun the process of adapting Morocco’s existing property system to suit the needs of colonial 
governance. As part of this process, the French administration effectively annexed all ḥubus 
property—or awqaf as it is commonly referred to outside of the Maghrib. Prior to the founding 
of the Protectorate, revenues generated through ḥubus property had been devoted to the 
maintenance of mosques and public services such as bath houses (ḥammām). Through a series of 
administrative reforms over the course of the nineteenth century, the makhzan had gradually 
taken over the management of such properties. Under the Protectorate, the Ministry of Religious 
Endowments was responsible for building, maintaining, and repairing the country’s mosques as 
well as leasing properties and generating the revenue to do so. Colonial Casablanca contained a 
great deal of ḥubus property ostensibly managed by a Moroccan official, the Nadir des 
Habous.229  
During the city’s construction boom, the Nadir leased a significant portion of ḥubus land 
to European speculators.230 One such speculator, a wood merchant named Domerc became 
infamous for the structures he built on a ḥubus tract along the road toward Mediouna. The 
substandard nature of this housing as well as the fact that it protruded into a public thoroughfare 
drew the ire of the local French press and eventually the municipality who threatened to evict 
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Domerc.231 Such abuses were enabled by the unique status of the Habous Administration. Until 
the mid-1930s, the city’s zoning restrictions had been only irregularly applied to ḥubus 
property—thus the highly favorable leasing arrangements with the Nadir also enabled speculators 
in some cases to avoid these regulations entirely.232 Casablanca’s local Habous Administration 
also boasted its own architectural service that constructed apartment buildings and rented them 
out for profit.233 The largest project undertaken by the administration was the creation of a new 
indigenous residential district to the south of the city center, which became known as the Habous 
neighborhood. Cadet and Brion were the chief architects of a project originally conceived by 
Albert Laprade in 1917 and largely completed over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. During 
the neighborhood’s construction, Cadet was embroiled in multiple disputes with Casablanca’s 
municipality which declined to provide funding for water, road, and sewer connections for the 
new neighborhood. Even when the Habous Administration took on the cost of infrastructure 
building, Cadet had to negotiate with the municipality for the right to connect the development to 
the city’s water grid.234 At a time when the notion of providing low-cost housing for Muslim 
residents was still alien to many Protectorate officials, Casablanca’s Habous administration was 
already doubly implicated in managing the precarious living conditions of the city’s Moroccan 
population. Both a provider of public services and one of the city’s largest landlords, the 
administration was on the front line of conflicts over the inequitable distribution of resources and 
infrastructural attachments in the colonial city.  
Muslim residents of Casablanca worked to politicize both facets of the Habous 
 
231 Verax, "La hernie Domerc," Presse marocaine, January 6, 1932 [no page number], E0810, AM. 
232 Verax, "La hernie Domerc," Presse marocaine, January 6, 1932 [no page number], E0810, AM. 
233 Service d’architecture des biens habous Casablanca, "Avant projet d'une mains de rapport à construire sur le 
terrain habous Boulevard de la Gare," July, 5, 1918, H63, AM. 
234 Office of Auguste Cadet to Chef du Service du contrôle des habous, June 26, 1923, H0032, AM; Office of 
Auguste Cadet to Chef du Service du contrôle des habous, April 20, 1923, H0032, AM. 
 92 
Administration, its inadequate upkeep and abusive rental practices.235 In the aftermath of the 
popular mobilization that followed the issuing of the Berber Dahir in 1930, nationalists 
insinuated that official disregard for the ḥubus affected the nature of Islamic practice in Morocco 
in general, a critique reinforced by the regular complaints of the faithful about the state of 
publicly managed religious establishments.236 Residents of Casablanca complained about the 
difficulties of obtaining written leases from the administration and about the scarcity of prayer 
mats provided at local mosques.237 Water consumption in particular took on an explicitly 
political character for Protectorate officials, who worried about providing infrastructural 
attachments and assuring that mosques were equipped with adequate water supplies for 
ablutions. Municipal officials in Casablanca produced reports calculating the exact quantities of 
water required for ritual ablutions and surveying the different mechanisms in place for servicing 
the city’s mosques.238 With many local religious establishments still relying on wells and buckets 
at the end of the 1930s, mosque-goers increasingly demanded attachments to water and 
electricity grids—requests that administrators could hardly ignore given growing protest over 
French involvement in Islamic affairs.239 
In the spring of 1934, popular dissatisfaction with the Ministry of Religious Endowments 
dovetailed with the increasing presence of Moroccan nationalists in Casablanca. A movement 
against the local Habous administration—lead primarily by Moroccan notables and merchants 
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who had moved from Fez to Casablanca—sought to channel widespread anger over its rental 
practices and neglect of maintenance and repair work. One leader of the campaign, Ahmad al-
Hajwi who worked as a salesman at the customs house, was a nephew of the reformist scholar 
and Minister of Education, Muhammad al-Hajwi as well as a member of the Jeune Marocain 
movement.240 Another well connected supporter was Saʿid al-Harizi, a British protégé. ʿAbd al-
Majid Bennis and Muhammad bin Ahmad al-ʿAlami were both well-established Fassi merchants, 
although French officials described the rapidly collapsing business of the former.241 Perhaps the 
primary leader of the movement was Muhammad al-ʿAlami (not to be confused with Muhammad 
bin Ahmad al-ʿAlami), a well-known sharif, who was also a jurist, a grain merchant, and a public 
scribe.242 Muhammad al-ʿAlami rented a storefront in a ḥubus building and had himself been 
engaged in multiple disputes with the Nadir. While Muhammad bin Ahmad al-ʿAlami organized 
his fellow merchants at the local qissaria owned by the administration, the sharif al-ʿAlami 
appealed to other Muslim residents in the new madīna to sign a petition demanding the 
construction of much larger mosque in the neighborhood.243 The current mosque reportedly 
could not accommodate even half of the faithful on Fridays.  
Like other nationalist protest movements of the period, these critics of the Habous 
Administration first lodged their complaints in the form of a petition to the Sultan, signed by 
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over a thousand residents.244 Their grievances were two-fold. First, they accused the Nadir—and 
by extension the French—of operating the ḥubus as a commercial venture rather than a religious 
one, with insinuations that he profited personally while allowing the city’s mosques to fall into a 
state of disrepair. Furthermore, the movement cited the plight of residents on ḥubus property who 
were subject to excessive rents. In evaluating these demands, French officials admitted that 
among the six hundred or so buildings administered by the Nadir, twenty seven remained entirely 
empty in spite of the high demand for housing in the city.245 The core grievance, however, was 
the very fact that the French controlled the ḥubus in the first place.246 As the movement 
progressed over the course of the spring of 1934, it gradually took the form of an organized rent 
strike against the administration. Large numbers of merchants and residents leasing ḥubus 
property simply refused to deliver their monthly payments to the Nadir. As a spokesperson for 
the movement, the sharif al-ʿAlami claimed that if rents were not reduced he would personally be 
forced to abandon his lease entirely.247 As tensions mounted over unpaid rent, official fears about 
the further escalation of the conflict led the Nadir to seek the central government’s intervention 
rather than simply evicting the strikers.    
French officials in Casablanca viewed the protest movement and the strike largely as a 
product of nationalist agitation. To dampen further mobilization, the Protectorate’s central 
government introduced a process of adjudication for individual renters who considered their 
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leases excessive where claims would be evaluated on a case by case basis.248 To investigate the 
state of mosques managed by the administration, the French proposed dispatching Muslim agents 
of Casablanca’s governor to inspect local religious establishments and propose necessary 
changes.249 The first measure sought to disrupt the collective nature of the rent strike while the 
second attempted to reduce the maintenance of mosques to a technical question. Both responses 
obfuscated the anti-colonial impetus behind the movement.  
In their critiques, the leaders of the rent strike invoked notions of proper conduct, piety, 
and a return to a precolonial urban social contract. While French observers attempted to 
distinguish the question of fair rental practices from the upkeep of mosques and the overall state 
of Islamic practice in Casablanca, Moroccan nationalists insisted that these concerns were one in 
the same. The demand that local mosques be well maintained and accessible to all believers was 
inseparable from the assertion that housing should be available at a reasonable cost despite the 
fluctuations of the urban property market. The notion that religious endowments could be 
managed for profit rather than as a public good, appeared to protesters as deeply impious—a sign 
that French involvement in Islamic affairs had begun to corrupt religious practice in Morocco in 
general. The presence of a sharif like Muhammad al-ʿAlami at the forefront of the movement 
raised questions of piety and descent—throwing into sharp contrast the illegitimacy of a French 
administration that claimed to preserve and protect Islam in Morocco. At the same time, the Fassi 
origins of the movement’s leaders and their connections to high-ranking Moroccan officials such 
as Muhammad al-Hajwi gave the protest an indisputably elite character. The place of British and 
American protégés among the strike’s members further complicated French attempts to deal with 
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the conflict. These characteristics produced a movement well versed in navigating both the 
French and Moroccan bureaucracies of the Protectorate—of winning small concessions but not 
of fundamentally altering the ways that ḥubus properties were managed and maintained.        
Toward the end of the 1930s and especially during WWII, the question of how mosques 
and other religious institutions were maintained and repaired became entwined with a colonial 
system for controlling the distribution of resources and materials such as industrial cement. This 
system for managing the “flow” of cement will be the subject of the following chapter. The 
significance of the brief rent strike of 1934, however, and the reason I chose to juxtapose it with 
the expert alliance of concrete and crisis concerns the ways that both sets of actors linked matter 
and agency to assert authority over the colonial city. While colonial technicians used vertical 
shaft kilns and neo-Moroccan aesthetics to link together epidemic, scarcity, speculation, and 
unrest through the label of crisis, urban middle- and upper-class Muslims in Casablanca engaged 
in their own practices of conjoining. Acts of petitioning, refusing, and mobilizing the precolonial 
past brought Islamic practice and piety, the maintenance of particular, public materialities, fair 
rent and access to housing, and the daily injustices of the colonial situation together into the 
same frame.   
Conclusion 
During the first two decades of the Protectorate, Lyautey’s peculiar modernizing vision, 
the influx of European and rural Moroccan migrants to Casablanca, and conditions of ongoing 
scarcity—whether of housing, cement, labor, or employment—set the stage for a series of 
clashes during the 1930s. In the Protectorate as a whole, nationalist responses to the Berber 
Dahir and military campaigns of rural pacification engendered a “political field” that revolved 
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around questions of “religion, ethnicity, territory and the role of the Alawid monarchy….”250 
During this period in Casablanca, the definitions of urban crisis that French experts invoked 
remained in flux. Questions about what could be included under the label of crisis and of 
whether crisis was indeed the appropriate label at all remained open to contestation. As urban 
Moroccan notables and European settlers tested their political strength, the mostly French 
professional communities of engineers and architects were a long way from exercising an 
exclusive right to define the city’s problems or propose solutions. These were not, however, 
simple rhetorical stances. They were backed by expert investments in particular forms of 
materiality—forms bound up with industrial processes, technical hierarchies, and colonial labor 
regimes. Stabilizing a political field in Casablanca was also a matter of making concrete 
Moroccan and of inserting Moroccan concrete along with the social and political relations 
supporting it into every facet of urban life.   
It is tempting to understand concrete’s place at the center of Casablanca’s modernizing 
construction industry as an inevitable result of its technological affordances—the speed, stability, 
and security it enabled in a rapidly expanding urban environment. It might be equally enticing to 
read concrete’s rise as a result of its symbolic entanglement with the dichotomizing visions of 
modernity at the heart of the French colonial project in Morocco. The aim of this chapter, 
however, has been to suggest that what came to define concrete construction during the early 
years of the Protectorate—both its precise materialities and symbolic resonances—was its 
imbrication with expert understandings of urban crisis. Concrete lay at the constantly shifting 
point of contact between calculable and incalculable forms of indeterminacy, between risk and 
uncertainty.251 Risks of corrosion and collapse could be measured and estimated by engineers in 
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Casablanca but real estate speculation, a cheap but transient labor force, a poorly understood 
Moroccan environment, and the on-the-ground technological practices of locals all made 
Moroccan concrete subject to forms of fundamental uncertainty. As the following chapter will 
show, anxieties over the use and abuse of concrete—as well as the ambiguous flows of industrial 
cement—extended into the slum removal campaigns of the late 1930s and of the postwar period, 
bringing with them forms of circulation and technological labor that were fundamentally 
disruptive to the ambitions of modernist urbanism and colonial engineering in Morocco. 
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CHAPTER 2 
VIOLENT MATTER  
AND THE CRISIS OF POSTWAR MODERNIST PLANNING
 
On the eve of Morocco’s independence in November 1955, an article appeared in the 
journal Construire—the leading publication for members of the building industry—on the 
evolution of cement production during the Protectorate. Given its status as “the foundational 
material for the building trades and for public works, the premier industries of a new country”  
and a core “economic indicator,” cement production, Morocco’s “oldest local industry,” was a 
source of anticipation and anxiety for investors, administrators, and urban professionals.252  After 
over a decade of scarcity and the recent opening of factories in Meknes and Agadir to 
supplement supplies from the main plant in Casablanca,  Morocco was on the verge of becoming 
a self-sufficient producer of cement at the very moment it would gain autonomy from France.253 
Initially a consequence of wartime shortages, cement’s scarcity during the postwar period 
resulted from a program of rapid infrastructure building and housing construction spearheaded 
by the Protectorate’s modernist planners—most notably Michel Écochard. Industrial cement was 
the key ingredient for mixing concrete—an essential material for erecting durable housing 
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projects, apartment buildings, utility poles, and subterranean pipes.  For the article’s author, 
cement was the substance responsible for securing the spaces, structures, and nodes upon which 
urban modernity was meant to rest. The article appeared in Constuire one day before Sultan 
Muhammad V’s return from exile in Madagascar, the event that would definitively signal the 
downfall of the Protectorate. In this context, Morocco’s autonomy in the realm of cement 
production signified the possibility of providing durable forms of life to urban Moroccans, of 
extending the promises of modernity beyond the European city-dwellers who had been its main 
beneficiaries during the colonial period.                     
This chapter examines the material foundations of postwar modernist urbanism. It 
analyzes the practices, arguments, and assumptions that channeled industrial cement into 
particular sites and projects in Casablanca during and after WWII. Cement flowed in ways that 
appeared both necessary and threatening to French officials. The flow of cement was 
symbolically tied to visions of a modern, colonial city cast in concrete as well as to anxieties 
about the position and agency of Moroccans within this city. Cement that passed through the 
proper administrative channels could be a tool for securing political assent and winning over 
local notables, while cement that moved too freely could enter the black market, exceeding the 
regulatory capacities of the state. If cement failed to flow, as in cases of hoarding, construction 
could stagnate, rents rise, and disorder erupt. And yet, the process of circulation must at some 
point cease for cement to become concrete, durable housing, secure forms of dwelling. For the 
Protectorate state, the flow of cement was more than just a logistical or administrative problem. 
Where, how, and for whom cement became concrete shaped the politics of urban life in postwar 
Casablanca.   
The “archive” for cement and its circulation, however, is fragmentary—composed of 
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scattered administrative accounts, technical reports, and the physical remnants of Protectorate-
era construction projects. As a method and reading strategy, I have tried to attend to points of 
rupture within this archive—moments when the network for distributing cement broke down.254  
Analyzing accounts of these “failures,” I link together anti-colonial violence, debates over 
matter, and the imagined futures of modernist planning in Morocco’s largest city. I argue that the 
distribution of cement within institutions, work sites, housing projects, poles, sewers, and roads 
embedded practices of neglect, segregation, and clientism into Casablanca’s urban environment. 
At the same time, the flow of cement constantly exceeded the boundaries that Protectorate 
officials attempted to erect—creating sites of possibility that disrupted colonial policies and 
categories.    
Protectorate-era systems for rationing scarce materials built upon the notion of “crisis” 
elaborated during the early years of the Protectorate [Chapter 1]. By the 1940s, “crisis” had 
become the byword of nearly all French urban interventions in Morocco. It referred to a 
particular way of distributing resources, of allocating access to technology, and of arranging 
urban natures. The “crisis” of postwar Casablanca was itself a product of modernist planning in 
at least two senses. First, as a category, crisis served to delimit Morocco’s urban problems, 
suggesting they could be resolved through technological solutions. It defined conceivable kinds 
of urban intervention. Second, as a set of practices, crisis involved rearranging forms of 
vulnerability, authority, and agency in the colonial city—determining whose homes would be 
demolished, rebuilt, or connected to water and electricity grids. During the interwar years, crisis 
 
254 I understand “breakdown” as the failure to stabilize a working technology through acts of maintenance and 
repair. That said my emphasis in this chapter is less on how exactly the system for distributing cement broke down 
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Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo Boczkowski, and Kristen Foot (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014). 
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served as a way of carving up the colonial city between different categories of experts [Chapter 
1]. While this remained the case in the postwar period, the concept took on additional meanings. 
During a series of urban experiments in Casablanca inspired by Le Corbusier and the principles 
of the Athens Charter, crisis came to designate an approach to urban life that positioned culture 
and society on one side of the equation, the economy on the other.255 In theory and practice, the 
problem for urbanists and administrators was how to mediate between a colonial society with its 
frictions and tensions on the one hand and a colonial economy with its budgetary constraints and 
limitations on the other.256 These experts put forward the notion that construction technologies 
were the means of mediation between these two poles and matter itself the domain for 
intervention. Scholars of postwar planning in the Protectorate have focused on the conflicts 
provoked by the country’s chief urbanist, Michel Écochard, his new functionalist plan for 
Casablanca, the transition to linear industrial organization, and extension of municipal 
boundaries to accommodate new zones for Moroccan housing.257 Écochard’s interventions 
initiated a new phase in Morocco’s urban history. At the same time, they built upon rather than 
displacing notions of crisis that were materially embedded in the structures and infrastructures of 
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colonial Casablanca.  
Postwar housing and infrastructural projects cannot be understood outside of their 
relationship with urban violence. Sociologist Abderrahmane Rachik has correlated the two major 
shifts in Casablanca’s urbanism—Écochard’s 1952 plan and the Schéma Directeur of 1981—
with two of the largest popular uprisings in the city’s history.258 For Rachik, the outbreak of 
violence did not so much initiate new thinking within Morocco’s urban planning agencies or 
compel planners to focus exclusively on security in the elaboration of new forms. Rather 
violence placed the implementation of new urban strategies within a distinct temporal frame—a 
“crisis” urbanism of rapid intervention.259  Violence also operated as a kind of heuristic for 
planners and officials—a means of estimating the gap between the state’s vision of cultural 
difference or urban society and the dynamic realities of city life. The final section of this chapter 
considers the violence of the December 1952 uprising in the Carrières centrales neighborhood of 
Casablanca as a foil to the modernist fantasies of a colonial city cast in concrete—where 
otherwise carefully managed stocks of materials were briefly enrolled into an insurrectionary 
project.   
The violence of the Protectorate’s urbanism was also multiple. Colonial and anti-colonial 
violence against persons took place within the distinctly “violent environment” of postwar 
Casablanca—a space of dust and demolitions, of infrastructural and bodily neglect, of 
asymmetrical exposure and vulnerability.260  Following the flow of cement from concrete pipes 
and collapsed homes into the cinder blocks thrown by protesters during the 1952 uprising, this 
chapter will propose a new frame for thinking about colonial violence that links together 
 
258 Abderrahmane Rachik, Casablanca: L’urbanisme de l’urgence (Casablanca: Imprimerie  El Jadida, 2002), 89. 
259 Rachik, 89. 
260 Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, eds., Violent Environments (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5. 
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violence “fast” and “slow.”261  By shifting attention from the flagship projects and policies that 
modernist planners and architects pioneered at the end of the 1940s to the seemingly mundane 
conflicts over housing that characterized the tenure of the Sharifian Housing Office (OCH), this 
chapter renders visible the violent arrangements of matter that undergirded French urbanism in 
Morocco. As the first administrative entity responsible for both Moroccan and European housing, 
the OCH offers a case for thinking about how the boundaries of urban segregation became a 
matter of matter itself—shaping distributions of authority and vulnerability across Casablanca’s 
divided landscape. 
The OCH and Cement’s Uneven Flow 
The Second World War initiated a series of profound disruptions within the Protectorate 
state and in Moroccan urban politics more generally.262 A Vichy administration, installed after 
1940, remained in power after the U.S. occupation until being eventually dislodged by the 
Gaullists in 1943. 1944 witnessed the emergence of a re-invigorated nationalist movement in 
Morocco which shifted its core leadership from the old imperial capital of Fez to the new 
administrative center in Rabat.263 The growth of nationalist and communist political organizing 
during the postwar period inspired a two-pronged program of development. In urban areas, 
Michel Écochard’s appointment as the head of urban services in 1946 signaled a shift in state 
housing policy toward expanded infrastructure building, low-cost housing construction for 
Moroccans, and systematic slum clearance.  Also in 1946, the Resident General Eirik Labonne 
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initiated a massive program of rural “modernization” that aimed to establish agricultural 
cooperatives in the countryside, in part with the aim of slowing the mass migration into 
Moroccan cities.264 The adoption of modernization as the mantra of the colonial administration in 
Morocco paralleled similar strategies elsewhere in the French and British Empires.265 In the 
domain of urban housing, the Sharifian Housing Office formed the link between policies of 
outright neglect during the interwar period and Écochard’s modernism. The Office’s efforts to 
shape the circulation of materials provide a means of understanding how the logics of the later 
came to be built into the projects of the former. 
Created by royal decree in June of 1942 in response to the influx French families into 
Moroccan cities, the Sharifian Housing Office (Office chérifien de l’habitat) was initially 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of European housing in the Protectorate.266 The 
OCH’s mission was to coordinate between multiple types of circulation that took place at varying 
temporalities: the production of construction materials, private investment in the urban property 
market, and in-migration to Casablanca and other cities. Michel Écochard would later criticize 
the Office for failing to carry out a single study or to produce a comprehensive plan during its 
early years.267 Nevertheless, the OCH built and built rapidly. During the first two years of its 
existence, the Office erected some 344 structures—a mixture of villas, chalets, and multi-story 
apartment buildings—in Casablanca alone.268 Given its relatively small staff and budget, this 
accelerated rhythm stemmed in part from the use of incarcerated laborers to carry out much of 
the actual construction work prior to 1944.269 The OCH’s main task with regard to European 
 
264 Miller, A History of Modern Morocco, 146-147. 
265 See for example Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard, eds., International Development and the Social 
Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
266 The June 24, 1942 dahir defined the OCH as an institution for providing European housing. 
267 Michel Écochard, “L’habitat au Maroc," [undated, circa 1952] 1MA/10/131, CADN, 1. 
268 Compte-Rendu, Section locale de Casablanca, Office chérifien de l’habitat, October 1944, A1410, AM. 
269 Conseil d’administration de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat, "Rapport sur l'exercice 1948," E0815, AM; 
 106 
housing was to provide lodging for state employees working in the Protectorate. This it did under 
constant criticism of incompetence and mismanagement. Many of Protectorate’s functionaries, 
from low-level administrators to primary school teachers, complained vehemently about the low-
quality prefabricated villas that OCH supplied during the 1940s. In one extreme case, a 
disgruntled teacher named Helmbacher, who worked for the Public Education Administration, 
forced the lock of an unoccupied villa owned by the OCH and began squatting there.270 In 
another instance, the OCH petitioned to evict a group European functionaries who had occupied 
a school in Aïn Sebaâ.271 European tenants also challenged the OCH when they considered rents 
disproportional and in many cases refused to pay the Office entirely.272 In 1949, a draft of an 
OCH report noted that “The European is a more difficult tenant than the native [crossed out to 
say ‘the Moroccan’]. He sometimes does not want to pay his rent because this or that accessory 
is missing from the accommodation, because there are minor repairs to be done, etc….”273  In 
Casablanca, European residents also formed a tenants union that proved successful at resisting 
the OCH’s rent increases.274 
Following its expansion into the domain of “indigenous housing” in the summer of 1944, 
the OCH embarked on a search for Moroccans to sit on each of its regional bodies. A debate 
occurred within the administration over the ideal type of subject to enroll in the office’s housing 
committees. While officials agreed that each committee should be composed primarily of urban 
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notables—from representatives of the local pasha and members of the municipal commission to 
Moroccan members of chambers of commerce and industry—the administration remained 
divided over the question of whether or not to recruit participants from the urban working 
classes, the artisan community, and the construction industry. French officials framed the 
inclusion of Moroccan members as essentially a question of expertise. Local notables with a 
more nuanced understanding of the social and religious dynamics of inhabitation could help the 
administration avoid potential conflicts with the Muslim community. OCH officials also 
expected Muslim notables to contribute financially to the construction of Moroccan housing—
projects for which they claimed it was more difficult to attract private investments.275 French 
attempts to seek out working class representatives to sit on these committees reflected a different 
set of priorities. On the one hand, they were clear examples of colonial practices of divide and 
rule. At the same time, these efforts reflected official doubts about the degree of influence 
notables collaborating with the French administration were able to exercise over local laborers 
and artisans, especially in Casablanca where immigration from other regions of Morocco was the 
highest.   
One of the most striking inclusions on Casablanca’s OCH committee was Abdelkader ben 
Tounsi (ʿAbd al-Qadir ibn al-Tunisi).  A local muʿallim in his fifties, ben Tounsi resided in 
Casablanca’s medina and was apparently well known to the administration.276 He had been 
involved in several construction projects for the Habous Administration and for private 
individuals on his own account. Ben Tounsi also worked under the French architects Edmond 
Brion and Auguste Cadet, most likely as an artisan during the construction of the Pasha’s 
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Courthouse in Casablanca, one of the most publicized projects of the period.277 Another local 
representative, Abdellah ben Kaddour (ʿAbd Allah ibn Qaddur) was a worker in the construction 
industry, chosen for his military service. This inclusion of working-class Moroccans on the OCH 
committees seems to have been particular to Casablanca. In other municipalities from Fez to 
Fedala, officials claimed that no reliable individuals from the laboring and artisan communities 
could be located, and their committees included only notables from the municipal councils or the 
chambers of commerce. Responding to a directive from Rabat, the contrôleur civil in Oujda 
doubted that “we will be able to find individuals among the workers cultivated enough to 
usefully collaborate in the committees work.”278 While mainly in practice in Casablanca, the 
possibility of capturing the intellectual as well as the manual labor of Moroccan workers with 
intimate knowledge of the construction industry held promise for the officials shaping the OCH’s 
institutional structure. 
In addition to planning and managing state-financed housing projects, the postwar OCH 
also took responsibility for examining requests for construction permits.279 Both Moroccan and 
European property owners were subject to the Office’s directives, which required applicants to 
demonstrate their proposed projects’ contributions to resolving the housing crisis. OCH 
committee meetings frequently referred to the scarcity of construction materials as a major cause 
of the postwar housing crisis and one of the prime reasons for the extent of the state’s 
involvement in construction. Committees examined plans submitted by Moroccan contractors 
and property owners to ensure that they used only minimal quantities of wood or cement.  As a 
branch of Public Works Administration, the OCH controlled reserves of essential materials—
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cement in particular, but also the iron and steel bars necessary for reinforced concrete 
construction—which it could distribute to projects in line with the Office’s vision. This network 
for material distribution enabled the OCH to speed the completion of projects deemed politically 
useful.   
The Office aimed to ensure the smooth flow of cement in the face of barriers that were at 
once technical, legal, and infrastructural. Prior to WWII, roughly a quarter of the cement 
consumed in the Protectorate was imported.280 These imports slowed with the onset of the war, 
then ceased entirely in 1942 while the demand for cement continued to increase.281 As producers 
began to feel the effects of wartime scarcity in 1940, the CCM sought to shore up their stocks of 
raw materials to secure a steady rate of output. Scarcity failed to displace cement’s centrality to 
the Protectorate’s housing vision. In Casablanca, the Office’s director, Milan, bluntly stated that 
“other than stone we must not count on local materials. There aren’t any.”282 For officials, neither 
local bricks nor wood could come anywhere near satisfying the needs of an already sluggish 
construction industry. It soon became clear, however, that distribution constituted as much of an 
obstacle to the smooth flow of cement as production. Access to paper sacks—once imported 
from Belgium and the Scandinavian countries—as well as burlap from Calcutta, dried up with 
the onset of the war.283 With no reliable substitute for these burlap sacks, the Public Works 
Administration attempted to institute a rental system in which consumers would be taxed for the 
use of sacks until they returned them to the original manufacturer.284 After a few exchanges, 
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however, the burlap would wear and tear, degrading beyond the point of reuse. To avoid the tax 
altogether, many contractors began to purchase cement in bulk directly from the plant in 
Casablanca. This meant that builders began storing large quantities of unpackaged cement on 
their construction sites, creating additional problems of exposure to humidity. The lack of sacks 
also restricted cement’s range of movement. The already limited exports from the Lafarge 
factory in Casablanca to Tangier and French West Africa (AOF) ceased entirely.285 While 
contractors in Casablanca could treat the plant as their own private storehouse, construction 
projects outside of the Protectorate’s economic capital had no reliable means of obtaining 
cement. These wartime problems of packaging and distribution coupled with the limitations of 
production inspired strident regulatory measures through which a material politics of scarcity 
began to take shape. With authorizations already required for the purchase of scarce materials, 
the French administration aimed to ensure that contractors employed the absolute minimum 
dosage of cement in all cases.286 By 1945, the OCH introduced measures for standardizing 
prefabricated concrete components to simplify the surveillance of the mixing process. Practical 
obstacles to the circulation of cement empowered state actors in Casablanca and elsewhere to 
assemble a network for material distribution with cement at its center. 
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Figure 4: “Ensacheuse,” Chaux & Ciments Lafarge, February 23, 1949, photograph number 29998, 
21/MA212, CADN. 
 
Through a combination of legal and technopolitical means, cement’s circulation—the 
pathways it followed to become concrete—became a way of doing politics under the 
Protectorate. The conditions of wartime scarcity revitalized the political possibilities of 
maintenance work, as the Protectorate administration and the OCH in particular deployed cement 
grants in an effort to secure assent.287 When Mohamed Derbani (Muhammad Darbani), the 
director of a small Qur’anic school in Casablanca, applied for a ton of cement, his request was 
forwarded to the Directeur des Affaires Politiques in Rabat. Derbani described serious cracks in 
one of school’s support walls and the extensive repair work required to prevent a dangerous 
collapse.288 While the municipality generally refused applications like Derbani’s, his request was 
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instead moved up the administrative hierarchy and marked as “confidential” due to the “political 
interest” it represented. Administrators also deployed grants of essential materials to secure 
alliances with rural clients. One engineer in Souk El Arbaa (Suq Arbiʿaʾ al-Maghrib) asked for 
twelve tons of cement for repairs to the home of a local notable, Cheik Ben Aissa (Shaykh ibn 
ʿIsa).289 In a note describing the degradation of the shaykh’s private residence, the engineer 
asserted the need to complete essential repairs before the winter rains to ensure the security of 
this elite rural family. Maintaining the appearance of rural notable households was a way of 
asserting the French administration’s capacity to continue delivering durable forms of material 
well-being to loyal clients. The state also supplied cement to two categories of local artisans: tile 
manufacturers making mosaics and zelliges and producers of cinder blocks.290 In a letter, Lahcen 
ben Mohamed Glaoui (Lahsan ibn Muhammad al-Glawi), the amīn of Casablanca’s cinder block 
producers assured the city’s head municipal engineer that he would personally oversee “all of the 
manufacturers and muʿallimūn to determine who deserve to have the cement and who does 
not.”291 Grants of cement and other materials like iron and steel, enabled Moroccan residents to 
act as intermediaries between the colonial state and artisan communities—distributing essential 
materials in ways that conformed to and potentially deformed the political intentions of 
administrators.    
While distributing material stocks to presumed political allies, the Protectorate’s Vichy-
era administration could also restrict flows to “less worthy city-dwellers.”292 Under Resident 
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General Noguès’ tenure, municipal service’s across Morocco contemplated the expulsion of Jews 
and other categories of residents labeled undesirable from European new cities as a means of 
lessening the effects of the housing crisis on non-Jewish French citizens living in Morocco. 
When two Jewish community leaders, Bendahan and Chocron, approached Casablanca’s 
municipality in 1941 about the possibility of  a cement grant for the completion of a local 
synagogue and Hebrew school, they received a refusal in spite of the fact that construction was 
already underway and considered of “unquestionable utility” and “extreme urgency” by the 
Sharifian Affairs Administration.293 After delaying the project indefinitely for “practical 
reasons,” Casablanca’s municipality moved to seize the existing stocks of materials that 
Bendahan and Chocron had accumulated, including a large supply of iron bars for reinforcing 
concrete.294 The administration rerouted these materials to another project deemed of “equivalent 
social and political interest”: the construction of the SOCICA Moroccan worker housing project 
in the Carrières centrales.295 
This capacity to regulate material flows gave the OCH an influence over urban 
construction that extended far beyond state-financed housing projects. And yet, the 
administration’s heavy investment in controlling the circulation of cement meant that the Office’s 
failure to reign in unauthorized flows threatened to undermine not only specific housing policies 
but the state’s capacity to intervene in urban life in general. In addition to issuing building 
permits, the OCH required owners to apply for “permits of purchase” for the exact quantities of 
construction materials needed for their projects.296 This measure, designed to prevent hoarding, 
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only encouraged the creation of a black market for cement. Officials even feared that their own 
cement grants were being funneled into the black market by unscrupulous intermediaries.297 The 
OCH suspected Moroccan recipients in particular. In one instance, members of the Office 
described how part of a cement shipment destined for housing construction in Port Lyautey 
(Kenitra) vanished while under the surveillance of one of their officials. The missing cement 
soon reappeared on Casablanca’s black market.298 The same year, the already scandal ridden 
head of the Office in Casablanca accused a foreman, Sugères, of using his position in the OCH to 
illegally obtain materials for the construction of two villas in the Quartier de l’Aviation in 
Casablanca.299 Another OCH foreman in Casablanca, Montade, was arrested and held in Rabat 
for usurping a false identity.300 Accusations of corruption and mismanagement plagued the Office 
throughout the late-1940s while the housing conditions of Moroccan and European residents 
continued to decline.     
Beyond the relative incompetence or corruption of the colonial state, however, the OCH’s 
financial and administrative irregularities suggest how the ambiguous boundaries between 
official and unofficial circulation both reproduced and undermined the Office’s mission. Cement 
flows in a time of scarcity presented moments of danger and possibility. Once imagined as a fast, 
cheap, and “modern” solution to the housing crisis, cement’s tendency to flow a little too freely 
threatened to engulf the Protectorate’s main housing authority in permanent scandal and to deal a 
serious blow to French “national dignity.”301 The Protectorate’s accounting office discovered in 
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1949 that the Office carried out a number of construction projects entirely off the books.302 
Challenged by the state’s accountants, the Office’s director, Milan, was never able to fully 
account for the number of properties the Office owned or administered. In the words of two 
financial inspectors, “the Office knows neither exactly what it has built nor what it owns.”303  Yet 
such lacunae could be immensely profitable. Given its legal authority to expropriate and close 
links with investors, the Office proved an ideal vehicle for accumulation. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that after leaving the OCH, Milan headed a major real estate firm that engaged in 
extensive speculation in Casablanca.304  
While embroiled in these financial scandals, members of the OCH’s administrative 
council continued to debate the most the viable solution to the problem of Moroccan housing in 
the Residency. Casablanca’s Aïn Chock (ʿAyn Shuq) neighborhood served as a frequent point of 
reference for officials, who generally saw the project as either too costly to scale up or as 
monotonous and alienating (i.e., too modernist). Designed by Antoine Marchisio the project was 
initially intended to absorb portions of the bidonville, Beni Msik.305 Aiming to harmonize 
modern design principles and prevailing assumptions about Moroccan social organization, 
Marchisio imagined a form of “semi collective housing” made up of interconnected single-
family units, often centered around an enclosed patio.306 Slopping archways and decorative 
details broke up the sharp lines and whitewashed walls that visually dominated the 
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development.307 These aesthetic features as well as the use of reinforced concrete in certain 
structures gave Aïn Chock a price tag that far exceeded expectations. Housing in the satellite city 
ultimately proved too expensive for most slum dwellers and instead attracted merchants, low-
level administrators, and even Europeans.308  
As Mirande, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior suggested, “the critique to 
formulate concerning Aïn Chock is not that it is not attractive enough, but that it is too good. 
Given the enormous demand for housing that confront us, it would be preferable to explore 
lighter constructions as a solution, as cheap and as economical as possible.”309 Milan argued that 
so-called “light” constructions ended up being even more expensive and that using locally 
available sources of stone to construct simple, solid structures for Moroccans was the most 
promising path.310 While uncertainty remained over exactly which qualities were desirable in 
new urban constructions, officials agreed that the eventual solution to the problem of housing 
should be a kind of intermediary form between the solid, stable constructions of Aïn Chock and 
the bidonvilles themselves. The basic components of Michel Écochard’s argument in favor of 
“housing for the greatest possible number” were already present in debates among OCH 
officials. The solution to the housing crisis was defined in terms of varying the material 
properties of structures themselves to adjust for fluctuations in either the urban population or 
state budgets. The OCH identified matter itself—solid or light, stone or concrete—as the domain 
into which the state could actually intervene. All other factors—rural migration, Casablanca’s 
industrialization, the allocation of state resources—were cast as externalities beyond the 
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influence of the colonial administration.   
Living en dur in the Postwar Protectorate 
Over the course of the 1940s, the OCH gradually positioned itself at the center of a 
network of material distribution that embedded the political priorities and paradoxes of the 
Protectorate into Casablanca’s housing projects—both those the Office directly sponsored and 
those it supported by providing access to stocks of materials. Official arguments about scarce 
matter intersected with debates that had been raging since the interwar period about how to 
secure adequate forms of bodily well-being for Moroccan and European residents. Municipal 
administrators marshaled assumptions about the cultural needs—or lack thereof—of recent rural 
migrants and about Moroccan family structures in general against the backdrop of rising 
densities in the center and growing slums on the periphery. As the nationalist and labor 
movements expanded their membership during and after WWII, colonial anxieties about the 
material aspirations and political mobilization of middle- and working-class Muslims peaked. In 
this context, questions about the durability of housing took on broad cultural and political 
significance.     
Architectural historians of Casablanca sometimes assume that once constructed, the 
meanings of colonial apartment buildings and housing projects were largely fixed.311 European 
and Moroccan residents of Casablanca, however, not only possessed differing access to durable 
forms of housing but also to state networks of material distribution that shaped possibilities for 
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maintenance work. When in 1945 European residents of the Cité du Peyroux apartment complex 
complained about leaky roofs, for example, the building’s owner applied for six hundred sheets 
of corrugated metal from the city. In requests addressed to the municipality and the Director of 
Political Affairs in Rabat, the owner and the renters described an “urgent” need for sheet metal as 
water dripped into the building.312 As discussed in the previous section, Moroccan inhabitants 
succeeded in acquiring such grants only when their interests aligned with those of officials. This 
rationing of repair gave material form to the political priorities of the French Protectorate. In 
most cases, “modern” materials like cement or corrugated iron were to be saved for European 
constructions. Local materials, masonry, and the skills of Moroccan artisans would have to fill in 
the gaps for projects such as the Habous neighborhood in Casablanca. In spite of collapses in 
Meknes and Marrakesh, members of the OCH continued to insist that industrial cement was not 
strictly necessary for building “indigenous housing” and that traditional methods would 
suffice.313  
State efforts to regulate material flows intersected with debates about how to house 
different categories of city dwellers. From the perspective of Protectorate planners, the problem 
of securing adequate housing for colonial subjects stemmed from a series of racialized and 
gendered assumptions about Moroccan bodies and the Moroccan body politic.314 Members of the 
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OCH imagined apartment living as a moral problem. Before the construction of Michel 
Écochard’s multi-story grands ensembles in the early 1950s, the prevailing wisdom within the 
housing administration was that Moroccan subjects would never tolerate living in apartment 
buildings. The only way of avoiding “the promiscuity that Muslim women would be submitted to 
in a multi-story building” —in the shared hallways and stairwells that could become sites of 
mixed-gender socialization—was to continue constructing cheap, single-story “traditional 
housing.”315 Neighborhoods composed of simple, one or two room homes generated additional 
problems, however. French urban professionals and Moroccan notables agreed that shared 
toilettes among the urban poor created “conditions in which promiscuity is infinitely more likely 
than it could ever be in a multi-story building where renters encounter each other on the 
stairway.”316   
Local officials also faced contradictions between imposing regulatory order on apartment 
dwellers and managing Moroccan forms of inhabitation. In Rabat, a property owner, Si 
Mohamed Ben Aomar, was targeted by the local contrôleur civil for the number of residents 
informally inhabiting his recently constructed apartment building. While Ben Aomar had legally 
rented some units in the building, a large number of the apartments were reserved for members 
of his extended family. Another section of the building contained the apartment and office of the 
director of the Institution Guessous, a school founded by the nationalist leader Ahmed Balafrej. 
Since these apartments had not been legally leased, their residents were technically subject to 
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expulsion. The contrôleur civil acknowledged, however, that the existing rental code conflicted 
with Muslim conceptions of property and the family. Confronted on the one hand with 
incommensurable notions of the boundary between formal and informal rental practices, on the 
other with the inevitable political scandal that the removal of a notable nationalist would have, 
Rabat’s municipal services opted to leave the case unresolved.317  
The problem of apartment living was not unique to Moroccans. Since the beginning of 
the Protectorate, European settlers had debated which forms of dwelling would be best suited to 
colonial urban life. In an article from the late 1920s, Joseph Vattier had addressed the reluctance 
of urban colons to countenance living in multistory buildings when they had arrived in Morocco 
expecting to reside in colonial villas. For Vattier the solution to the European housing crisis was 
identical to the solution to a wider crisis of “domesticity.”318 Centralized cooking, washing, and 
heating could revolutionize apartment living, helping to transform the French of Morocco into 
“hommes nouveaux.”319  Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb have demonstrated how the 
emergence of these apartment-dwelling “new men” depended upon a class Moroccan domestic 
workers whose presence was inscribed in the architectural forms of 1920s and 1930s apartment 
buildings.320 Unlike metropolitan structures of the period, Casablanca’s multi-story buildings 
contained shared laundry rooms and service tunnels designed to remove domestic workers from 
view. The erasure of Moroccan workers from interior spaces paralleled the incorporation of 
Moroccan motifs into the art deco and art nouveau façades of the city center. French architects 
such as Albert Laprade, Edmond Brion, Auguste Cadet, Albert Greslin and others elaborated the 
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“Neo-Moroccan” or “Neo-Mauresque” style that incorporated zellige, green tile roofs, and other 
stylistic elements associated with North African Islamic architecture into the sumptuous designs 
of French colonial exteriors.321 This formula—the aesthetic inclusion of cultural markings 
associated with “Moroccanness” alongside the spatial exclusion of Moroccan inhabitants from 
city centers (expect as domestic workers)—was the defining feature of modernist architecture in 
Morocco prior to WWII. The official assertion that multi-story dwelling was incompatible with 
Moroccan mores formed against the backdrop of arguments about the role of apartments in 
creating an ideal colonial type: an entrepreneurial, energetic, and exclusively European subject. 
Over the course of the 1940s, the complexities of urban life and housing scarcity began to 
erode this argument. Within the housing administration, the notion that apartment living was ill-
suited to Moroccan family structures—creating dangers of mixed-gendered socialization or 
violation— was gradually overwhelmed by concerns about moral decline in the bidonvilles 
themselves. The “excessive densities” of the slums inevitably created problems of 
“promiscuity.”322 In a thesis for the Centre des Hautes Études Administratives, Jean Ratier 
described the problem of “rural women” living in the qaryan: 
If she…stays at the factory, left to her own devices, a veritable unrestrained child, its to 
be supposed that fear will not always win out over curiosity.  If she stays at home, as 
mandated in the ‘caïdat,’ the promiscuity of the environment in the bidonville can lead to 
deviations of behavior that the husband will find out about one day or another. In such 
cases, it is a raucous drama, often followed by a separation. It is curious to note that 
Moroccans, very well informed of these scandals, seem to link the housing situation to 
these failures of virtue….those living, not in the shanties, but in the derbs built en dur 
around the bidonville were seriously married, the women were faithful to their husbands. 
To live in stable housing [Habiter le ‘dur’] is to have lived longer in the city and 
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especially to be wealthier.…Virtue is considered proportional to one’s income….323 
Ratier’s off-hand remark that Moroccan residents attributed moral decline to the environment of 
the bidonvilles suggests that the material qualities of Casablanca’s different neighborhoods had 
come to represent more than a neglectful state. The changing class and moral connotations of 
living in stable, permanent housing (en dur) made the question of where and how cement became 
concrete a matter of respectability.  
These material-semiotic shifts around questions of housings’ durability were inseparable 
from the Protectorate state’s history of managing the slums prior to WWII. Casablanca’s postwar 
housing shortage was at least in part a result of municipal interventions in the bidonvilles during 
the late 1930s. Since the first use of the term in Casablanca in the 1920s, references to 
bidonvilles as a threat to public health masked colonial anxieties about the successes of leftist 
and nationalist political organizing in these neighborhoods. After the city’s municipal 
government began razing neighborhoods in the slums, displaced inhabitants were forced to seek 
housing elsewhere. Landlords in the new or old madīna—areas unaffected by the demolitions—
resorted to auctioning off houses to the highest bidder.324 Owners could raise rents on a monthly 
basis, forcing even residents with stable employment into precarious living arrangements. With 
no effective rehousing policy in place, displaced Moroccan residents were either submitted to the 
whims of unregulated landlords or compelled to sleep outside in even more perfunctory forms of 
shelter 
The typhus epidemic of 1938 provided the initial impetus for municipal legislation 
targeting Casablanca’s slums. In response to fears about the disease’s spread into European 
 
323 Jean Ratier, “Étude sociologique du bidonville des Carrières centrales” (Centre des hautes études administratives 
sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes, [undated, circa 1950]), AM, 31. 
324 Copy of a letter to le Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Sécrétaire Général du Protectorat, February 14, 1939, E0831, 
Archives du Maroc. 
 123 
quarters, the July 8, 1938 dahir established the legal groundwork for practices of urban 
demolition in the bidonvilles.325 The royal decree gave qa’ids and pashas the authority to order 
the destruction of individual homes or entire neighborhoods without the possibility of a legal 
challenge from either owners or residents. In describing what constituted a “bidonville,” the 
decree explicitly targeted “groups of houses made from light materials.”326 While such 
agglomerations were theoretically outlawed in both cities and suburbs, Article Four clarified that 
“indigenous constructions made of light materials like those erected by the administration of the 
Committee on Indigenous Housing can be authorized within cities and their suburbs…” if they 
met the appropriate hygienic criteria.327 The administration envisioned the continuation of light, 
temporary housing as an urban form at the very moment of planning for its elimination. This 
provision evidenced a certain tolerance for precarious forms of urban life providing they could 
be adequately assimilated into state networks of surveillance and management. Moreover, when 
it came to their demolition, light, temporary structures were not simply tolerable, they were 
desirable.   
The removal of Moroccan housing built en dur posed technical and political problems for 
the municipality.  When officials slated the Derb Ghallef neighborhood for demolition in 1938, 
the population of local laborers and functionaries—many of whom had sold off property in the 
bled to invest in new, solid houses in Casablanca—protested vehemently. Residents threatened, 
for example, to immolate three bulls in front of the Sultan’s palace in the Habous 
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neighborhood.328 Moroccan inhabitants of these aspiring “middle-class” quarters—built 
informally but with the tacit acquiescence of the municipal government—proved more resistant 
to removal during this period than those in the bidonvilles of Beni Msik or the Carrières 
centrales. The presence of structures with concrete components—often mixed using black market 
cement—in a neighborhood like Derb Ghallef threatened to delay state-sponsored demolitions 
and empower the Moroccan inhabitants of these aspiring zones.  
At no point did French administrators envision the total elimination of bidonvilles from 
Moroccan cities. By 1948, after a decade of intermittent demolitions, an estimated nineteen 
percent of Casablanca’s population still resided in the qaryan.329 No matter how great the danger 
to public health or to the Protectorate’s reputation, bidonvilles—while they may have required 
urgent improvement—were accepted as a permanent feature of urban life. Questions about the 
precise materialities of structures in the bidonvilles became important as officials sought to 
distinguish between threatening and acceptable forms of construction. In making these 
evaluations, officials frequently referred to the experiences of rebuilding in postwar Europe as a 
model. Unlike France or Germany, however, the practice of maintaining substandard housing 
emerged as potentially permanent rather than a temporary solution to the housing crisis. Citing 
fears of fire in a 1948 circular, the Resident General Alphonse Juin called for reducing the 
amount of wood in the bidonvilles, instructing municipal officials to encourage the use of earthen 
bricks painted with whitewash instead.330 Juin nevertheless suggested that prefabricated, wooden 
structures would have a role to play if better methods for covering them with metallic containers 
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(bidon) could be instituted. He envisioned a strategy developed during Austria’s rebuilding of 
collecting recycled canned goods of the same type and fastening them together to produce an 
effect that resembled roofing tiles. Even Écochard, who was widely credited with attempting to 
deliver more durable forms of life to Moroccan inhabitants, ostensibly accepted the permanent 
nature of “temporary” housing.331 
In other words, the materiality of the bidonvilles became central to debates about housing 
in the Residency in the context of arguments about the environmental causes of moral decline 
and anxieties over the more durable urban forms that aspiring Moroccan residents would produce 
of their own accord.  Beginning with the worker housing projects of Brion and Cadet in 1920s 
and 1930s, architects, engineers, and planners cultivated the notion that lack—of industrial 
cement or individualized connections to water and power grids—was somehow suited to the 
ethical forms of life valued by Moroccan residents. For urbanists like Pierre Mas, Morocco’s 
bidonvilles were signs of “a taste for life and ingeniousness…a concern with embellishment and 
decoration—painted murals in vivid colors, and well-maintained shrubbery….”332 Mas studied at 
the Institut d’Urbanisme in Paris and joined Écochard’s team in 1949. He carried out studies of 
Casablanca’s bidonvilles and other forms of Moroccan housing and later worked on Agadir’s 
reconstruction after 1960. Mas juxtaposed the external vivacity of slum neighborhoods and their 
simple sense of social solidarity with the aspirational, discomforting Europeanness of petit 
bourgeois constructions in the New Medina. Concrete here was not a symbol of safety and 
progress but the sign of a kind of perverse, black-market modernity, flourishing in conditions of 
scarcity. Citing one example Mas noted that “the excessive use of floor space, without any 
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concern for hygiene, has been rendered possible thanks to the use of reinforced concrete, 
although the construction is of very poor quality.”333 
Working with Mas and others, Écochard’s interventions after 1946 ranged from the 
creation of bidonvilles améliorées—the partial clearing and extension of road and sewer access 
to slums—to the rapid construction of new low-cost Moroccan housing typologies, primarily the 
trame 8x8.334  For proponents, a major advantage of single-story trame 8x8 or trame Écochard 
was its adaptability and appearance of durability. Units could be quickly demolished if the area 
was rezoned or built-up two or even three stories to create denser agglomerations. With the help 
of new public-private housing companies—whose role will be the subject of the following 
chapter—the state built 6,000 of these single-story units in Casablanca alone, covering the 
Carrières centrales.335 Compared to the preceding decade, Écochard’s plan for the city prioritized 
extension over direct intervention, with Beni Msik and the Carrières centrales as notable 
exceptions.336 While arguably improving the living conditions of many residents, all of these 
efforts also responded to a security-centered imperative to make the qaryan more accessible to 
colonial police forces.337  
As in previous campaigns, the demolitions that began in Carrières centrales at the end of 
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the 1940s were largely carried out by residents themselves. Locals took apart the wood and 
sheet-metal structures they inhabited under the threat of more violent displacements. Écochard’s 
techno-utopian vision of housing “for the greatest possible number” depended on the destructive 
labor of the Moroccan workers in the slums. The labor of demolition was also gendered. As the 
nationalist daily, Al ʿAlam, demonstrated in a series of photographs tracking the transformation 
of the Carrières centrales, women were key participants in dismantling the neighborhood, which 
remained in a state of perpetual reconstruction and partial demolition throughout the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.338  
 
 
Figure 5: The Trame Écochard in the Carrières centrales 
Michel Écochard, Casablanca: Le roman d’une ville (Paris: Éditions de Paris, 1955) 
 
In remaking the Carrières centrales, Écochard also relied on the equation of material 
simplicity with cultural authenticity. The notion of “culture-specific” housing, already tested in 
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the corporate housing projects of the 1920s and 1930s, emerged as a solution to a distinctly 
modernist crisis—a solution designed to mediate between culturally situated subjects and 
constrained colonial budgets. Various state actors promoted culture-specific housing for 
Moroccans that used a minimum of scarce and relatively costly modern materials such as 
cement. Cohen and Eleb have traced this linking of ideas about cultural authenticity to the 
politics of colonial austerity through the example of the courtyard in new housing typologies 
deployed by Écochard’s team:  
It is a strange twist of fate…that the ruling colonial powers elected the multifunctional 
vernacular language for interior layout precisely because of its affinities with minimum 
housing. In the end, the design teams’ inability to respond to different housing needs and 
variations in family size casts a negative light on their work on housing composition and 
culture-specific programs.  It is somewhat derisory, to say the least, that these types of 
programs amounted to nothing more than a standard housing type composed of a main 
room and courtyard.339    
The example of the courtyard—taken to stand in for Moroccan culture as a whole in new housing 
projects of the period—illustrates one of the paradoxes of the Protectorate’s postwar urbanism.340 
Écochard’s adoption of  a “modernist discourse for European schemes and an ethnological-cum-
regional discourse for other [Moroccan] programs,” further enshrined the notion that culture, 
family-structure, bodily and gendered norms, ought to determine access to particular 
materialities—to the durable forms of life that industrial cement afforded.341 The fact that 
residents of Écochard’s trame 8x8 used cinder blocks to build over the units’ patios almost as 
soon as they gained access to these plots was an irony largely lost on French planners who 
continued to argue that these simple structures were “well adapted to the tastes of a population 
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that had kept its rural attachments.”342  
The case of illicit cement flows into new Moroccan neighborhoods built en dur illustrates 
how the network of material distribution created by the OCH failed to conform to the state’s 
priorities. Moroccan shop keepers and construction workers shaped the form of new 
neighborhoods in opposition to official directives. In this context, state-sponsored interventions 
into the qaryan during Écochard’s tenure—including the construction of the most iconic housing 
projects of the era—represented a way for administrators to reassert their authority over the kind 
of concrete future that Moroccan cities would take. The extension of Casablanca’s urban 
infrastructures provides a counterexample, where Moroccan residents had fewer means of 
subverting policies of crisis urbanism.  
Infrastructures of Scarcity and Grandeur  
Like postwar housing projects, urban infrastructures also depended upon regulating the 
distribution of scarce materials. Concrete pipes enabled Casablanca’s municipality to tap water 
sources deeper into the Chaoui.343 The OCH rationed electrical wires and cement for telephone 
poles, and municipalities across Morocco intensified security at power stations. As with housing, 
the years following WWII witnessed expanded infrastructure building across the Protectorate. As 
conflicts erupted within the state over Écochard’s new linear plan for Casablanca, however, the 
vision of a networked city clashed with the limitations of colonial budgets based on an 
asymmetrical distribution of state resources between Moroccan and European residents. It was 
during this period that the notion of  “bidonvilles améliorées”—slums reorganized into a regular 
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grid with basic water and sewer attachments—came to prominence within the new housing 
administration as a cost effective first stage in what Écochard envisioned as the eventual 
replacement of most slums with collective housing.344 Officials in Casablanca and elsewhere also 
embraced the argument that housing (at least temporarily) without infrastructure could be a fast, 
cheap, and culturally appropriate means of addressing the most pressing consequences of the 
continuing housing crisis.      
Scholars in STS, the history of technology, and anthropology have imagined 
infrastructure as a kind of architecture—poetic and political—for the flow of goods, people, 
ideas, etc.  As anthropologist Brian Larkin maintains “infrastructures are the material forms that 
allow for exchange over space….[the] totality of technical and cultural systems that create 
institutionalized structures whereby goods of all sorts circulate, connecting and binding people 
into collectivities.”345 Following the circulation of cement in postwar Casablanca brings to light 
an aspect of this politics and poetics often lost in discussions of already existing built 
infrastructures—even those characterized by constant breakdown.  This is that infrastructures 
depend on the flow of labor and materials for both their construction and maintenance.346 Larkin 
also argues that scholars must become attuned to the ways in which technical governance blends 
with aesthetic imaginaries in the everyday construction and management of water, road, and 
electricity networks.347 Infrastructures in this reading are not the mundane backdrop to 
modernization projects, but central spectacles of colonial power—stages for performing 
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promises of technological development.348 While Protectorate and post-Protectorate planners and 
engineers certainly indulged in their own visions of a techno-utopian future—with vivid reports 
of new dams and power stations—a more austere ethics emerged alongside these celebrations—a 
poetics of infrastructural lack. Urbanists like Mas, imagined scarcity as a virtue and equated 
bricolage in the bidonvilles with cultural authenticity.349  
In the postwar period, the pipes, roads, and sewers necessary to service single-family 
homes for Moroccan residents remained far more costly than housing construction itself. At 
times, Protectorate planners justified delaying connections to Moroccan neighborhoods by 
calling attention to the consumption patterns of local residents. While a European family used 
five hundred liters of water a day on average in 1950, an unconnected Moroccan family was only 
expected to consume one hundred and fifty.350 For administrators, maintaining clean and 
hygienic forms of life for French families in Morocco was a question of “national dignity.”351 Yet 
as Milan pointed out while director of the OCH, the pipes, electrical wires, and paint necessary 
for preserving French dignity constituted 60% of the cost of new constructions and were 
carefully rationed.352 Notions of Moroccan consumption patterns shaped also the physical form 
of the water grid in Casablanca. Even when planners did connect single-family Moroccan 
housing, they used thinner lead pipes than those intended for European apartment buildings and 
villas.353  
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Electricity especially seemed a luxury to French administrators for whom it was “socially 
and politically more useful to house Moroccan populations rather than extending the power 
grid.”354 While administrators assumed that Moroccan families were accustomed to limited 
water, they imagined locals as excessive, undisciplined consumers of electricity. In the first year 
of its publication, the nationalist daily, Al ʿAlam, reported on state-imposed power cuts and the 
various exceptions created for industrial production.355 In the spring of 1949, with rivers low and 
hydroelectric production reduced, the authorities attempted to limit electricity consumption 
through surcharges, individual shut offs, and eventually planned blackouts for entire 
neighborhoods.356 The image of Moroccans as unruly consumers of electricity blended with other 
forms of colonial anxiety as anticolonial resistance intensified in the early 1950s and officials 
scrambled to increase security at power stations.357  Fears of sabotage at the power plant in 
Meknes, for instance, justified the allocation of another 100 million francs to secure an electricity 
grid that disproportionately served Europeans at the expense of local residents.358 
There was a distinct temporality to infrastructure building under the postwar Protectorate. 
Practices of delay and deferral characterized the construction of connections for much of the new 
Moroccan housing during this period. One project for seventy-one worker houses in Marrakesh’s 
Industrial Quarter was initially conceived as a model for safe, cheap, and hygienic housing. With 
concrete for the framework, masonry from local quarries, and the adaptation of “indigenous” 
waterproofing methods the project was one of many that sought to capture local forms of 
expertise in an effort to build as quickly and as inexpensively as possible. Before construction 
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even began, however, the promises of safe and hygienic housing had begun to erode. While the 
municipality planned to enlarge the existing sewer system to include the Industrial Quarter by the 
end of 1952, no corresponding extension of the water distribution system was scheduled. One of 
the project’s engineers, Papet, delayed installing plumbing until plans for connecting the housing 
project to water infrastructure were in place. By October of 1952 with ninety worker houses 
nearly completed, both water and sewer connections remained a pipe dream. The administration 
feared that a project originally imagined as a hygienic solution to the housing crisis would itself 
become a public health hazard upon occupation.  A year later, in the fall of 1953, the project 
remained uninhabited and unconnected to water, sewer, or electricity grids. With orders from the 
assistant director of Public Works to move residents into the homes as quickly as possible, the 
projects’ engineers proposed the temporary solution of taking water from the nearby seguia of 
Targa.  As the region’s head engineer noted, “the water [of the seguia] is obviously polluted; but 
the natives of the nearby douar use it. There is no question of filtering this water to remove the 
materials suspended in it, which would prove extremely costly with unpredictable results. Instead 
we could simply limit ourselves to withdrawals on days when the water is not too murky.”359    
Assumptions about differing bodily needs and consumption patterns embedded a logic of 
racial difference into the urban infrastructural projects of the French state in Morocco.360 At the 
same time, the delayed attachment of Moroccan housing to water and electricity grids served an 
explicitly security-centered function, especially in the growing bidonvilles on the outskirts of 
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major Moroccan cities. While European residents and state officials blamed Casablanca’s two 
major slums, Beni Msik and the Carrières centrales for the outbreak of various urban epidemics 
during the 1930s and 1940s, “hygienic” measures in these zones often seemed designed for rapid 
entry by colonial police forces more than cleanliness. The first telephone lines—supported by 
concrete utility poles—that extended into Casablanca’s bidonvilles connected outlying police 
posts to central stations.361 In 1948, the Resident General Alphonse Juin noted that in the 
bidonvilles, “There is no question of bringing [electrical] current into the homes of inhabitants, 
but perfunctory public lighting must be carried out in each douar.”362 Opening and illuminating 
streets in the qaryan to facilitate easy access by colonial police forces remained the first priority 
of Casablanca’s municipal government until 1952.  
Ellen Amster has suggested that “in Morocco, the colonial separation of races into two 
cities—madina and ville nouvelle—impeded the unification of a municipal sewer system and 
made waterborne illness a disease category tied to race.”363 This argument applies as readily to 
Casablanca as to Fez or Marrakesh. In the context of formal segregation, the placement of pipes 
was inseparable from the production of racialized bodies as Europeans and Moroccans gained 
asymmetrical access to hygienic resources. The point, however, is that once constructed, 
municipal sewer systems depended on a network of repair and material distribution that at times 
threatened to undermine the very categories they were meant to enact. Waterborne diseases 
traveled from Moroccan neighborhoods to European centers. Asymmetrical distributions of 
cement were also implicated in these public health crises. An outbreak of typhoid fever in May 
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of 1945 contaminated much of the Casablanca’s water supply. In response, municipal public 
health authorities requested an exceptional fifty tons of cement to repair damaged sewer 
connections in an effort to slow the disease’s spread.364 Repair work in such cases had the dual 
purpose of containing contamination and shoring up the separation between European and 
Moroccan bodies.  
While promoting an ethos of limited connection for Moroccan residents, Protectorate 
officials also found opportunities to stage French grandeur through the concrete pipes of 
Casablanca’s water grid. By the late 1940s, consumption in the city had nearly exhausted nearby 
water sources, pushing municipal engineers to tap rivers deeper into the Chaouia. Reinforced 
concrete was the preferred vehicle for this infrastructural extension. One project to transport 
water from the Oum Er-Rbia depended on new types of flexible concrete pipes like those 
designed by the SOCOMAN corporation. In their application for the Oum Er-Rbia contract, the 
Société Commerciale et Minère pour l’Afrique du Nord cast the pipe itself as the 
“materialization of considerable technical progress”—a manifestation of the Protectorate’s social 
vision and economic mission.365 They emphasized the pipe’s qualities as a “Cartesian” product 
and charted its transnational expansion from France and North Africa to the U.S., Cuba, 
Argentina, and Chile.366   
Just as Casablanca’s water grid depended on the concrete pipes produced by SOCOMAN 
or the Société Tuyaux Bonna, these companies depended on a regulated network for ensuring 
their access to scarce cement. Public ceremonies celebrating the extension of Casablanca’s 
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infrastructures were also occasions for the performance of colonial power.367 High officials, 
industrialists, and Moroccan notables assembled in 1950 for the opening of a new factory for the 
Tuyaux Bonna company that included a visit to the construction sites where workers installed 
five meter long, eleven ton concrete tubes that would eventually connect the Si Said Machou 
dam to water consumers in Casablanca.368 A group led by the director of Public Works included a 
number of qaʾids, pashas, and khalifas from Casablanca and the surrounding areas. Welcomed 
with speeches and scale-models, this group then proceeded to a segment of the 76 km long 
construction site to observe the coordinated efforts of three teams of workers as they lowered 
massive segments of pipes into a trench.   
One member of the group described the clouds of dust thrown up at every stop and the 
desert of debris surrounding each of the sites. The movements of this procession of Moroccan 
and European officials—from the factory to the scale model to the construction sites— mapped 
out a modernist vision of the construction process itself with fabrication, design, and execution 
separated into distinct phases and sites. References to dust and debris portrayed a landscape 
turned inside out for the needs of urban expansion. Following the visits, the ranking Moroccan 
official M. Zarouki praised the “artisans” of this engineering feat—a term that ambiguously 
lumped together the labor of construction workers, engineers, and industrialists.369 The European 
and Moroccan notables who participated in such events portrayed development as a collective 
process—a category that papered over the unequal distribution of stable forms of dwelling and 
attachment in the colony city.  
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Figure 6: “Partial View of the New Tuyaux Bonna Factory,” Paul Guerin, “La nouvelle usine des 
Tuyaux Bonna à Casablanca,” Construire, (May 18, 1950).  
 
 
 
The assumption that Moroccan residents—particularly in the qaryan—would continue to 
tolerate unequal access to cement, water, and electricity compared to Europeans as long as 
gradual improvements continued was central to the strategies of modernist planners from the 
OCH’s housing policies to Écochard’s grand interventions. Practices of delaying access to more 
durable forms of life were bound up with arguments about cultural difference—about Moroccan 
residents ultimately demanding less. In December of 1952, the violence of deferred connection 
and neglect would intersect with more dramatic forms of violence—an eruption that provoked a 
reformulation of categories for thinking and techniques for managing the colonial city.   
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Violent Matter and the Riots of December 1952 
The urban uprising that took place in Casablanca in December of 1952 shattered the 
official vision of a carefully managed social peace. Following the riots and the deadly reprisals 
carried out by European residents and the colonial police force, state administrators and 
nationalist politicians alike cast the outbreak of violence as an inevitability. Both groups 
identified the proximate causes of the events that began in Carrières centrales on the morning of 
December 7th as the assassination of the Tunisian trade unionist leader Farhat Hached and the 
calls for a general strike by Moroccan trade unions and members of the nationalist Istiqlal party. 
Inspectors investigating the origins of the uprising singled out nationalist and communist 
political organizing in Casablanca’s largest bidonvilles as the true culprit.370 In official reports, 
the police described how groups of Moroccan men moved through the streets attacking 
Europeans in and around the Carrières centrales. At multiple junctures, these groups encountered 
patrols of armed mokhazem—colonial auxiliaries—who opened fire on the crowds. Although 
numerous disputes emerged over the official numbers, hundreds of Moroccans were likely killed 
during the course of the riots along with at least four Europeans.371 Hundreds more were arrested 
including seven European members of the Communist Party.  
Nationalist historians and institutions memorialized the events of December 1952 as the 
most dramatic scene of sacrifice in the struggle for independence—notably by renaming the 
Carrières centrales “Hay Mohammadi” after the reigning sovereign.372 At times, this has 
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involved downplaying the role of union organizers and labor mobilization and recasting the riots 
as a spontaneous eruption of anti-colonial sentiment.373 Historians have analyzed the complex 
factors that contributed to the outbreak violence and the role of the uprising in hastening the fall 
of the Protectorate.374 I am interested instead in how the uprising and its aftermath unfolded 
within an urban environment marked by the distribution of disruptive materialities. This is not to 
suggest that the placement of construction sites or scattered piles of cinder blocks somehow 
caused the riots—although colonial police officials were quick to attribute urban unrest to a 
disorderly landscape as well as communist and nationalist agitators. My aim is to place the 
eruption of colonial and anti-colonial violence within the same frame as the slow violence of 
calculated delays, planed neglect, and the uneven arrangement of secure forms of dwelling. 
Following the announcement of the general strike, the Chef de la Region, Philippe 
Boniface dispatched troops to the Carrières centrales on December 7th. These soldiers circulated 
in the neighborhood along with representatives of the Pasha informing inhabitants that the strike 
had been forbidden.375 That evening, a large group of protesters surrounded a local police station 
chanting and throwing rocks and other debris. Reinforcements, composed mostly of mokhazem, 
arrived and attempted to disperse the crowds. Pursuing protesters through the maze of worksites 
in the qaryan, detachments of troops engaged in a number of small skirmishes that left an 
unknown number of rioters dead along with two mokhazem. In state accounts produced shortly 
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after the riot, the urban environment itself figured as a kind of hostile entity in these encounters. 
Casablanca at the time was a city teaming with construction in both European and Moroccan 
neighborhoods. The presence of construction sites—emptied by the general strike and filled with 
now dangerous stocks of concrete blocks—made the Carrières centrales an unruly terrain for 
colonial police forces attempting to reestablish order. Across this landscape, “what followed was 
a confusing skirmish during the course of which six mokhzanis were isolated and assaulted by 
the rioters. The post was abandoned. The neighborhood is vast and covered with numerous 
construction sites separated by empty lots and quarries.”376 The following morning on December 
8th, a similar incident occurred at another police post in the area, and again colonial troops fired 
into a crowd of Moroccans killing numerous protesters. Isolated acts of violence, including 
reprisals against Moroccans and the killing of a Spanish nationalist in the qaryan, began to erupt 
throughout the city.377   
At the same time, several funeral processions converged on the cemetery in Beni Msik, 
presumably to bury protesters killed on the first day of the uprising.378 While many of the 
attendees returned home after these funerals, police reports describe how a crowd of four to five 
hundred Moroccans broke off from the main procession near the Rue du Lt-Mannevy and began 
attacking Europeans near the Gironde neighborhood. Members of the crowd were armed with 
stones and other detritus taken from nearby construction sites. Three rioters whom colonial 
police later arrested admitted to throwing fragments of cinder blocks at a Frenchmen, Louis 
Ribes, who was driving through the neighborhood in his car. Two of the accused—Abdelatif ben 
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Kaddour ben Djillali and Ahmed ben Smain ben Lahbib—worked in the building industry as a 
carpenter and painter respectively. Other witnesses described ben Djillali as having thrown 
numerous cinder blocks at Ribes and his vehicle. Rioters smashed in the doors and windows of 
Ribes’ car. Photographs in the colonial archive show the side of a battered Citroën, then the 
interior—a chunk of concrete laying on the seat, fragments of glass strewn on the floorboards. 
According to police, Ribes fired a revolver from his car, injuring two members of the crowd. He 
was then pulled from his car, dragged onto a nearby work site, and beaten to death with a number 
of cinder blocks. Close to Ribes two other Europeans, Henri Ramajo and Norbert Siorat, had 
been pulled from their bicycles—their faces completely smashed in by large pieces of debris and 
discarded materials taken from the site. Only the identity cards they carried made it possible to 
identify the three victims. The police discovered Ribes body last because it had been thrown into 
an excavated portion of the chantier. While some members of crowd had armed themselves with 
knives and other blunt weapons, the police report emphasized that in each case concrete blocks 
dealt the fatal blow and rendered the victims unrecognizable.   
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Figure 7: Interior of Ribes’ Car After the Riots, Photograph enclosed in file from the Director of the 
Interior, Casablanca, January 1953, 1MA/200/375, CADN. 
 
Already in their initial observations, colonial officers imagined the debris-strewn 
landscape of Casablanca as a factor in the unfolding of the riots—a space that amplified and 
channeled the violence in particular directions.379 The concentration of violence on or near 
construction sites also paralleled the participation of workers in the building industry in the 
general strike that preceded the riots. In Casablanca alone, the Interior Administration estimated 
that ninety percent of laborers in the building trades joined the strike with similar numbers in 
Rabat.380 Police described how, on the second day of the uprising, organized groups of locals 
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circulated in the Carrières centrales and Beni M’sik shutting down any remaining work sites and 
forcing those present to stop working.381 For officials, the fact that Casablanca was a space under 
construction helped explained the police’s difficulty in reestablishing order. References to 
weaponized cinder blocks scattered throughout police reports recast a standardized material once 
imagined as a low-cost solution to the rapid construction of Moroccan housing as a vehicle for 
the rapid escalation of violence.   
The cinder blocks thrown by protesters were undoubtedly part of an urban assemblage. I 
draw attention to this fact not to downplay the subjective qualities of violence or to discount the 
motivations of protesters, but to suggest that even intimate acts of harm can generate wide 
ranging effects—reformatting not only subjectivities but also technologies, materials, and 
infrastructures and eventually touching the very core of a “sociotechnical imaginary.”382 If in 
Frantz Fanon’s terms acts of violence could unsettled colonial categories through a reversal of 
roles—the colonized laying claim to a new kind of identity by doing violence to the colonizer—
then this reversal implicated not just the actors but also the stage—Casablanca’s urban landscape 
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attempts to mobilize the excessive qualities of things to rethink the category of the “political” itself.  Elaborating on 
Jacques Rancière’s definition of politics as actions that trouble existing distributions of agency, Bennett argues that 
non-human actors also participate in such disruptions.⁠ When the disruption in question, however, is an act of 
violence—whether structural, symbolic, or intimate— Bennett’s emphasis on non-human participation performs its 
own kind of erasure—minimizing issues of subjectivity, responsibility, and motivation. Given this risk, linking the 
excessive qualities of materials to the violent acts of urban residents in Morocco only makes analytic sense insofar 
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and the modernist fantasies that took material form within it.383 Police officers could confiscate 
knives and make arrests, but the weaponization of urban materials—the literal building blocks of 
a racially segregated colonial city designed by modernist planners—posed a different kind of 
threat. When Abdelatif ben Djillali threw cinder blocks at Louis Ribes, this act of insurgent 
demolition inverted not just colonial categories affixed to bodies, but also narratives about urban 
modernity embedded in construction technologies. In the wake of these violent re-enactments, 
colonial administrators conjoined their concern over the possibility of France’s continued 
presence in Morocco with a growing anxiety about the promises of modernist urbanism in 
general.  
In the aftermath of the riots, urban officials discussed housing segregation—with all of its 
exceptions and problematic in-between categories (poor European workers and wealthy 
Moroccans)—as an insufficient antidote to the forces plaguing the urban social order. During the 
violence, police evacuated European families who remained in the qaryan. Providing shelter for 
these “refugees,” however, proved difficult given the scarcity of housing in the city. The 
municipality envisioned constructing new emergency shelters for evacuees with funds allotted 
for “Moroccan Housing.” The Director of the Interior justified this proposed reallocation of 
resources by suggesting that these temporary shacks would eventually be turned over to 
Moroccan families once more permanent accommodations had been secured for displaced 
European residents.384 The Europeans who fled the Carrières centrales were primarily workers in 
the Industrial Sector and their families. Many were not French citizens, and they tended to 
occupy relatively lower positions within the colonial social hierarchy.  The riot sparked new 
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anxieties about the living conditions of poor Europeans in the kingdom. Shortly after the 
uprising, the Interior Administration embarked on a survey of Europeans inhabiting substandard 
housing or residing in the mudun and bidonvilles of the Protectorate.385 As the police 
reestablished order in the qaryan, most evacuees refused to move back into their homes, 
although, as one official noted, the poorest among them would eventually be forced to return by 
necessity.   
To avoid further violence, those residents who did return were to be rehoused in close 
proximity to the various defensive posts erected in the neighborhood. The administration 
envisioned creating islands of prefabricated European housing with police stations at their center 
for the least well-off residents. Located within Moroccan neighborhoods these islands of 
temporary housing could be rapidly dismantled and moved to other locations in the event of 
renewed violence. Despite their preoccupations with “national dignity,” municipal officials 
considered the prospect of building new homes for poor Europeans en dur ill-suited to the 
current situation and opted instead for the flexibility of prefabricated wooden shelters.386  The 
parallels between these post-1952 debates about where and how to house European workers and 
the state’s history of managing Moroccan bidonvilles themselves are striking. As with conflicts 
over demolition in Derb Ghallaf in the late 1930s, planners and administrators began to regard 
the new Moroccan neighborhoods consisting of permanent constructions, often using concrete as 
potentially more problematic than bidonvilles like Beni Msik and the Carrières centrales.387 The 
less substantial structures of the qaryan, the argument went, could be more easily demolished or 
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relocated when the administration needed to intervene in these neighborhoods for reasons of 
public health or safety. As fears about anti-colonial violence peaked after December 1952, 
officials imagined this same “flexibility” as a broader solution to the problem of urban order. 
“Temporary” housing that could be rapidly demolished and relocated was the ideal form for 
managing working class populations whether European or Moroccan.  
Conclusion 
After the riots of December 1952, Morocco entered an accelerated phase of the 
nationalist struggle. The critical decision to exile a recalcitrant Muhammad V in the summer of 
1953 sparked widespread protests across the Protectorate. From this moment, intermittent 
violence intensified in urban and rural settings.388 Low-cost housing construction continued 
during this period although with less vigor than under Écochard. Cement production increased 
annually, and for the first time, new plants opened outside of Casablanca’s industrial zone. When 
independence came in 1956, cracks in the façade of postwar modernist planning had already 
begun to show as demographic growth continued to out-pace construction and completed 
projects continued to falter.   
Yet focusing on the “failures” of modernist planning ignores the durable arrangements of 
matter that such “failures” produced. The violent environment that postwar policies of material 
distribution left behind did not vanish with independence, nor did the fundamental assumptions 
of Protectorate housing policy. The postcolonial planning authorities envisioned projects for 
surpassing Écochard’s trames that would be even “less expensive and better adapted to the 
customs of the Moroccan population”—two characteristics that were now thoroughly 
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conjoined.389 In the end, however, the period of substantial public investment in low-cost 
housing that surrounded the 1952 uprising would prove the exception rather than the rule, as the 
independent Moroccan state explored other, supposedly more “flexible” solutions such as 
construction cooperatives, prefabrication, and public-private housing finance [Chapter 3]. The 
network of institutions, techno-legal practices, and cultural imaginaries that shaped the 
circulation of cement—the substance necessary for delivering the promises of urban 
modernity—permanently marked Casablanca’s landscape with the political priorities of the 
Protectorate. And yet, these priorities were constantly subverted by cement’s materiality—by the 
ways in which cement was bound up with the agency, aspirations, and sometimes violent 
frustrations of actors outside of the state.   
Independence did not fundamentally alter the practices of clientism and neglect that 
channeled cement’s flow, but it did shift the stakes. Najoui Mukhtar, a long-term resident of 
Casablanca, recounted his memories of this period during an interview. Living in two-room 
“traditional housing” within a company housing project, Mukhtar described the bare simplicity 
of growing up in the Carrières centrales during the Protectorate. While subjected to every sort of 
scarcity in his own neighborhood, he had fond memories of traveling from the Industrial Zone to 
the boulevards and cinemas of the city center. During our conversation, he mourned the decline 
of these spaces—sites of pleasure and privileged for Casablanca’s European residents. A lifelong 
leftist, Mukhtar was not expressing nostalgia for colonialism. Rather he lamented the loss of a 
future passed, a future anterior in which residents like himself would have had unrestricted 
access to the infrastructures and forms of maintenance that made colonial materialities durable 
and desirable markers of the good life. Instead, it was precisely the moment when most 
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Europeans departed and working-class Moroccans hoped to enjoy these forms of life that the 
promises of urban modernity appeared to collapse.390 
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CHAPTER 3 
CRISIS TECHNOLOGIES 
IN AN ERA OF “FLEXIBLE PLANNING” AND DECOLONIZATION 
 
M’hamed Douiri was a “French-Moroccan success story.”391 Born to a “modest family of 
[Fasi] artisans” in 1926, Douiri received one of ten scholarships to study in France in a 
competition sponsored by the Sultan in 1945.392 Once in the metropole, he enrolled at the École 
Polytechnique, then the École des Mines. Douiri returned to the country as the first French-
trained Moroccan mining engineer and soon became involved in nationalist politics.393 He would 
eventually marry into the family of the nationalist leader Ahmed Balafrej. After the 1952 
uprising and the imprisonment of most nationalist cadres, Douiri became a member of Istiqlal’s 
Executive Committee.394 In the final months of the Protectorate, he was appointed Morocco’s 
first Minister of Public Works at the age of twenty-nine. Douiri’s background—a French 
technical education and Fasi family ties—was not uncommon among leading Moroccan 
nationalists, but his specular rise to prominence set him apart. Having witnessed the limits of 
postwar modernist planning and the political impact of the December 1952 uprising, he 
understood the potential efficacy of urban revolt. In a 1962 article for Le monde diplomatique, a 
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matter of months after the signing of the Évian Accords, Douiri, addressed Algeria’s hard fought 
anti-colonial struggle—laying out his vision for a Moroccan alternative.395 Writing in the 
aftermath of the FLN’s victory, Douiri presented himself to the new leaders of Morocco’s 
neighbor as a guide and a kind of older sibling in independence. “The experience [of 
decolonization] confirmed our affective attachment to the elaboration of a greater whole, on the 
scale of the Maghrib, and opened toward the outside world.”396 
Charting a course that would diverge sharply from the modernization projects of a 
socialist Algeria, Douiri celebrated the fact that “our country is among those that have adopted 
the principle of flexible planning [la planification souple].”397  On paper this meant supporting a 
mixture of public and private investments in both urban and rural modernization projects. In 
practice, flexible planning was about transforming the relationship between the state, Muslim 
elites, experts, and the urban poor as a reaction to Morocco’s intensifying housing shortages, 
continuous urban unrest, and limited municipal budgets. In response to challenges to colonial 
authority in cities like Casablanca during the final years of the Protectorate, practitioners of 
“flexible planning” developed a novel set of technical, financial, and organizational strategies 
that aimed to resolve and re-scale Morocco’s urban crisis by creating new kinds of semi-
autonomous and indebted subjects. Douiri oversaw the continuation of these strategies of 
“flexible planning” during the transition to independence.    
This chapter traces techniques of housing finance, construction cooperatives, and the 
changing politics of housing construction from the early 1950s through the transition to 
independence in 1956. In modernist definitions of Morocco’s urban crisis, bidonvilles remained 
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the central source of anxiety and the main target of interventions by the Protectorate’s planning 
offices. Experiments with state-financed housing projects, such as Aïn Chock, had proven too 
costly for state accountants and too durable for architects enamored with more flexible 
constructions. With budgets constrained and unrest on the rise during the postwar period, an 
array of offices, institutions, and urban professionals sought new “experimental” solutions to the 
housing crisis that accompanied and outlasted Écochard’s policies of “housing for the greatest 
possible number.”398  
By centering strategies like prefabrication and institutions like the Compagnie 
immobilière franco-marocaine (CIFM), this chapter suggests that the most lasting legacy of 
colonial urban interventions in the Carrières centrales was not the new architectural and urban 
forms pioneered by Écochard, Pierre Mas, Shadrach Woods, or Georges Candillis, but rather a 
collection of crisis technologies. Between Casablanca’s urban uprising in December 1952 and 
Morocco’s independence in 1956, Protectorate planners and officials confronted a range of urban 
problems: a renewed nationalist movement that encouraged open revolt in cities and rural areas, 
a continuing housing shortage in cities like Casablanca in spite of new public housing initiatives, 
the ongoing resistance of slum-dwellers to displacement and demolition, and a tightening of 
colonial budgets in response to metropolitan concerns about the future of French rule in 
Morocco.             
Three interlocking technologies enabled planners, accountants, engineers, and foremen to 
navigate these constraints while transforming violence and neglect into value: prefabrication, 
housing cooperatives, and new finance models. I argue that these technologies offered three ways 
of inverting the “problems” of low-cost housing construction. They thus turned a drain on state 
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resources and a source of violent tensions into strategies for the accumulation of resources and 
the harnessing of labor. Prefabrication permitted a rescaling of expertise—a means of inscribing 
forms of previously complex and multi-sited technical surveillance into a single artifact—yet 
ultimately failed to replace the on-site fabrication of standardized cinder blocks. Construction 
cooperatives and new strategies of work-site management seized on and attempted to mobilize 
forms of building that state planners had previously considered threatening. Financial 
mechanisms, like small, low-interest loans made Moroccan workers responsible for the 
construction of their own housing and indebted to state and public-private institutions. These 
crisis technologies offered Protectorate officials and their postcolonial successors a means of 
managing subversive forms of building and dwelling in Moroccan neighborhoods while 
generating revenue (both on and off the books). All of this while continuing to equate simplicity, 
flexibility, and lack with cultural authenticity.   
While attending to the relatively simple credit arrangements that Protectorate-era officials 
engineered, it is worth recalling a few core principles from recent scholarship on how finance 
works in practice. Social studies of finance have contested the virtual, immaterial qualities of 
financial objects and practices by asserting “the materiality of markets: their physicality, 
corporeality, technicality.”399 In my analysis of housing finance during postwar Protectorate, I 
treat the materiality of Morocco’s real estate markets as a given. Rather than simply asserting 
that calculative and speculative practices remain material, I follow how state officials concerned 
with housing finance encountered the materiality of the built world as both obstacle and vehicle 
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for the creation of value. Fin-du-Protectorat financial techniques that targeted the urban poor 
were not simply political strategies for distributing debt. They were also a means of distributing 
matter and of re-distributing the state.400 New credit arrangements between Moroccan residents 
and public-private institutions came with requirements about how, where, and what to build. 
Low-interest loans for housing construction tied urban residents to a particular set of 
materialities—standardized materials and construction technologies that depended upon the 
continued presence of French experts in the country. 
The brief and rocky history of prefabrication in the last decade of the Protectorate 
provides a case study for thinking through the kinds of technopolitical projects that resulted 
when modernist fantasies collapsed into failure. The examples of new housing finance programs 
and new practices of work-site organization offer insight into the kinds of techniques and 
concepts that persisted in the aftermath of these failures—assumptions and strategies that would 
be built upon and elaborated decades later during the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s.401 Decolonization only amplified the conditions that made these technologies appear as 
possible solutions to crisis. After independence, the first generation of postcolonial Moroccan 
officials reacted to further reductions in state budgets by suggesting that low-income Moroccans 
who invested their (uncompensated) labor in housing construction were engaged in the project of 
building the nation itself. The complex interplay between the different crisis technologies 
discussed in this chapter reveals the overlap and the shared limitations of nationalist and colonial 
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visions of Morocco’s urban future during the process of decolonization.  
Prefabrication and Modernist Failure 
The postwar history of prefabrication in Morocco constituted a “technopolitical” process 
in at least two respects.402 First, prefab technologies played a central role in the scale-making 
projects of Protectorate planners who indulged in the dream of managing urban disorder through 
the regulation of technical minutiae.403 In defining the potentialities and risks of prefabricated 
methods in a colonial setting, officials and engineers also contributed to a vision of Moroccan 
labor as cheap and unskilled and of Moroccan environments and materials as risky and 
unreliable. Second, prefabrication redrew the network of actors and agencies implicated in the 
construction process—linking together new sites, institutions, and forms of knowledge. At the 
same time, Morocco’s early experiments with prefabrication largely failed according to their own 
criteria—especially when compared to the history of housing finance and construction 
cooperatives. Prefabricated building components were neither shipped from Europe nor 
manufactured in Morocco on a large enough scale to alleviate housing shortages. Moreover, even 
when selectively deployed in temporary or emergency housing, prefabricated materials often 
proved ill-suited to conditions in the interior of the country. While the fantasy of a homogeneous 
national territory across which housing technologies could seamlessly travel never materialized, 
this failure opened up a practical and discursive space—sparking a search for new technofixes to 
Morocco’s urban problems. Techno-failures also strengthened the conviction of certain actors 
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within the colonial and postcolonial state that “flexible” urban policies based on the exploitation 
of local materials, cheap labor, and traditional methods represented the most expedient option in 
a time of crisis.   
Protectorate officials used the term “prefabrication” in a broad sense—sometimes to refer 
to the project of mass-producing entire homes, sometimes simply to housing components 
manufactured in a factory setting and assembled on site. During the postwar period, the Housing 
Administration operated workshops in Rabat that manufactured housing units, cell by cell, then 
transported them on-site to be positioned over already existing foundations.404 Various 
workshops also produced concrete slabs and other components that were shipped to work sites 
across the country. Advocates of these methods emphasized their speed vis-a-vis “traditional” 
mortar and masonry constructions.405 In official documents and engineering journals, references 
to fully prefabricated housing units and their potential appeared alongside discussions of 
Morocco’s housing crisis and the need for rapid resolutions. Ultimately though, cinder blocks—
portrayed as a cheaper and more flexible option for low-cost building—dominated new housing 
construction, in spite of the poor thermal insulation they provided. 
The prefabricated concrete house and the cinder-block house represented two different 
political technologies—two means of scaling the problem of scarce housing.406 Prefabrication 
centralized the technical surveillance involved in housing construction and the majority of the 
physical labor. In one of the major models of prefabrication supported by the OCH, a network of 
small, open-air factories situated across Morocco would supply low-cost housing units to urban 
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populations within a radius of fifteen to twenty kilometers.407 Prefab housing was modular by 
definition, with units expected to perform identically regardless of their location.408 The 
underlying logic of prefabrication implied tightened, centralized control over labor, dominance 
of design over execution, the flattening out of local conditions, and the replication of 
homogeneous forms. Yet these affordances clashed with the on-the-ground political relations that 
made up Morocco’s urban fabric. Prefabrication generated friction when experimental methods 
encountered patterns of urban segregation and uneven development between the coastal 
regions—known since the early days of the Protectorate as le Maroc utile—and the neglected 
interior—le Maroc inutile.   
Cinder blocks, on the other hand, could be manufactured on site (or in a factory setting) 
using standardized metallic molds. As a flexible, decentralized method, cinder-block housing 
varied in form and quality and was often constructed beyond the regulatory reach of the state. 
Still, cinder blocks fit the political priorities of the postwar Protectorate and the municipal 
administrations of the early independence-era. As an imperfectly standardized form not radically 
distinct from older masonry constructions—cinder-block housing filled the gaps where more 
iconic and expensive modernist housing projects failed to reach. In contrast to the techno-utopian 
aura surrounding prefabrication—visions of mass-production and full-housing—the cinder block 
was the material embodiment of colonial austerity. Though quite often indistinguishable in both 
form and in terms of the materials used in their construction (both were primarily composed of 
concrete components)—the prefab house and the cinder-block house differed in terms of how 
their materialities were bound up with various political futures imagined at the end of 
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Protectorate. Prefabrication fit into the bold modernist visions of architects and engineers who 
envisioned housing construction as a rationalized, industrialized, and ultimately placeless 
process. Official tolerance and even encouragement of cinder-block housing betrayed colonial 
assumptions that Moroccan materialities and the technologies used to produce them would 
remain inferior to metropolitan ones.  
By 1947 the OCH was the primary institution advocating for expanding prefab strategies 
within the Protectorate’s housing programs. Officials there cast prefabrication as a cutting-edge 
construction technology and an industry that could be developed in Morocco with the eventual 
goal of exporting prefabricated materials elsewhere.409 The office hired contractors from Europe 
to set up shop in Morocco. Having fulfilled their state contracts, however, these companies 
proved unable to compete with brick and cinder block manufacturers.410 One of these 
contractors, Roger Adam, received praise from administrators for the efficiency of his methods 
and the aesthetic qualities of the structures themselves but also encountered skepticism over the 
technical aspects of his Casablanca-based project.411 For members of the Service de l’Urbanisme, 
prefabrication retained its reputation as a “process of the future, but it will not attain its full 
potential until our industries have arrived at a level that will allow them to produce metallic 
houses through either press forming or folding like the body of an automobile.”412 The vision of 
whole houses manufactured on a Fordist assembly line never came to fruition in Morocco, but 
planners maintained that the “principle of prefabrication” when applied to specific building 
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components could still revolutionize construction work on a grand scale.413   
At the height of Morocco’s housing shortages, a number of firms explored the possibility 
of shipping prefabricated structures from Europe to Morocco en masse. Prefabricated 
components could be unloaded in Casablanca, then distributed across the country and assembled 
on site in various locales. This approach, however, was never seriously attempted due to the high 
cost and logistical difficulties of transport. Instead companies like the British firm, Wates 
Limited, proposed establishing factories for producing prefabricated components in Morocco 
itself.414 The firm promised that a network of small workshops with no more than fifty 
workers—sixty percent of whom could be women—could supply ten houses per week each.415 
The OCH’s director Milan became enamored with such proposals that allowed for the 
introduction of new standardized materials and processes “born of the war” that used only half 
the material of “traditional constructions.”416 For Milan, prefabrication offered a means of 
reducing the need for skilled Moroccan workers through a “mechanization of labor on the 
construction site.”417 The OCH’s enthusiasm for the Wates program ran afoul of the 
Protectorate’s Finance Administration, however, which was reluctant to introduce a “foreign 
firm” into Morocco and worked to limit the scale of the project.418 State accountants pointed out 
that projects like Wates Limited’s—though requiring specialized plans, engineers, and imported 
components—used materials that were “effectively identical to those necessary for traditional 
Moroccan constructions.”419  Associations with speed and efficiency aside, prefabricated housing 
 
413 Service de l’urbanisme et de l’architecture, “Quelques idées sur la politique de l’urbanisme et du logement au 
Maroc,” 1947, 1MA/200/303, CADN. 
414 Wates Ltd. to Milan, Directeur de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat, November 1, 1945, E0686,AM. 
415 Wates Ltd. to Milan, Directeur de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat, November 1, 1945, E0686,AM. 
416 Milan, Directeur de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat to le Directeur des Finances, June 8, 1946, E0686, AM. 
417 Milan, Directeur de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat to le Directeur des Finances, June 8, 1946, E0686, AM. 
418 Directeur des Finance to Milan, le Directeur de l'Office chérifien de l’habitat, May 23, 1946, E0686, AM. 
419 Veron and de Lattre, “L’enquête effectuée à l'Office chérifien de l’habitat," Inspection générale des finances, 
March-April 1948, E0817, AM, 48. 
 159 
lacked the grand performative qualities of multi-story modernist housing or infrastructural 
projects and remained visually indistinguishable from other forms of minimum housing. 
The U.S. military presence in Morocco during the Second World War had instilled a 
certain appreciation for American construction methods among French engineers and planners. 
New wartime building technologies came to represent the cutting edge for these expert 
communities.420 The administration’s use of prefab methods expanded during the postwar period 
but remained confined to small-scale projects. A major impetus for the state’s reinvestment in 
prefabrication came in the aftermath of Michel Écochard’s housing policies in Casablanca and 
the remaking of the Carrières centrales during the early 1950s. While Écochard’s trames 8x8 
were undoubtedly cheap—using a mixture of cinder blocks, bricks, and concrete slabs for the 
terraces—they relied on “traditional” construction methods as well as local skilled and unskilled 
labor.421 Opponents and successors criticized aspects of  Écochard’s plans, singling out these 
methods as too slow to counter the need for rapid construction and proposing American 
prefabrication technologies as an alternative.422  The U.S.-based Le Tourneau company 
introduced a system for pouring concrete into a standardized mold for a four-walled cell-unit that 
could be transported on a specialized vehicle to construction sites.423 In this process, only a small 
portion of the work—laying the foundations—had to be carried out on the construction site itself. 
Not only were far fewer laborers required, but they were spatially spread across different sites 
rather than clustered on a single chantier. In the aftermath of the December 1952 Casablanca 
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riots, the Protectorate administration was likely more attuned to the dangers of concentrating 
workers and materials on construction sites during moments of urban unrest. 
 
 
Figure 8: Vehicle for Transporting Prefab Units, “Congrès nord africain du bâtiment et des travaux 
publics” (Casablanca, April 13, 1953), 577, BMHPV. 
 
Advocates of prefabrication in both Europe and North Africa promised to reorganize 
work sites along the lines of the Taylorist factory—rationally restructuring the process of 
building and the hierarchical relations between experts and laborers.424 The need for 
 
424 For discussions of prefabrication in other contexts see Amy E. Slaton, Reinforced Concrete and the 
Modernization of American Building, 1900-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Adrian Forty, 
Concrete and Culture: A Material History (London: Reaktion Books, 2016); Krisztina Fehérváry, Politics in Color 
and Concrete: Socialist Materialities and the Middle Class in Hungary. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2013). 
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prefabricated elements to travel seamlessly between multiple sites, however, undermined this 
project. A Belgian engineer, Maurice Delange, noted in 1950 that “as regards prefabrication 
itself, which aims to provide housing in the same way as an automobile or any other sort of 
ready-to-use machine, the problems of execution are far from resolved.”425 As concrete elements 
moved from specialized workshops, to stocking facilities, and eventually to work sites, they were 
subject to shifts in temperature and humidity that could lead to decay and deterioration. For some 
French engineers, the introduction of prefabricated concrete components created as many 
problems as it aimed to solve, particularly when the crews in charge of their installation were 
inexperienced.426 Architects and planners expressed a different set of concerns about 
prefabrication’s future in Morocco. Écochard became a cautious supporter of prefabrication 
while remaining concerned about the difficulties of thermal and sound insulation for this new 
type building.427 
Arguments in favor of prefabrication as a solution to material scarcity and work-site 
discipline clashed with interests within the state that continued to equate cultural authenticity 
with austerity.  The major public housing finance institution, the Caisse de Prêts Immobiliers, 
refused to issue loans for the construction of prefabricated housing, citing the lower cost and 
proven track record of “traditional” constructions.428 Concern over how prefabricated materials 
would behave in Morocco’s supposedly unruly climate also played a role in limiting the 
involvement of housing lenders in these projects.429 Lamy, the Director of Finances, went as far 
as to suggest that experimental technologies like prefabrication were ill-suited to the needs of 
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low-income Moroccan residents who ought to “be satisfied with a construction that is simple, but 
with a solid structure, which they can be sure will last long after they have repaid their 
mortgages.”430 In this articulation, the source of risk was less prefabricated methods themselves 
than the unpredictable nature of local conditions in Morocco. Any failure of prefabrication to 
translate into a workable housing solution contributed to a vision of Morocco as a risky space for 
investment. The “solution” proposed by the Finance Administration—continuing to invest in 
“simple,” “traditional constructions” —was predicated on the assumption that Moroccan labor 
was and would remain radically cheaper than in the metropole.431 Continued austerity and the 
devaluation of labor—the argument went—was a more solid guarantee of value than any 
presumed technological advantage that prefabrication presented.  
While these perceived limitations and the opposition of the Morocco’s lenders curtailed 
their expansion in urban settings, prefab units played a different role at the margins of empire. 
Prefabricated housing allowed administrators and military officials to make their sparse presence 
felt across distant corners of the Protectorate. A rapidly deployed prefab villa for a local French 
officer in a rural commune served as material manifestation of the state’s authority. The 
Protectorate’s Public Works Administration made ample use of prefabricated chalets 
manufactured in Europe such as those imported by the Fabrima Company for the Distribution 
and Installation of Prefabricated Housing in Casablanca.432 These chalets, which could be 
assembled and disassembled with relative ease, would serve as temporary homes or offices for 
the administration’s personnel on far-flung work sites. Public Works officials flipped through 
catalogs of stand-alone structures and blueprints provided by Fabrima. The plan for the 
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construction of one model known as the “Villégiature” suggests the ways in which prefabrication 
fit into metropolitan imaginaries of colonial technology.433 Page one depicts a completed version 
of Fabrima’s “Pavillon 7” flanked by palm trees and other tropical flora. The scenery is vague 
but suggestive of the model’s capacity to fit seamlessly into a variety of colonial climes. At the 
same time, the term villégiature evoked images of leisure and rural retreat—comfort and 
tranquility for the unit’s European inhabitants.  
 
 
433 Génie civil et bâtiment (Paris), "Pavillon 7: Type 'Villégiature'" [undated], G1360, AM. 
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Figure 9: "Pavillon 7: Type 'Villégiature'" Génie civil et bâtiment (Paris), [undated], G1360, AM. 
 
Like other forms of housing in the postwar Protectorate, prefab units were racially 
marked, albeit more subtly than the “techno-cosmopolitan” hybrid architecture of the interwar 
period.434 In postwar Europe and the U.S., prefabrication evoked images of standardized, 
uniform housing—notions of modernity associated with placelessness and homogeneity. The 
 
434 Rabinow, French Modern, 278. 
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idea being that, when regarding the façade of a prefabricated home, one could make few 
assumptions about the type of subjects living inside. This conceit proved threatening in 
Morocco’s segregated urban landscape where official policy dictated that racial divisions 
between subjects ought to emerge through housing forms. In their negotiations with prefab 
suppliers, the OCH made clear that standardized housing units were to visually maintain 
distinctions between Muslim, Jewish, and European residents. The administration’s initial 
contract with Wates Limited, specified that the company was to provide two hundred and fifty 
prefabricated “double villas” for Europeans.435 These “villas”—though subdivided into two 
separate and much smaller units— were intended to give the outward impression of colonial 
luxury.  In contrast, prefab units for Moroccans were characterized by their very lack of 
ornamentation. In Casablanca’s slum removal campaigns, prefabrication was meant to replace 
the already stripped down “old Moroccan methods” for building minimum housing while 
reproducing the visual form of the trame 8x8 with lightweight, whitewashed concrete walls.436 
One aim of prefabrication was a rescaling of expertise—an attempt to horizontally 
reproduce the same hierarchical relations between laborers and engineers across different work 
sites. The failures of prefabricated materials to travel seamlessly across Morocco’s fractured 
geography betrayed and reinforced the state’s continued weakness in the interior of country. 
Methods developed during the slum removal campaigns of Casablanca fell short when applied in 
Marrakesh, for example. As unrest intensified in the summer of 1955, officials in Marrakesh 
called in new police contingents to reestablish order in the city. To house these incoming officers, 
the Service de l’Urbanisme planned to build a development of prefabricated chalets. 437 
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Marrakesh’s chief contrôleur civil protested, however, that previous versions of these 
prefabricated structures had proven ill-adapted to the local climate. Citing the security situation 
in Marrakesh, the contrôleur civil  argued that “experience has demonstrated multiple times the 
extent to which these dwellings offer poor protection from the heat, hence the difficulty for the 
[police] personnel to rest comfortably, exhaustion, irritation, and as a result, actions that are 
damaging to morale and to the composure that is indispensable for agents of the state.”438 Urban, 
anti-colonial violence formed the backdrop to this discussion about the housing needs of police 
officers. Outside of Casablanca, the temporal demands of rapid construction clashed with those 
of daily, bodily reproduction. The failure of these units to ensure basic levels of comfort 
threatened prefabrication’s promise to resolve urban unrest by redistributing, redeploying, and 
rescaling the state to meet the needs of distinct security situations. Despite the supposed urgency 
of reestablishing order, Marrakesh’s head police official envisioned delaying the entire project by 
two to three months in order to replace at least a portion of the prefabricated structures with 
“classic constructions.”439 The bodily comfort of police forces trumped even the frantic temporal 
imperatives of urban crisis.  
During the period of heightened urban unrest from the early 1950s to independence, 
programs for evacuating Europeans from Moroccan quarters also relied on prefab methods. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the official responses to the December 1952 Casablanca riots 
included projects for rehousing evacuated Europeans in prefabricated wooden structures.440 As 
adaptable technologies that could be rapidly deployed and relocated, prefab constructions 
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embodied the uncertain political future of the Protectorate itself. The final years of French rule 
witnessed a reshuffling of urban populations, as the administration either evacuated Europeans 
living in Morocco’s mudun or encouraged them to move to the New Cities along with 
“francophile Moroccans” who could be subject to reprisals.441 Prefabrication served as a stopgap 
measure in these moments of unrest, providing a temporary solution for state officials 
increasingly preoccupied with urban security. This association with semi-permanence and 
flexibility extended to the uses of prefabrication in slum clearance campaigns during 
decolonization. As displaced residents from the Carrières centrales and elsewhere were pushed 
farther to the outskirts of Casablanca, “temporary” rehousing programs offered a means of 
reaffirming the state’s promise to provide affordable housing without committing the necessary 
resources. The rehousing project in Sidi Bernoussi, for example, included experiments with 
prefab plastic roofing and light-weight concrete blocks.442 Postcolonial officials praised these 
methods, noting that they would allow for the eventual rebuilding of the neighborhood en dur at 
a later date. Prefabrication thus played a role in these strategies of continuous deferral, 
particularly as the construction industry began to slow in the years following Morocco’s 
independence.   
To suggest that prefabrication represented a failed technopolitical project is not to 
downplay the fact the prefab methods and materials circulated widely in Morocco before and 
after the experiments of the 1940s and 50s. Rather, it was the notion of transforming housing 
itself through mass production and the centralization of labor and expertise that ultimately fell 
short, especially in the years following decolonization. When applied in practice, techniques like 
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prefabrication—considered cutting-edge by the Protectorate’s housing authority—looked more 
like stopgap security measures than a housing revolution. Prefabrication’s inability to translate 
outside the coastal zone of le Maroc utile also revealed patterns of uneven development and 
encouraged the state’s shift in emphasis from technical to the financial and organizational 
strategies associated with “flexible planning.”  At the very moment of centralized planning’s 
supposed apex in Morocco, state and corporate actors began to turn instead to a new set of 
technologies that aimed to decentralize the problem of housing while turning the urban poor into 
entrepreneurial and permanently indebted subjects. 
"The Attraction of Property": Debt and the CIFM 
The strategies of housing finance developed during the 1940s and 1950s introduced new 
types of personal indebtedness to Morocco’s urban working classes. Public-private corporations 
like the CIFM (Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine) explored alternatives to direct state 
investment in housing during and after the Écochard era. These alternatives embodied particular 
assumptions about precisely which aspects of the modernist urban project would fail. The search 
for new strategies to finance low-income housing also involved re-imagining and attempting to 
remake existing class relations in Morocco between Muslim notables and the urban poor.    
Official anxieties over the use and abuse of certain building materials—such as concrete 
in the unregulated constructions of the New Medina [Chapter 2]—paralleled concern over certain 
categories of investors. On the one hand, the specter of the speculator perturbed planners and 
officials in the Service de l’Urbanisme. Fast moving and under-regulated capital in Casablanca’s 
real estate market threatened to undermine the political goals of Protectorate’s housing policy 
and to exacerbate social tensions. On the other hand, the figure of the Muslim urban notable 
represented one of the core obstacles to capital’s circulation. In Casablanca and elsewhere, 
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French officials blamed Muslim notables for failing to invest adequately in low-cost housing. 
Notables stood accused of shirking both their duties to the economy as potential capitalists and 
their responsibilities to the urban poor as “traditional” elites.  
Downplaying the contributions of Muslim notables while continuing to maintain the 
colonial state’s visibility as a provider of welfare was a core part of the Protectorate’s strategy for 
undermining nationalist calls for independence. Housing finance served as a critique leveled in 
particular at the elite supporters of the Istiqlal Party. As one official, Charles Esteve stated 
explicitly, “Our propaganda in Moroccan circles should emphasize this complete failure on the 
part of Moroccan notables in the fight against the housing crisis for Muslim residents in Rabat 
and should emphasize the Government’s efforts to make up for this failure.”443 Though cynical 
on a certain level, official criticism of Muslim notables also led to the creation of new institutions 
like the CIFM whose partial goal was to reshape the investment practices of the country’s elite 
on the eve of independence.  
Protectorate administrators hoped to transform Moroccan urban elites from rentiers into 
model capitalists. Their efforts in this period were distinct from, but also semantically built upon 
earlier attempts to “[pressure] Muslim bourgeois elites to create private charity societies on a 
European model to care for the Muslim poor.”444 For postwar officials, creating opportunities for 
notables to invest in construction and housing finance companies offered the dual promise of 
resolving housing shortages while disciplining the financial practices of the country’s elites. 
D’Hauteville, the head of the Marrakesh region, lamented, however, that when urban elites 
decided to construct new housing it was typically reserved for their personal use.445 Rather than 
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investing in potentially valuable new constructions, landlords were content to raise rents in the 
mudun. During the late 1940s, the task for officials in the OCH, was to convince a larger 
proportion of Muslim notables to invest in the Office’s low-cost housing projects. At times, 
members of the office acknowledged that in practice the “Moroccan capitalist” differed little 
from the “European capitalist”—both seeking primarily to increase rates of profit.446 Affordable 
housing for the urban poor was simply not a lucrative investment for aspiring landlords in 
Casablanca or Rabat. To counter this fact, members of the OCH leveraged the office’s role as a 
distributor of scarce materials to convince notables of the advantages of investing in state-run 
projects. By providing guaranteed access to stocks of cement or rebar the office hoped to assert 
some influence over the investment practices of the country’s elite.  A carefully regulated 
distribution of materials could then channel the flow of capital into the urban projects that French 
officials deemed most politically relevant.    
The OCH aimed to position itself as a conduit through which Moroccan capitalists must 
pass. At the same time, the office encountered resistance among potential Muslim investors that 
was irreducible to financial explanations. In Fes and Taza, French officials noted that the 
hesitance of elites to invest in low-cost housing stemmed not from the profit motive but from an 
aversion to any association with state-led projects.447 On the rare occasion that Fasi elites such as 
Si Mohamed El Marnissi endeavored to construct Moroccan housing, their projects tended to 
challenge policies of urban segregation. El Marnissi’s plans for a low-cost housing development 
were ultimately rejected by Fez’s municipality because of its proximity to European housing in 
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the new city.448 Muslim notables also appeared eager to invest in other types of generally 
unprofitable urban amenities. In Oujda for instance, Moroccan landlords began challenging the 
Habous Administration’s monopoly on the construction of public baths (hammamat) and 
endeavoring to erect a new qissaria (covered market).449 Moroccan capitalists who stood accused 
of shirking their traditional duties nevertheless appeared ready to participate in delivering the 
types of social services that had fallen under their purview prior to the French invasion. 
Providing housing for the urban poor had never been a expectation of Moroccan elites in the 
years before the Protectorate. Instead wealthy city-dwellers in pre-Protectorate times had helped 
maintain fanadiq (sing, funduq) for travelers, public baths, and centers of healing for local 
residents.450   
The fact that postwar Muslim notables invested more readily in public markets than 
public housing has little to do, however, with the resilience of any sort of “traditional” duties that 
may have existed prior to the founding of the Protectorate. Rather at the very moment that the 
French administration was attempting to re-shape elite investment practices, Moroccan 
intellectuals were engaged in the process of reinterpreting the nature of notables’ social 
responsibilities. Thinkers like the reformer-jurist and French-appointed Minister of Education, 
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥassan al-Ḥajwī, brought their own revisionist understanding of urban life to 
bear on questions of Islamic reform.451 Al-Hajwi positioned the market at the center of urban 
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society.452 As sites for the free exchange of ideas and goods, the open-air suq and the trader’s 
funduq historically provided a dynamism to Muslim urban life.453 In al-Hajwi’s reading, 
harnessing the energy of the city’s merchants was the key to creating an educated, cultivated 
urban public.454   
During the final decade of the Protectorate, the stakes of capitalist investment in the 
urban built environment were up for debate. Nationalist publications like Al ʿAlam served as 
venues for evaluating the compatibility of Islamic values with capitalism and other economic 
systems.455 Notions of charity, profit, social responsibility, and anti-colonial sentiment blended 
together, bringing to the forefront questions about the kind of urban elite that could emerge in an 
independent Morocco. Muslim notables’ hesitance to participate in projects backed by the 
colonial state and their interest in financing other sorts of unprofitable urban amenities reveal the 
limits of French attempts to shape urban real estate markets. In this context, the colonial 
administration envisioned a novel institutional framework for harnessing the wealth of Muslim 
elites and channeling it toward slum removal and low-income housing projects. The public-
private housing corporation they helped create became the model for a new politics of urban 
intervention that continues to the present.  
The Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine (CIFM) exemplified an alternative to 
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direct state investment in housing. Created on April 17, 1951, the CIFM’s structure and strategies 
took shape during the peak of Casablanca’s housing shortage, a period of intensifying anti-
colonial unrest. As the OCH dissolved in scandal, the CIFM took over the office’s role as the 
primary builder of both Moroccan and European housing in the Protectorate’s economic capital. 
One key difference, however, distinguished the CIFM from its predecessors. As a public-private 
corporation, the CIFM was tasked with turning low-cost Muslim housing—imagined by 
Protectorate officials as an immense, but politically necessary drain on colonial budgets—into a 
profitable enterprise that would not only decrease financial pressures on the central state but also 
attract the attention of elite Muslim investors. Headed by René Durand, a member of the civil 
engineering corps, the CIFM brought the Protectorate’s community of urban experts together 
with the major entities driving real estate speculation.456 The company’s stakeholders included 
the Crédit foncier de France, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Crédit foncier 
d'Algérie et de Tunisie—financial institutions invested across the colonial Maghrib.  
The CIFM was, in effect, an attempt to imagine a type of organizational structure—
derived from the segregated municipal councils of the Protectorate—that would not only survive 
decolonization but provide a model for it. The company’s board of directors was made up of a 
mixture of private investors and state representatives. Like colonial municipalities, divided into 
European and Moroccan sub-commissions, these state representatives had to include one 
Moroccan and one European official.457 Auditors drawn from the Moroccan elite sat in on both 
CIFM board meetings and state housing commissions.458 The “public-private” character of the 
CIFM, however, was not an indication of the intrusion of private capital into a previously public 
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service (Protectorate municipal governments and the central state had only recently become 
involved in large scale housing construction for Moroccans at the time of its founding). Rather, 
the CIFM’s material interventions into the urban environment of Casablanca are better 
understood as attempts to rescale the state itself—distributing the state temporally rather than 
spatially, into regular payments at the end of the month rather than an omniscient view from 
above.  
Beginning in 1952, the CIFM’s first large-scale construction program included 482 units 
for Europeans and 2,342 for Moroccans, spread across Casablanca, Rabat, and Port-Lyautey 
(Kenitra).459 Approximately half of these were located in the Carrières centrales alone.460 
Composed of two rooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and an external patio, these single-story, poured 
concrete structures represented a subtle break from more austere colonial approach to Moroccan 
housing. To reduce costs, CIFM managers claimed to have exercised a precise “discipline and 
organization of the work sites.”461 The demand that the company turn a profit through the sale 
and the rental of low-cost housing also led managers to jettison earlier colonial arguments about 
the dwelling patterns of Muslim (and in some cases Jewish) residents. The notion that multi-
story apartments were ill-suited to practices of gender seclusion, however, was translated into 
increasingly reductive architectural features. In one four-story, “experimental” structure located 
at the edge of the Cité Riad housing project, CIFM architects simply raised the allèges on the 
upper-floor windows to prevent residents from being able to look down at the patios on the 
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ground floor.462 
The materiality of the CIFM’s new housing projects became both an obstacle and a 
catalyst for the creation of valuable real estate. Residents moved into the first completed section 
of the vast housing development in the Carrières centrales toward the end of December 1952—
only weeks after Casablanca’s urban uprising transformed the orderly chantiers into spaces of 
violence and possibility. The lengthy construction process that turned the qaryan into a network 
of half-finished building sites created channels for unrest directed against both European 
residents and the colonial state [Chapter 2]. Earlier approaches by the Protectorate’s urban 
services in the 1940s and before had sought cheap and flexible (i.e., easy to demolish) 
constructions methods for Moroccan housing in order to rapidly displace or reshuffle what the 
French considered antagonistic urban populations. In spite of periodic panics over public health 
threats from the bidonvilles, colonial municipal officials were often more wary of the solid, but 
informally constructed neighborhoods around the new madīna. The CIFM’s shift to durable, 
concrete housing in the main neighborhood associated with anti-colonial organizing represented 
a novel strategy: extracting revenue for state and private investors and managing unrest by 
placing the urban poor in new kinds of debt relations. The same concrete that enabled modernist 
promises of the good life, hygienic housing, and security also rendered durable a new politics of 
extraction and new ties between capital, a state in the process of decolonization, and the urban 
poor.                 
In the sections of the bidonville targeted by the CIFM, residents were given a choice. If 
they willingly demolished their own structures, they became eligible to receive state-backed 
mortgages to purchase one of the CIFM’s new two-room homes built on land they had 
 
462 René Durand, “L’économie mixte au service de l’habitat,” Notre Maroc, January 1954, 51. 
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previously occupied. The CIFM was not itself a lending institution but rather coordinated 
between buyers and the Caisse Régionale Marocaine d’Épargne et de Crédit.463 In some cases, 
access to credit also required residents to register with one of the Castor housing cooperatives 
that will be discussed in the following section. Riad and Koudiat, the two major CIFM projects 
in the Carrières centrales, mainly housed the families of industrial workers.464 Less than a third 
of the residents actually came from the bidonvilles themselves. The rest were marginally better-
off families from the New Medina or the European quarters.465 French managers were quick to 
emphasize and even encourage socioeconomic division between families in the CIFM’s housing 
developments.  
By fixing interest rates and acting as a conduit between potential buyers and state-backed 
lenders, the CIFM connected a new network of agencies and actors to the problem of low-cost 
housing. Modernist housing initiatives like the projects in the Carrières centrales were not simply 
about imagining new social forms—they were a means of creating new financial and material 
links between urban residents, capital, and the central state.466 In their sociological surveys of the 
qaryan, CIFM managers were well aware that in order to provide down payments on their units, 
many industrial workers had also sought out loans from their employers. The same applied to 
domestic workers living the Riad and Koudiat.467 Credit and debt were the means of 
transforming Moroccan workers into a new kind of urban subject:  
The characteristic fact that emerges from the study of these housing projects is, in fact, 
the attraction of property. It is the feeling of being a home owner that provokes these 
 
463 René Durand, “L’économie mixte au service de l’habitat,” Notre Maroc, January 1954, 47-53. 
464 Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des cités construites par la 
Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND, 7. 
465 Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des cités construites par la 
Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND, 3. 
466 Cf. Rabinow, French Modern, 3. 
467 Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des cités construites par la 
Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND, 12. 
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renovations [of the built environment], because the inhabitant is proud of his home and 
aims to make it as agreeable and as comfortable as possible….The mentality of an elite 
(in relative terms obviously also but in a real sense) living in homes which they own, in 
clean and well ventilated projects where communal life is organized on a modern basis, 
commercial centers, schools, clinics, and youth centers, etc…All activity is oriented 
toward economic goals, toward work and improving standards of living. It is clear that 
the idle have no place in these cities. The people there are peaceful.468 
In the modernist vision behind the CIFM’s housing initiatives, “the attraction of property” would 
pacify a neighborhood that had already demonstrated its attachment to anti-colonial nationalism 
and revolutionary Communism. The “elite mentality” CIFM managers hoped to create through 
homeownership, however, rested on debt. As the Carrières centrales morphed into a patchwork 
of state, CIFM, and corporate housing projects, with large sections of bidonvilles remaining, new 
links of material attachment and financial dependency emerged as a means of anchoring what the 
military sociologist Jean Ratier had once described as a “nomadic” labor force.469 The final 
sentence of one CIFM report suggested the scope of this project, arguing that "the mortgage 
system in practice thus results in carrying out a veritable selection of neo-citizens."470 Though 
directed toward decreasing anti-colonial unrest, this project retained its relevance for imagining 
forms of urban authority in a new nationalist context.  
 
 
468 Emphasis in the original. Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des 
cités construites par la Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND,14. 
469 Jean Ratier, “Étude sociologique du bidonville des Carrières centrales” (Centre des hautes études administratives 
sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes, [undated, circa 1950]), AM, 25. 
470 Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des cités construites par la 
Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND, 3. 
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Figure 10: “Plan de situation des logements marocains des Carrières centrales,” 2MA/1/240, 
CADN. 
 
Documentation on the CIFM provides a window into how experts, investors, and officials 
envisioned urban futures beyond the Protectorate. In one meeting of the Housing Service and the 
Public Works Administration in October 1954, René Girard claimed that the state’s resources 
could no longer go toward “European constructions” but must be devoted to resolving the 
growing crisis in the working class and slum neighborhoods of the Residency.471 In the meeting 
report, an editor has crossed out “European” and written “bourgeois.” A minor alteration of the 
written record, but such modifications were part of a wider attempt to envelop the racializied 
 
471 Délégation aux affaires urbaines de Casablanca, “Compte rendu d’information sur la réunion tenue à Rabat le 30 
octobre 1954,” November 2, 1954, 1MA/200/303, CADN. 
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divisions of colonial urbanism within hierarchies of class and of expertise—dividing lines that 
could cut across the transition to independence. Similar linguistic shifts affected the institution 
itself, as managers retitled the Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, the Compagnie 
immobilière et foncière marocaine during the early years of decolonization.  
The postcolonial future of the CIFM was assured by an agreement on May 31, 1957 with 
the Sharifian state to engage in a massive nation-wide housing construction program. The 
company weathered the first years of decolonization with few changes to its personnel, 
administrative structure, or the colonial idioms that it continued to mobilize in public 
performances. In an article from 1957, a reporter from Construire described a ceremony 
commemorating the opening of new  work-sites at Aïn Chock and Diar El Salam where the 
company’s directors and new Moroccan officials from the Ministry of Public Works gathered for 
a cocktail hour followed by a Polo match.472 A collection of photographs by the art and 
architectural photographer, Marc Lacroix, portray the event. In the series, CIFM managers stand 
alongside youthful Moroccan administrators in double-breasted suits followed by images of 
construction sites in Yacoub-el-Mansour, Damremont, Jawadieh, Aïn Chock, and Diar Daada 
four months after the opening ceremonies.473 Arrayed across various reports and professional 
journals, series of images like these served as visual arguments for a particular understanding of 
postcolonial cooperation. French and Moroccan officials stand out in these sequences as the 
primary actors in the country’s housing drama—enjoying courteous and professional relations 
with one another. The second half of the series shows stark geometric frames of iron and planes 
 
472 “Visite des chantiers ouverts par la C.I.F.M. à Diar El Salam et à Aïn Chock,” Construire 888 (July 20, 1957), 
279. 
473 “Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated [circa 1961], Centre de ressources documentaires de 
Casamémoire. This undated report, signed as a “gift from M. Renaud Bruel,” located in the small library of the 
Casamémoire association. 
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of concrete punctuated only by the darkened, distant figures of construction workers. Alongside 
images of active construction sites, the obligatory “view-from-above,” also suggests the orderly, 
symmetrical nature of new housing developments. Lacroix’s work inscribes the CIFM within the 
visual vocabulary of modernist architecture and modernization projects elsewhere while at the 
same time setting up an idealized vision of how authority and expertise interact within the 
postcolonial state. The first photograph in the collection shows the young Moroccan nationalist 
and recently appointed Minister of Public Works, M’Hamed Douiri, standing in the foreground at 
a microphone while a French official looms, arms crossed, face somewhat blurred, in the 
background.  
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Figure 11: Douiri Speaking at Opening Ceremony 
“Compagnie immoblière franco-marocaine,” undated [circa 1961], Centre de ressources 
documentaires de Casamémoire.   
 
The CIFM contained within its institutional structure, imagery, and programs—as well as 
the materiality of the housing it produced—a blueprint for a particular kind of postcolonial 
future—a future that involved reassembling relations between Moroccan elites, the urban poor, 
the central state, and French experts. The company’s managers claimed a mantle that extended 
far beyond “the simple question of housing” devoting themselves to “a natural selection of the 
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urban proletariat,” a “true movement of the masses towards progress,” and “a successfully 
evolution of the country.”474 Rather than tempering this newest version of the civilizing mission, 
decolonization in Morocco only accelerated it. The dissolution of the Protectorate initiated a 
process whereby state actors renegotiated their commitments to the poorest members of urban 
society while maintaining existing class relations and austerity policies. On the one hand, the 
newly independent Moroccan administration—structurally more or less identical to the French 
colonial state—promised to extend privileges previously held by European residents to all 
Moroccans. Home ownership was a core—and often forgotten—aspect of this project in the early 
years of decolonization. As the first Moroccan Minister of Public Works, Douiri declared in 1958 
that it would be possible in the future for every Moroccan to own their own home.475 At the same 
time, the postcolonial state made the creation of entrepreneurial, self-sufficient urban subjects a 
key priority. This meant in essence not only lessening the state’s commitment to redistributive 
urban policies but also reducing the threat of unrest from working-class communities that had 
learned the efficacy of open revolt during the final years of the Protectorate. 
The postcolonial Ministry of Public Works expanded upon late colonial crisis 
technologies for harnessing the labor of the urban poor and generating real estate value at 
minimal cost. In 1958 a massive fire in the Derb Jdid bidonville in Casablanca (the city’s third 
largest after Beni Msik and the Carrières centrales) left nearly 2,500 families homeless and 
provided the administration with a unique opportunity to rehouse slum residents with relatively 
little resistance.476 To rapidly erect a new city for nearly 10,000 residents, Douiri’s Ministry 
relied on two forms of partially state-funded housing finance: the lotissement économique and 
 
474 Compagnie immobilière franco-marocaine, “Étude sur les populations habitant dans des cités construites par la 
Cie immobilière franco-marocaine,” undated (c 1957), 33408-00-ET, CND, 15. 
475 “La cité du Derb Jdid,” Construire, September 27, 1958, 387. 
476 “La cité du Derb Jdid,” 385. 
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the lot évolutif.  
For the lotissement économique, residents who could furnish at least 100,000 francs 
received a ten-year loan to purchase a plot of state-owned land and up to 250,000 francs for the 
construction of a private residence. Reimbursed in monthly payments of 2,600 francs each 
month, the loans for construction work alone carried a fixed interest rate of 2.48%.477 In spite of 
such low-interest loans, these sums remained inaccessible to most residents of Derb Jdid. For 
those with even less income and no funds for a down payment, the Ministry created the lot 
évolutif. The lot was based on the model of the bail emphytéotique—a form of long-term leasing 
agreement in which the tenant could gain ownership of the structures built on a piece of rented 
property without having ownership of the land itself. In principle, the forty-year leases offered to 
low-income residents of Derb Jdid for their lots évolutifs would be renewable, but only on the 
condition that the property was maintained according to the satisfaction of the lender—the 
postcolonial Moroccan state. In both cases, residents were required to build using one of the 
standardized models provided by the housing authority and to submit to regular inspections 
during the construction process.478 
The different financial packages available to the residents of Derb Jdid also corresponded 
to different materialities and temporalities of housing. In the immediate aftermath of the fire, 
only those families with funds to invest in homeownership would have the opportunity to either 
purchase or rebuild a home en dur. The neighborhood’s poorest residents were rehoused in 
emergency shelters designed by Elie Azagury—one member of the first generation of Moroccan 
 
477 “La cité du Derb Jdid,” 385. 
478 Arnaud de Montmarin, “Les conceptions actuelles en matière d’habitat économique au Maroc et leur application 
à la reconstruction du Derb Jdid à Casablanca”, Supplément aux annales de l’Institut technique du bâtiment et des 
travaux publics 150 (June 1960), 616. 
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modernist architects.479 In theory these lightweight, one-room emergency models could be later 
replaced by permanent housing. Azagury’s emergency units were emblematic of the search for 
the most “flexible solution” to urban poverty in Morocco—designed so that “if economic 
conditions improved, it will be possible to combine two different lots to house a family under 
normal conditions, and furthermore, at the next stage, it will be possible to build up and construct 
a second story.”480 In this context, a “flexible solution” meant building the postcolonial promise 
of single-family home ownership into structures that embodied the politics crisis and scarcity.  
 
Figure 12: Typology for Emergency Housing 
Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Catalogue de plans-types de logements élaborés 
pour le Service de l’habitat” (Rabat: Ministère des travaux publics, 1969), R205, BMHPV. 
 
479 De Montmarin, 628. 
480 De Montmarin, 628. 
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Arnaud de Montmarin, a French engineer who headed the Urban Planning Administration 
of the Ministry of Public Works during decolonization and remained in Morocco as a technical 
advisor, cast Derb Jdid as a model bidonville. With most heads of household in Derb Jdid earning 
less than 5,000 francs per month, de Montmarin noted that residents of the neighborhood 
remained definitively beyond the reach of the real estate market.481 Contemplating the policy of 
direct construction by the state, he cited Henri Prost’s spectacular realizations during the early 
years of the Protectorate, but also supported the administration’s creation of a housing finance 
sector in the form of the Caisses Régionales d'Épargne et de Crédit. Rather than simply 
guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the financial sector, however, the postcolonial state, for 
de Montmarin, had to mimic it—becoming a creditor for the urban poor.482 Like efforts to mold 
urban elites into model capitalists, state-lead projects to transform the urban poor into 
paradoxically autonomous and indebted subjects spanned the period of decolonization. 
Reconstructed bidonvilles like Derb Jdid became sites for re-imagining not only urban politics 
but the contours and nature of the state itself. 
The explicit commitments of French administrators to provide housing for low-income 
Moroccan residents arrived late and remained partial during the Protectorate—couched in the 
paternalistic language of the civilizing mission and in anxieties over unrest and contamination. 
At the end of the 1950s in contrast, officials like Douiri affirmed the state’s responsibility to 
provide housing for all of its citizens. At the same time, the principle of home ownership for all 
became a means of transforming state and parastatal institutions like the CIFM into creditors. 
Debt became fundamental to the relationship between the urban poor and the new postcolonial 
state. And yet these debts, like the many of the physical structures built during the slum clearance 
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campaigns of the 1950s, were cast as temporary. They would prove anything but.    
"Builders in the Soul": Work-site Organization and the Cooperative Movement 
Alongside new housing finance strategies, techniques of work-site organization—most 
notably housing cooperatives—were bound up with the postcolonial project of delivering not just 
full housing, but housing ownership to all citizens while at the same time rendering the urban 
poor responsible for much of the cost and the physical labor involved in construction. At times, 
officials presented the cooperative movement as an alternative to top-down, state-run housing 
initiatives—a means of decentralizing approaches to Morocco’s housing crisis. Rather than 
providing urban residents with greater autonomy, however, cooperatives allowed urban experts 
to harness local forms of knowledge and labor that had previously appeared threatening. 
Officials in the 1950s aimed to capture construction techniques rooted in the experience of life in 
the bidonvilles while retaining oversight through the application of standardized materials and 
models. While new finance strategies adopted by the CIFM and the postcolonial state tied former 
residents of the bidonvilles to their new neighborhoods through low-interest loans, new forms of 
work site management enrolled Moroccan participants into the project of literally building the 
nation. 
Like prefabrication, public-private housing companies, and low-interest mortgages, the 
techniques of work-site management that would shape the first decade of urban projects under 
the postcolonial state had their origins in the final years of French rule. In 1954 colonial officials 
imagined youth unemployment as yet another of the urban problems precipitating the 
Protectorate into crisis. To mediate the forms of unrest that supposedly resulted, officials 
envisioned a program of youth work sites whose goal would be “to reduce unemployment, to 
contribute to the social recovery of a mass of idlers currently subjected to a stark moral and 
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physical deterioration, [and] to engage in the task of educating young people who are beyond the 
reach of the school system.”483 As a “solution that must be highly flexible,” these youth chantiers 
were pedagogical spaces of bodily discipline and moral management whose value lay in the fact 
that they could be deployed anywhere and for any duration.484 Even more strikingly, the French 
architects of this project adopted certain Moroccan nationalist arguments about territorial 
integration, asserting that the connections created between urban and rural work sites would have 
the advantage of “linking people to the country in which they were born.”485 The experimental 
sites for testing youth chantiers, however, where primarily located in the suburbs of Casablanca. 
In 1955, the Resident General visited and inaugurated a handful of these chantiers du chômage 
(unemployment worksites) around the city.486  
New medical clinics also extended forms of work-site discipline and surveillance to the 
internal workings of the bodies of Moroccan laborers.487 Casablanca’s Specialized Occupational 
Health Center collected personalized patient files and generated statistics on everything from 
infection rates to psychological disorders.488 All workers who passed through the clinic received 
a radiological exam upon each visitation.489 Opening up workers’ bodies to inspection through 
X-rays coincided with expert attempts to grasp the link between psychological dispositions, the 
organization of work-sites, and work place accidents. French occupational medicine examined 
how the rhythms of the workday, climatological factors, and the psychological impact of prior 
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accidents all shaped the probability of a fall from scaffolding or a dropped load of cinder 
blocks.490 Securing the construction site meant determining how and under what conditions the 
bodies of workers encountered potentially risky matter. When translated outside of the 
metropolitan context, however, French observers argued for additional surveillance over 
Moroccan victims of workplace accidents for the duration of their treatment. Fearing that injured 
workers would seek to heal themselves “with fantasy”—a reference to forms of saintly or 
Qur’anic public healing—or return to rural communes while still receiving compensation from 
their employers, administrators argued for forms of occupational medicine that required laborers 
to remain in place for regular check-ups.491   
 
 
490 Jean Perrin, “Les accidents du travail et leurs cause psycho-physiologique,” Laboratoires du bâtiment et des 
travaux publics (February 23, 1944); Hanoteau, “La prévention des accidents d’échafaudage,” Laboratoires du 
bâtiment et des travaux publics (June 28, 1945). 
491 Barbarin, “La main d’oeuvre marocaine d’un grand chantier des travaux publics” (Centre des hautes études 
administratives sur l’Afrique et l’Asie modernes, 1950), E3195, AM, 14. 
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Figure 13: Representation of a fall from scaffolding in French public works journal.  
Hanoteau, “La prévention des accidents d’échafaudage,” Laboratoires du bâtiment et des travaux 
publics (June 28, 1945). 
 
Concern about the growing numbers of unemployed Moroccans in cities and their 
capacity to revolt also spurred the creation of rural work sites to discourage residents of the beld 
from immigrating to Casablanca and joining the ranks of the jobless. Echoing the language of 
“nomadism” that sociologists and administrators had used to describe Casablanca’s overly 
mobile labor force, officials spoke of the need to “attach the agricultural worker to the land.”492  
Rural construction sites represented a stopgap measure for doing so. More radical proposals for 
 
492 A. Boutales, Ministre du Travail et des questions sociales to Ministre des Finances, February 8, 
1956, 1MA/1/219, CADN; Jean Ratier, “Étude sociologique du bidonville des Carrières centrales,” 25. 
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relieving unemployment existed as well. Toward the end of 1954, urban officials considered 
sending large numbers of Moroccan workers, recently rendered jobless after the completion of 
Port Lyautey (Kenitra), to carry out road building projects in Ethiopia.493 An American company, 
The Imperial Highway Authority, began recruiting laborers from construction sites in Morocco to 
work on a vast program of infrastructural expansion in the Horn of Africa. The administration 
encouraged these efforts but remained skeptical that the company would find skilled Moroccan 
workers to fulfill their need for specialized laborers.494 In these examples, work sites, whether in 
urban settings, rural communities, or abroad, served as a means of managing the flow of 
workers. As a kind of valve for dealing with unemployment and a space that supposedly instilled 
bodily and moral discipline, the French chantier represented a “flexible solution” for a colonial 
administration in crisis.     
At the same time, the top-down structure of state-run work sites proved costly and risked 
provoking even more militancy from the laborers whom Protectorate officials hoped to manage. 
Housing cooperatives on the other hand had the advantage of redistributing responsibility for 
construction among working-class Moroccans while allowing the French administration to 
govern at a distance through code enforcement. Cooperatives appeared on paper as a radically 
low-cost solution—one that could be financed through small, low-interest, state-backed loans—
because they removed labor from the equation. Easing pressure on late-colonial budgets, 
however, was only one of the advantages that cooperatives appeared to afford. French observers 
of Morocco’s housing crisis, such as Emmaüs’s founder Abbé Pierre, suggested to the Sultan 
Muhammad V that a large-scale cooperative movement would be essential not only to address 
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housing shortages but to instill a sense of national belonging on the eve of independence. 
Referencing his own charitable organization in France, Abbé Pierre argued that “any young 
country, if it wants to avoid falling into anarchy and discouragement, must endeavor to realize 
certain grand national projects.”495 He went as far as to suggest that the state establish a 
“Mouvement Marocain du Logement” that would act as the equivalent of the Union marocain du 
travail (UMT), the country’s largest labor union, in the domain of housing.496 
As a set of organizational strategies, the cooperative model was exclusively applied to the 
problem of lodging Muslim Moroccans. While the movement had its origins in postwar 
reconstruction efforts in Europe, French officials considered cooperatives ill-suited and 
undesirable for the housing needs of Europeans in the Protectorate.497 In the assertion that, “the 
Moroccan is a builder at heart” officials found justification for this new means of managing of 
low-cost housing construction in Casablanca.498 Within the French administration, 
characterizations of Moroccan culture typically arose in debates between opponents and 
supporters of  Michel Écochard’s vision of large, state-financed housing projects. As with the 
architectural inclusion of patios in Écochard's trame 8x8, assertions of cultural difference among 
advocates of the cooperative movement imagined Muslim residents as requiring little in terms of 
material comfort [Chapter 2]. As recent arrivals from the bled (countryside), the argument went, 
former inhabitants of the bidonvilles were accustomed to more austere living arrangements. 
While dispensing with material comforts, advocates of cooperatives cast Moroccan residents as 
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dependent upon certain forms of sociality—forms that cooperatives were designed to encourage. 
They criticized Écochard’s projects for lacking “human warmth.”499 Dismissing modernist 
constructions as “soulless barracks that kill the spontaneously communitarian spirit of 
Moroccans,” supporters of cooperatives pushed for a model that fostered collective participation 
by requiring residents to invest uncompensated labor and take out long-term loans.500   
One cooperative model, known as “Castor” was tested in Fedala (Mohammedia) during 
the early 1950s. From their origins during postwar reconstruction in France, Castor cooperatives 
represented one of the more decentralized cooperative models and the most dependent upon the 
labor of individual participants. Each member was required to fulfill a work commitment of 
between 1,500 and 2,000 hours on an assortment of different construction projects. To assure 
attention to detail, housing was determined according to a lottery system, and members would 
not be assigned a unit until all of the homes were complete. Rather than receiving titles at the end 
of their work commitments, however, members remained beneficiaries, and the project as a 
whole remained collective property.501 Proponents of Castor methods in the Protectorate argued 
that as a set of organizational and construction technologies, Castor cooperatives were ideally 
suited to conditions in Morocco. During the testing phases, one advocate suggested that the 
model’s capacity to rapidly provide “modest and simple constructions”—though unattractive to 
Europeans—could appeal to Moroccan residents.502 The ideal participant for a Castor was 
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someone “without technical competencies, without capital, and without a salary [who] devotes 
their leisure time to the edification of their own home.”503 Descriptions of the Fedala test site 
invoked images of communal labor and a harmony achieved through engagements with materials 
themselves:  
Gathered together in groups, “Castor” subjects, absorbed during the day by their 
professional occupations, work on their construction projects during their hours of liberty 
and, particularly, in the evening when men, women and children collaborate in the 
transportation of materials, the mixing of mortars, and the placement of stones.504 
On the cooperative construction site, the organization of family and the nation played out 
through the “placement of stones” and the “mixing of mortars”—the material organization of the 
urban environment.  
The Moroccan laborers who participated in Castor projects in Casablanca were 
overwhelming from the Atlantic regions of the Chaouia and Doukkal with smaller contingents 
from the Sous and Marrakesh. Mostly married men, the group comprised industrial laborers, 
construction workers, or small shop owners, tanners, and other artisans.505 The Public Works 
Administration provided the materials for construction—including sand, cement, gravel, iron for 
reinforcement, and a total of over 11,000 cinder blocks for around four hundred structures.506 
Each team was composed of five workers—typically overseen by a European technician—and 
was responsible for completing between four and five houses. During the program’s testing 
phase, the four pilot teams each included a mixture of masons, laborers, merchants, and other 
 
503 "A/s des conditions de mise en oeuvre des techniques Castor" [undated, circa 1954], attached to a letter, George 
Hutin to Directeur des Finances, 2MA/1/237, CADN. 
504 Conseil du Gouvernement, Section marocaine, “Séances des 8,9,10 et 11 Décembre 1952,” (Casablanca: 
Imprimérie Ifram, 1953), 144. Cited in Najib Taqi, Jawanib min dhakira Karyan Santral-al-Hay al-Muhammadi bi-
l-Dar al-Baydaʾ fi-l-qarn al-ʿashrin muhawala fi-l-tawthiq (Casablanca: A. Retnani Les Éditions la Croisée des 
Chemins, 2012), 147. 
505 Roger Maneville, “L’expérience ‘Castor’ aux Carrières centrales de Casablanca,” Notes marocaines 7 (1956), 4. 
506 Maneville, 5. 
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artisans—the idea being that those more accustomed to construction work would bring the other 
members up to speed.507 In practice, however, teams were often created more on the basis of 
“personal affinities” and other forms of relatedness than on the organizational principles of the 
Castor model.508 
The CIFM became a major supporter of Castor projects—helping to finance and organize 
cooperatives in Aïn Sebaa on the outskirts of Casablanca.509 Such projects enrolled Moroccans, 
whose homes in the bidonvilles the municipality had recently demolished, into the reconstruction 
of new neighborhoods. Local contrôleurs civils and officers of indigenous affairs initially 
oversaw the day-to-day progression of these cooperatives. The contrôleurs managed the 
recruitment, administration, and inspection of the work-sites, not in their capacity as state 
officials, however, but as “volunteers.”510 Proponents of the model endeavored to preserve the 
impression of autonomy, as though a low-level political official assigned to the Castor were a 
member like any other—one who just happened to be suited to administrative tasks. At the same 
time, it quickly became apparent to members of the Ministry of Interior that engineers or at least 
inspectors with some technical training were an essential presence if cooperatives were to 
expand beyond a few test cases along the Atlantic coast.511   
As one Public Works representative reluctantly pointed out, Castor test sites in Rabat, 
Casablanca, and Fedala depended upon a great deal of interference by the administration and 
failed to function as autonomously as expected.512 Moroccan members of the cooperatives also 
found ways to avoid the forms of work-site discipline that the Castors were designed to inspire. 
 
507 Maneville, 6. 
508 Manville, 7. 
509 Maguy Mortier, “L’exemple des Castors," Le matin January 18, 1954" 4. 2MA/1/241, CADN. 
510 "A/s des conditions de mise en oeuvre des techniques Castor" [undated, circa 1954], attached to a letter, George 
Hutin to Directeur des Finances, 2MA/1/237, CADN. 
511 Capitant, Directeur-Adjoint de l'Intérieur to Secrétaire Général du Protectorat, July 19, 1954, 2MA/1/237/CADN. 
512 Vaez-Olivera, "Construction marocaines faites par des 'Castor.’” 
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An observer of the test sites in Fedala noted that members of the Castor—rather than sacrificing 
their own labor—used loans acquired through the administration or the CIFM to hire Moroccan 
specialists, muʿallimūn, to perform most of the actual building. At times, cooperative members 
also relied on extended kinship networks to carry out construction work.513 The practice of 
paying muʿallimūn directly to take over work of construction and of enrolling family members 
through the exchange of “gifts and meals,” subverted the aims of  the cooperative movement as 
understood by its supporters within the administration.514 If the only goal of the Castors had been 
the rapid erection of low-cost housing or the pacification of unrest by promoting new forms of 
investment in urban space, it is not immediately apparent why the contractual labor of Moroccan 
craftsmen and the uncompensated labor of local kinsmen would have constituted the two poles of 
administrative anxiety. If on the other hand, cooperatives represented a scaled-down model for 
organizing the nation—one that could weather the transition to independence—then kin and craft 
emerged as threats to the kind of future envisioned by late-colonial bureaucrats. Public works 
officials concluded that Castors had to “depend greatly on the administration of the inspection 
authorities.”515 Reducing official involvement risked encouraging an independent class of 
Moroccan skilled workers who relied on kin-based forms of solidarity to avoid the technical 
oversight of French engineers and the time-work discipline of the chantier.     
In spite of skepticism over the Castor experiments, state planners pushed to expand the 
cooperative model in Rabat, Fez, Meknes, and Casablanca. In 1955 nearly all new constructions 
in the Carrières centrales were built using the Castor system.516 Most members in the Carrières 
centrales were industrial laborers who had to fulfill their commitments to the cooperative after 
 
513 Vaez-Olivera, "Construction marocaines faites par des ‘Castor.’” 
514 Vaez-Olivera, "Construction marocaines faites par des ‘Castor.’” 
515 Vaez-Olivera, "Construction marocaines faites par des ‘Castor.’” 
516 “L’habitat au Maroc: Réalisations 1955,” Construire, February 25, 1956, 114. 
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work hours. As was the case with personal loans between workers and industrialists, officials 
saw the cooperatives as creating new forms of attachment between Moroccan laborers  and their 
employers.517 Urban administrators called upon factory owners to participate by purchasing 
necessary materials on behalf of their workers and by putting their technicians at the service of 
the cooperatives.518  A corporatist social vision lay at the heart of these projects. Rather than 
providing spaces of autonomy, cooperatives aimed to encourage new forms of sociality that 
disrupted solidarities based on kinship while further pushing Moroccan working-class families 
into debt.    
Decolonization provoked no immediate shifts in the Ministry of Public Works or the 
Ministry of Interior’s support for the Castor model. The independent Moroccan state continued 
to encourage cooperatives through the same financial mechanisms as those tested during the 
rebuilding of Derb Jdid. Small, low-interest loans that could rarely cover the cost of building 
new housing from scratch were designed to force residents to pool their funds and their labor.519 
Postcolonial planners maintained that the combination of cooperative construction and low-
interest loans represented a “newer and more original…formula [that] responds better to the 
tastes of the majority of Moroccans, builders in the soul.…”520  At the same time, the 
postcolonial administration leveled increasingly harsh critiques against the Moroccan residents 
of new housing projects for their perceived failure to engage in maintenance work and the 
modification of their new homes. As one planner argued “in the face of the disastrous 
 
517 Capitant, Directeur-Adjoint de l'Intérieur to Contrôleur Civil, Chef de la région de Casablanca, September 13, 
1954, 1MA/200/303, CADN. 
518 Capitant, Directeur-Adjoint de l'Intérieur to Contrôleur Civil, Chef de la région de Casablanca, September 13, 
1954, 1MA/200/303, CADN. 
519 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat” (Ministère des Travaux 
Publics, 1957), R188, BMHPV, 4. 
520 Claude Vignaud, “Nouvelles cités d’habitat économique : Maroc 1960-1962” (Ministère des Travaux Publics, 
1962), R7, BMHPV, 8. 
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transformations that the new neighborhoods built by the State have undergone…it is important to 
rapidly undertake…an educative action for the urban population, in order to teach them how to 
better profit from the housing and the land that will be provided for them.”521 Such observations 
became an argument for even further abandoning urban policies based on the central state’s 
direct involvement and for pushing strategies such as cooperatives that allowed officials to 
govern at a distance. Douiri and the first generation of Moroccan Public Works officials saw low-
interest loans, cooperatives, and public-private corporations as the means to ensure a 
“harmonious evolution” of Moroccan cities—adhering to the “modern urbanism” mapped out in 
the final years of the Protectorate while responding to the further reduction of state-budgets 
during decolonization.522   
In an interview, Douiri framed ongoing slum clearance in the kingdom as the result of 
popular will and called for the continued “dynamic mobilization of all” in the “struggle against 
slums.”523 The language used to promote new housing finance measures and construction 
cooperatives echoed nationalist rhetoric more broadly: 
We are aware of our compatriots’ will and their great desire to abandon their provisional 
dwellings for happier housing projects. This will must be realized through the continuous 
efforts of all, by a direct collaboration between private interests and the State; from this 
intimate association fruitful results will be born...Thus, by mobilizing all of our efforts, 
those of the State and those of individuals, to realize this great national enterprise, we 
have answered his Majesty’s call by contributing to the building of a new Morocco.524 
Douiri emphasized that programs such as the cooperative movement were not utopian, but 
instead “realistic solutions” for “integrating the underprivileged into urban life.”525  
As the cooperative movement gathered momentum in Morocco, labor activists and left-
 
521 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat,” 4. 
522 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat,” 7-8. 
523 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat,” 7. 
524 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat,” 7-8. 
525 Circonscription de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, “Éléments d’une politique de l’habitat,” 7-8. 
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wing journalists observed efforts on the other end of the Maghrib to formulate critiques of the 
postcolonial state’s housing policy. One journalist for L’avant garde produced a mostly favorable 
assessment of the Tunisian state’s experiments with cooperative construction. Echoing the 
language of modernist planners, the author affirmed that the cooperative movement had created 
“a sentiment of human dignity that constitutes a form of social progress  in the domain of 
hygiene, solidarity, and responsibility.”526 At the same time, the Tunisian state’s projects also 
provoked resistance: “bulldozers…often received with thrown stones.”527 The cooperative 
movement was widespread  in Algeria as well. There the French Ministry of Veterans Affairs 
provided financial support for construction cooperatives specifically for Muslim veterans. The 
administration supported more grass-roots movements as well touting their “more flexible 
formula” for addressing Algeria’s urban housing needs compared to large public H.L.M. 
projects.528 Cooperative models in Algeria aimed to bring military discipline to the construction 
site and as a result became a core part of the program of massive displacements of urban and 
rural Algerians as part of France’s counterinsurgency campaign during the Revolution.529 As 
housing and urban policies across the Maghrib were met with protest, state-organized 
cooperatives provided a way for officials to place the responsibility for building and financing 
onto low-income residents while continuing to guide the construction process at a distance. 
The potential for cooperatives to subvert the aims of modernist planning, however, was 
not lost on French experts who continued to work in Morocco during decolonization.  As de 
 
526 “Tunisie: Coopératives et investissement du capital humain pour résoudre le problème de l’habitat,” L’avant 
garde, June 4, 1960. 
527 “Tunisie: Coopératives et investissement du capital humain pour résoudre le problème de l’habitat,” L’avant 
garde, June 4, 1960. 
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529 Padovani, 7. For discussions of strategic displacements during the Algerian Revolution see Pierre Bourdieu and 
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Montmarin pointed out in a presentation to French and Moroccan colleagues at the Ministry of 
Public Works, the cooperative movement was born of the realization that “the Moroccan was a 
builder in the soul and that as soon as he was provided with a suitable plot, he would perform 
miracles in an effort to build his house; the problem is often how to stop him since he always 
wants to add more stories than the plan allows for.”530 This possibility did not diminish 
postcolonial administrators’ enthusiasm for cooperatives. Instead they doubled down on 
programs that tasked working-class Moroccans with building the nation while becoming 
indebted to the state.  
Conclusion 
Admittedly prefabrication, public-private housing corporations, low-interest loans, work-
site management techniques, and cooperatives form a highly heterogeneous list—a mixture of 
knowledge practices, institutional relations, and financial objects. Yet this chapter has argued that 
it is precisely in the overlapping space between these crisis technologies that an understanding of 
the peculiar politics of the late Protectorate period begins to take shape. While some modernizing 
projects—Écochard’s program of housing for the greatest possible number or the Taylorist vision 
of prefabrication—largely remained fantasies, others came to be built into the architecture of the 
postcolonial state and the material environment of Moroccan cities. The visions of “flexible” 
modernization embodied by crisis technologies responded to administrative anxieties about anti-
colonial unrest, shrinking budgets, and place of French experts after independence as well as to 
Moroccan nationalist projects for building the nation. As a result, these crisis technologies 
spanned the period of decolonization with little resistance—either from Moroccan residents or 
new postcolonial officials.  
 
530 De Montmarin, 616. 
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Focusing on strategies of “flexible planning” (public-private, cooperative, and credit-
based) in the 1950s—a decade associated with colonial modernization projects and the advent of 
a developmentalist postcolonial state—suggests the need to rethink the process of decolonization 
in Morocco more broadly. With regards to state structure and expertise, the postcolonial 
transition was not a total rupture. Nor did the postcolonial administration simply adopted all 
Protectorate-era policies and programs under the new rhetorical mantle of nationalism. Rather 
the major shift lay in the early years of the 1950s when French experts and officials began 
experimenting with crisis technologies that would transform the role of state, Muslim investors, 
and experts within the lives of Morocco’s urban poor. Cooperatives, public-private housing 
corporations, and new credit arrangements were ideally suited to weather the process of 
decolonization because of the ways that they distanced state officials and experts from the 
messy—and at times violent— realities of slum clearance and reconstruction and because they 
meshed relatively well with the projects of Moroccan nationalists.       
At the same time, following crisis technologies does more than clarify the dynamic 
interplay of continuity and rupture through the process of formal decolonization. The 
resemblance between these strategies and those associated with both the periods of “roll-back” 
(1980s) and “roll-out” (1990s) neoliberalism are striking.531 In the context of efforts to reduce the 
colonial state’s financial commitment to provide housing for Moroccans, cooperatives and new 
credit arrangements were designed to create semi-autonomous, entrepreneurial, and permanently 
indebted subjects. Crisis technologies transformed the destruction of bidonvilles (whether 
through fires or bulldozers) and the devaluation of Moroccan labor into strategies of 
accumulation for investors in public-private corporations like the CIFM. Histories of 
 
531 Koenraad Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism: Megaprojects, Slums, and Class Relations in Urban Morocco 
(Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2018). 
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neoliberalism in Morocco have been told as though structural adjustment in 1983 introduced a 
set of radically new structures and relations—invented by economists at the World Bank and the 
IMF—that replaced the developmentalism of postcolonial state with its emphasis on 
modernization and welfare. This chapter suggests that it is possible to look deeper—to consider 
aspects of recent and present-day neoliberal urban projects in Morocco that constitute a return to 
late-colonial assumptions and techniques. The history of late colonial crisis technologies reveals 
durable strategies for managing construction that remade relations between elites, experts, 
officials, and the urban poor—buried lines of connection between the colonial past and 
neoliberal present. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE AGADIR EARTHQUAKE 
AND THE CRISIS OF POSTCOLONIAL EXPERTISE 
 
An earthquake struck the southern city of Agadir, Morocco, on February 29th, 1960, 
reaching a magnitude 5.7 on the Richter scale. Between ten and fifteen thousand Moroccans and 
Europeans lost their lives as a result of shaking that brought down hotels and high-rises in the 
city center as well as nearly all of the buildings in Agadir’s three poorest districts: the Kasbah, 
Founti, and Yachech. Almost immediately after the earthquake King Mohammed V declared 
rebuilding the city on roughly the same site a national priority and established a solidarity tax to 
aid the victims. At the time of the earthquake, Morocco had been independent from France for 
four years, but conflicts continued at a diplomatic level over the presence of French citizens 
living in Moroccan cities, of French military bases in Moroccan territory, and of French experts 
and administrators working within the Moroccan government as technical assistants. The 
unfolding of disaster in Agadir also presented a paradox for the seismologists and structural 
engineers of the time: How did an earthquake five thousand times less powerful than the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake—with around four hundred causalities—lead to so much death and 
devastation? Drawing on a history of French colonial science and engineering, the newly 
independent Moroccan administration seized on the disaster as an opportunity to create new 
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forms of urban governance.532 These strategies rested on expert attempts to recast Agadir as a 
seismically vulnerable space by explaining inordinate levels of death and destruction in terms 
that both supported and shaped the policies of the post-independence Moroccan authorities. At 
the same time, experts and officials managing the reconstruction efforts drew upon crisis 
technologies developed during the final years of the Protectorate to deal with urban 
overcrowding and unrest in Casablanca. Adapting approaches based on the regulation of urban 
vulnerability and the distribution of debt to the context of seismic disaster, Agadir’s experts 
brought colonial crisis technologies to bear on the project of postcolonial risk management. 
This chapter will examine how international teams of experts fashioned a notion of 
“seismic risk” out of data from seismographs, isoseismal maps, witness accounts, geological 
studies, and direct observations of destruction following the 1960 earthquake.533 Rewriting 
Agadir as a vulnerable space and connecting the city to other sites through a global 
conceptualization of seismic susceptibility, these experts adjudicated between various 
interpretations of earthquake causality—sometimes separating, sometimes subtly combining the 
human, the natural, and the technological.534 In the process, they obscured the French 
 
532 Spencer D. Segalla, “Natural Disaster, Globalization, and Decolonization,” in French Mediterraneans: 
Transnational and Imperial Histories, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2016), 102; 106-108. 
533 In my analysis of the seismological and engineering studies carried out in post-quake Agadir, I have relied on 
published materials generated by international technical missions sent to Morocco following the earthquake. To 
gauge the governmental response to these studies, I have analyzed a series of reports from the Moroccan Ministry of 
Public Works and the Haut-Commissariat à la Reconstruction (HCRA) on the planning and implementation of the 
city’s rebuilding. To my knowledge these reports are only available at the libraries of the Institut Scientifique and 
the Ministère de l’Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville in Rabat. While in Agadir on two separate occasions, I 
attempted to access the city’s postcolonial municipal records dealing with the years of the reconstruction under the 
HCRA. I was not able to gain access to these materials and in one case was made to understand that they most likely 
no longer exist. As a result, I have focused on the formal process of reconstruction made visible in state reports and 
have attended to the ways in which these accounts diverge from newspaper sources and French Embassy records 
from the period. 
534 This conceptual distinction between humans, natural forces, and technologies is found in the work of the actors 
whom I follow. It is not an analytic division that I maintain.  In engineering and seismological accounts, humans, 
natural forces, and technologies have the status of causal factors that support particular interpretations of a disaster.  
Experts and bureaucrats in Agadir combined these factors—arguing in favor of particular strategies for governing 
the city as a seismic space—but did not conflate them.  The understanding of seismic risk formulated by Agadir’s 
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Protectorate’s long history of urban neglect and assigned responsibility for the devastation of the 
city’s poorest neighborhoods to “natural” forces or ineffective “traditional” building practices.535 
As a technoscientific object, seismic risk masked the role of material inequalities in the 
distribution of damage and transformed political questions surrounding Agadir’s rebuilding into 
technical ones.536 This is not to suggest that Agadir’s experts simply overlooked an “underlying 
political economy of risk” or concealed the “social construction of ‘natural’ disaster.”537 Rather, 
they played an active role in determining which institutions and professional communities would 
be held responsible for future seismic security and which forms of knowledge and practice would 
be excluded from the reconstructed city. The earthquake not only enabled unprecedented levels 
of direct administrative oversight but also provided an opportunity for recasting the relationship 
between experts—especially foreign ones—and the postcolonial state in Morocco.          
As it cut across scientific, engineering, and bureaucratic domains, seismic risk gave rise 
to projects aimed less at controlling nature than at redistributing vulnerability and authority 
among experts, administers, and inhabitants. The city’s new antiseismic building codes, the 
 
experts rested on a conceptual separation between humans, natures, and technologies, but this separation was a 
flexible one—capable of generating multi-causal explanations and complex visions of the social and natural order. 
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“Normes Agadir 1960,” reshaped collective construction practices and created new networks of 
power linking architects, real estate magnates, builders, and bureaucrats. As part of the city’s new 
master plan, the authorities designated a large area of the former city as too seismically risky for 
future development. Founded in July 1960, the Haut-Commissariat à la Reconstruction d’Agadir 
(HCRA) engaged in a massive expropriation of private land in the zones where seismic 
destruction had been the greatest—drastically simplifying the city’s property regime in the 
process.538 Blending technical, legal, and political values, building codes laid the groundwork for 
an unequal geography of risk and exposure in which seismic security in the city center was 
traded against the increasing vulnerability of the city’s poorest residents.539 Through their multi-
causal interpretations of this contradictory Moroccan earthquake, international scientists and 
engineers set the stage for the politics of reconstruction, a seismic politics in which strategies for 
managing risk became vehicles of socio-spatial exclusion and unequal exposure to a variety of 
new hazards.      
The reconstruction efforts themselves betrayed a bipolarity between postcolonial 
performances of modernization and underlying austerity policies. On one end of the spectrum, 
Moroccan and European modernist architects designed apartment and government buildings in 
the city center that aimed to aesthetically embody the ethos of risk management through raw 
concrete forms. On the other, the city’s poorest inhabitants received low-interest loan packages, 
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joined construction cooperatives, and employed cinder blocks to rebuild their neighborhoods. 
The earthquake provided postcolonial planners with an opportunity like no other—a drastically 
scaled-up version of the 1958 fire in Derb Jdid [Chapter 3]. Risk management also served as an 
impetus for the expropriation, reorganization, and redistribution of urban property in Agadir. 
Spencer Segalla has suggested that the city’s rebuilding represented the end of a “the Lyautist 
fetishization of Moroccan tradition” in urban planning and the acceptance of a “culture of 
postwar urbanism that led the new city’s designers to treat Agadir’s residents as cultureless, 
universal inhabitants of a theoretical modern world.”540 In contrast, Aziza Chaouni has shown 
how Agadir’s reconstruction provided members of Group GAMMA (Groupe d’Architectes 
Modernes Marocains) with a canvas for developing a distinctive style of postcolonial modernism 
in Morocco.541 Group GAMMA’s projects sought inspiration from local construction practices 
and modes of inhabitation while at the same time embracing many of the core principles of 
Écochard’s urbanism.542 Beyond questions of whether Agadir’s new architectural forms could be 
labeled Moroccan or European, however, the reconstruction process involved adapting many of 
the logics, technologies, and forms of governance associated with the management of colonial 
urban crisis to postcolonial disaster response.  
The techniques of experts who rewrote Agadir as a seismic space have their origins in the 
development of the modern discipline of seismology. Like early climatology and epidemiology, 
late nineteenth century seismology underwent a transformation from an anthropogenic science—
based on “felt reports” or witness accounts—into a “purified,” hard science that conceptually 
 
540 Segalla argues that Agadir’s destruction and reconstruction provide a foil to urban histories of Protectorate-era 
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separated earthquakes as quantifiable geophysical occurrences from the lived experiences of 
disasters as socio-environmental phenomena. In Agadir, however, hundreds of miles from the 
nearest seismograph station, experts turned to observational methods to fill the gaps of unreliable 
instrumental data and produced multi-causal interpretations of the earthquake that assigned 
responsibility for destruction to a particular configuration of humans, natural forces, and 
technologies.543 In creating maps, models, and structural analyses, Agadir’s experts participated 
in the project of “reflexive modernization” that Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens identify as a 
defining condition of post-industrial societies.544 The history of earthquake response reveals how 
risk managers submitted natural disasters to the same practices of prediction and decision-
making as the hazards of industrial production.545 Seismic events reveal the extent to which 
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the Modified Mercalli-Cancani-Siedberg for seismologists has, however, increased in recent years. Gregory K 
Clancey, Earthquake Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868-1930 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 70; Deborah R. Coen, The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to Richter 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 4-36; Conevery Bolton Valenčius, The Lost History of the New 
Madrid Earthquakes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 157-159; In contrast to this history of the 
discipline’s gradual “purification” in Japan, Europe, and the U.S., Fa-ti Fan’s study of Chinese seismology in the 
1960s and 1970s provides a provocative account of how Maoist mass science enacted a porous and permanently 
unclosed object rooted in local forms of knowledge.  Fan Fa-ti, “Collective Monitoring, Collective Defense’: 
Science, Earthquakes, and Politics in Communist China,” Science in Context 25, no. 1 (March 2012), 128. 
544 At the same time, however, I follow Jean-Baptiste Fressoz and Fabien Locher’s critique of the concept of 
“reflexive modernization.”  Fressoz and Locher argue against approaches to reflexivity that emerged out of the 
sociology of risk—suggesting that “by stressing the recent reflexivity as an intrinsic characteristic of our 
contemporary societies, such narratives tend to treat ecological concerns as a given and disregard the conflicts that 
have actually driven them.” Fabien Locher and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, “Modernity’s Frail Climate: A Climate 
History of Environmental Reflexivity,” Critical Inquiry 38 (Spring 2012), 581; Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, 
109; Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1991); Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
1993). 
545 As Beck points out, “ultimately it is cultural perception and definition that constitute risk,” but the “becoming-
real” of risk is linked to its materialization in various sites and practices (Beck 133-136).  At the same time, he 
maintains a firm distinction between risks as the man-made hazards of industrial society and other “human 
dramas—plagues, famines, and natural disasters” (Beck 50).  Acknowledging the hybrid nature of risks that “include 
and combine politics, ethics, mathematics, mass media, technologies, cultural definitions and perception,” he 
nonetheless emphasizes that they remain “man-made hybrids” (Beck 146). 
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“tightly coupled” technical systems are also bound together with soil distribution and fault 
patterns as well as political institutions and policies of infrastructural neglect to form 
“envirotechnical systems.”546 Within these systems, expert calculations of risk constitute 
attempts to stabilize particular visions of the relationship between geophysical forces, the 
technologies designed to resist them, and human lives. New “interactive complexities” between 
these systems also generated the potential for new forms of harm to emerge.547 In Agadir, seismic 
safety measures similarly engendered unexpected forms of vulnerability: a lack of housing, 
exposure to the byproducts of cement production, and a susceptibility to new forms of personal 
indebtedness. At the same time, these vulnerabilities resulted less from the complexity of 
Agadir’s post-quake built environment than from the specific ways in which expert strategies for 
mapping and managing risk intersected with the priorities of postcolonial state officials anxious 
to consolidate their hold on the country. As Charles Walker and Mark Healey have suggested, 
earthquakes have historically provided opportunities for state centralization, territorial 
consolidation, and the weakening of local forms of authority. Since the nineteenth century, teams 
of seismologists and engineers—international purveyors of what Scott Knowles refers to as 
“disaster expertise”—have facilitated in this process.548 
Rather than the result of scientific reflexivity and the emergence of a “risk society,” 
seismic risk is better understood as the heterogeneous product of expert and bureaucratic 
practices that aim to stabilize a particular the relationship between nature, technology, and 
 
546 For a seismic event to develop into a full-blown natural disaster it must come into contact with what Sarah 
Pritchard calls an “envirotechnical system,” a “dynamic, porous, and inextricable configuration of nature, 
technology, and politics.” The notion of an envirotechnical system also avoids the division that Beck and Perrow 
draw between natural and human-made catastrophes. Sara B. Pritchard, “An Envirotechnical Disaster,” 219; Beck, 
50. 
547 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 52-53. 
548 Charles F. Walker, Shaky Colonialism, 12; Mark A. Healey, The Ruins of the New Argentina, 5; Scott Knowles, 
The Disaster Experts. 
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politics.549 Disasters provide opportunities for reconfiguring this relationship. To explain a 
disaster in terms of risk is to arrange a complex array of factors in ways that distribute both 
blame and authority.550 Approaches to disasters as “socially organized and systematically 
produced” phenomena have emphasized how “the norms, beliefs, and procedures that [affirm] 
risk acceptability” can contribute to a “normalization of deviance.”551 The question in Agadir, 
however, was less how experts defined notions of acceptable risk than how the calculation and 
mobilization of risk by a variety of actors constituted a strategic rearrangement of space, 
knowledges, and state-society relations. Risk was a technopolitical object—embedded within 
wider networks of power and subsequently deployed to reformat those networks.552 In 
formulating seismic risk, scientists and engineers in Agadir explained the disaster in terms of a 
multi-causal configuration of natural forces, technologies, and human agency. Administrators 
then mobilized this new definition of risk alongside techniques developed during the Protectorate 
for the management of “crisis.” Through their efforts to make sense of the earthquake, these 
groups of experts and officials promoted a vision of how technical authority and agency ought to 
be arranged in the postcolonial city. The process of formulating seismic risk became a way of 
 
549 As Jean-Baptiste Fressoz asserts, the problem with the historical narrative undergirding Beck’s notion of the risk 
society is “not so much its falseness as its lack of specificity.” The complex political afterlives of historically 
situated practices for defining and managing risk cannot be reduced to stagist arguments about epochal shifts toward 
reflexive modernity. Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, L’apocalypse Joyeuse: Une Histoire Du Risque Technologique (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 2012). 12. 
550 The environmental disasters that Kim Fortun associates with late industrialism and its interlocking “natural, 
technical, political-economic, social, and discursive systems” have parallels in postcolonial Morocco and the 
physical, legal, and institutional infrastructures it inherited from the French Protectorate. The infrastructural neglect 
of non-European neighborhoods in Protectorate-era urban policy and a colonial political-economy that encouraged 
the formation of densely populated and poorly constructed settlements of unskilled workers at the margins of 
Moroccan cities ultimately contributed to the level of destruction in Agadir’s poorest neighborhoods. Kim Fortun, 
“From Latour to Late Industrialism,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4, no. 1 (June 23, 2014), 310. 
551 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016), xiv; 67 
552 Seismic risk in Agadir was technopolitical in the sense proposed by Gabrielle Hecht, in that its stabilization and 
application as a technoscientific object constituted a “strategic practice of designing or using technology to 
constitute, embody, or enact political goals.” Hecht, The Radiance of France, 56-57. 
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preserving a leading role for French and international experts and expertise within a Moroccan 
polity in the process of negotiating the meanings and limits of decolonization.553 
Agadir's Experts 
The earthquake of February 29, 1960 transformed Agadir into the site of an international 
humanitarian disaster. French, American, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese marines landed in the 
ruined city only days after the initial shock and joined the rescue effort.554 Via print and radio, 
King Mohammed V called for international aid and national solidarity in assisting the victims, 
and Prince Moulay Hassan (the future Hassan II) reached Agadir the day after the disaster to 
oversee rescue operations.555 The King himself arrived in Agadir a week later. Newspapers 
described how the “staggering cortege” of journalists, ministers, and dignitaries accompanying 
Mohamed V wound through the empty streets of the quarantined city. As they prepared to enter 
the most severely damaged neighborhoods, teams of public health workers advanced to spray the 
royal procession with D.D.T.  Finally, the cortege reached the refugee camps on the outskirts of 
the city. There, Moulay Hassan, briefed his father on the relief effort’s progress. Dressed in a 
 
553 In his recent book, Segalla has elaborated a comprehensive and comparative account of how the politics of 
disaster response intersected with struggles over the nature and meaning of decolonization in North Africa. Thinking 
through the varied ways that environmental factors shape political actors, Segalla demonstrates the 
interconnectedness and lasting impacts of “slow” and “fast” violence in the North African context. Spencer D. 
Segalla, Empire and Catastrophe: Decolonization and Environmental Disaster in North Africa and Mediterranean 
France since 1954 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020). 
554 “L’escadre française fait route sur Agadir,” Le petit marocain, March 2, 1960, 1; “1.600 marins de l’escadre 
fouillent les décombres,” Le petit marocain, March 4, 1960, 1; “Les militaires marocains, français, américains et 
espagnols coopérent dans l’oeuvre de secours aux sinistrés,” La vigie marocaine, March 4, 1960, 1; For a discussion 
of the humanitarian and diplomatic dimensions of the disaster see Spencer D. Segalla, “The 1959 Moroccan Oil 
Poisoning and US Cold War Disaster Diplomacy,” The Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 2 (2012): 315–36. 
555 “S.A.R. le Prince Moulay Hassan chargé par Sa Majesté le Roi d’organiser les operations de sauvetage,” Le petit 
marocain, March 2, 1960, 3. Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, Rapport sur la suppression du Haut-
Commissariat à la reconstruction d’Agadir (Ministère de l’Interieur, 1971), BMHVP, annex 5. The total sum 
collected through the national solidarity tax mentioned in this 1971 report (460 million dirhams) conflicts with the 
number (350 million dirhams) cited in Hazel Barret, Howard Fox, and Linda Stanier, “Continuity through 
Adversity: Recovery from the 1960 Earthquake in Agadir, Morocco,” in Environment and Housing in Third World 
Cities, ed. Hamish Main and Stephen Wyn (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), 73. 
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military uniform, the Prince delivered this report in his characteristically precise and eloquent 
French, a language in which his father was not entirely fluent.556 After touring the remains of the 
“martyred city,” the King declared his and the nation’s commitment to rebuilding Agadir.557 The 
city’s “rebirth,” however, would depend less on royal volition than on the techno-scientific work 
of seismologists, engineers, and architects who brought their own professional considerations to 
bear not only on the task of reconstruction but on the project of decolonization. As part of this 
influx of foreign doctors, marines, and aid workers, scientific and technical experts arrived on 
site, not as participants in the rescue work but as “technical assistants.”558 Working with the 
Moroccan authorities, their explicit goal was to determine the feasibility of rebuilding the city on 
the same site. For the administration, Agadir’s rapid reconstruction was essential for reinforcing 
the government’s authority in the south and asserting its territorial claims to the Western 
Sahara—still under Spanish control at the time.559 
A number of the experts sent to study Agadir came as participants in international 
scientific missions to Morocco. The U.S. mission, for example, included a committee from the 
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) with engineers from leading steel producers and 
universities in the U.S. A German team, headed by Dr. Lehmann—a geologist, seismologist and 
former mine director—was comprised of engineers specialized in demolition and town planning. 
Around the same time, a Portuguese mission landed in Agadir led by Júlio Ferry Borges and 
composed of members of the Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil in Lisbon. In addition to 
engineers and geologists, these teams included photographers, draftsmen, chauffeurs, and various 
 
556 Miller, 162. 
557 “Un hallucinant cortège a parcouru la ville morte,” La vigie marocaine, March 7, 1960, 1, 3. 
558 “La reconstruction étudiée à Rabat hier soir en conseil des ministres avec l’aide de techniciens,” Le petit 
marocain, 5 March 1960, 1. 
559 Segalla discusses how Moroccan elites linked the reconstruction of Agadir with the recovery of the Moroccan 
nation as a territorial whole. Segalla, “Natural Disaster, Globalization, and Decolonization: the Case of the 1960 
Agadir Earthquake,” 113-14. 
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other technical assistants. Their visits to Agadir were official, formalized affairs, carried out in 
close cooperation with Morocco’s Ministry of Public Works and overseen by the Ministry of the 
Interior. Several teams presented their findings directly to the Crown Prince.560 
The majority of scientists and engineers involved in post-quake studies, however, were 
French nationals—coopérants who held semi-permanent positions in Morocco’s universities and 
scientific institutions. Robert Ambroggi, the head of the Moroccan Geological Service at the 
time, had been in Morocco studying hydrology since 1942. Georges Choubert and Anne Faure-
Muret of the Service de la Carte Géologique in Rabat contributed studies of the Agadir region 
following the earthquake. Another long-time resident, Jean Debrach, who headed the Service de 
Physique du Globe et de Métérologie of the Institut Scientifique Chérifien, was one of the first 
scientists to analyze Morocco’s seismicity in the early 1930s and became an active participant in 
the post-quake studies. Others such as Jean-Pierre Rothé—the leading seismologist working in 
Agadir and the Director of the Bureau Central International de Séismologie in Strasbourg—
though not residents, had made their careers studying North Africa.  
These French experts and their scientific ventures within the newly independent Morocco 
were part of a shifting relationship between colonial and technical hierarchies negotiated under 
the rubric of coopération.561 Since its founding in 1912, the French Protectorate in Morocco had 
long claimed the mantle of “technical assistance” as a key justification for its project of 
 
560 American Iron and Steel Institute, The Agadir, Morocco, Earthquake, February 29, 1960 (New York: Committee 
of Structural Steel Producers of American Iron and Steel Institute, 1962), 8; Lehmann et al, “The Reconstruction of 
Agadir,” U.S. Operations Mission to Morocco, 1960, 2; Júlio Ferry Borges, “Estudo do comportamento das 
construções quando do sismo de Agadir” (Lisbon: Laboratório nacional de engenharia civil, 1960), 1; “Agadir: 
première audition des experts,” Le petit marocain, March 19, 1960, 1; The Moroccan government also brought two 
Japanese seismologists to study the city’s destruction and provide recommendations for the reconstruction. Jean 
Daridan, “Mission de deux sismologues japonais au Maroc,” April 7, 1960. Box 365, 15P0/1, Archives Postal 
Agadir, CADN. 
561 Robert Ambroggi, “Underground Reservoirs to Control the Water Cyclea,” Ground Water 16 (1978): 158–66; 
Jean Debrach, “Les tremblements de terre au Maroc en 1933,” Mémoires de la société des sciences naturelles du 
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“paternalism, progress, cooperation, [and] mutual accommodation.562” After the dissolution of 
the Protectorate in 1956, large numbers of French administrators, engineers, scientists, and 
advisors stayed on in Morocco as technical assistants or coopérants. As the new mantra of a 
rapidly decolonizing French empire, coopération allowed former colonial agents to retain their 
positions in postcolonial administrations across the African continent.563 While the financial and 
cultural aspects of the policy remained a source of controversy between the two countries, a 1958 
convention established the essential framework for technical and administrative coopération 
between France and Morocco.564 The work of foreign experts in Agadir lay on the cusp of a 
transition in which scientific practices and epistemologies deployed by the colonial state to 
render Morocco legible became strategies of postcolonial rule.565 
In Agadir, seismology and structural engineering were the vehicles for this transition. 
Given their close ties with the Moroccan administration, French experts unsurprisingly produced 
studies that paralleled the priorities of the postcolonial authorities. Only days after the 
earthquake, Prince Moulay Hassan declared the goal of rebuilding the city on the same site a 
national necessity.566 Maintaining a strong economic presence in the south required 
 
562 Rabinow, French Modern, 277. 
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reconstructing Agadir, the capital of the Sous region. In a widely publicized speech, the first 
High Commissioner of the HCRA, Mohammed Imani, cited the importance of “seismological 
and geological expertise” in guiding the state’s reconstruction policy.567 The work of foreign 
experts to rewrite the city as a seismically vulnerable space scientifically sanctioned the 
reconstruction project and provided the administration with new techniques for managing urban 
building and dwelling.568 
The international teams sent to study the Agadir earthquake drew on techniques of 
seismic analysis that were common to their disciplines at the time. Along with the less deadly but 
more powerful earthquake in Orléansville, Algeria in 1954—to which experts drew frequent 
comparisons—Agadir fit into an emerging understanding of North Africa as a seismically 
vulnerable region.569 Broadly, expert studies of the earthquake argued that seismic risk must be 
taken into account in regional and urban planning. Agadir’s surprising number of fatalities served 
as a reminder of the dangers of low-quality constructions in unplanned and unregulated urban 
environments—an increasingly common refrain among earthquake engineers across the world.570 
Like the 1970 earthquake in Gediz, Turkey, Agadir’s destruction and reconstruction became 
synonymous with the failure of traditional construction methods and their subsequent reform 
through modernizing state action. Earthquakes such as Gediz came to signify not only the 
unpredictability of seismic events, but also the fundamentally different character of natural 
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hazards in “developing societies” and the lessons to be learned by their central governments 
during reconstruction.571 What made Agadir distinct from Orléansville or Gediz was the 
conjuncture of disaster and decolonization.572 Local forms of skill and knowledge, such as 
masonry, and local categories of property left largely untouched under the French Protectorate in 
Morocco suddenly became critical sites of intervention for the sweeping modernization projects 
of the newly independent administration. While Protectorate-era planners indulged in dreams of 
creating rationalized and regulated cities, it took the destructive force of the earthquake, the 
threat of “economic asphyxia” in the region, and the postcolonial government’s decision to seek 
technical assistance to transform these high modernist fantasies into a reconstruction project.573 
Risky Visions of Reconstruction 
For Agadir’s experts, investigating Morocco’s seismicity meant providing precise 
explanations not only for the disaster of 1960 but also for past and future catastrophes, as well as 
adjudicating between the natural and man-made causes of destruction. Assigning causal weight 
to one factor or another involved alternating between different spatial and temporal scales. 
Seismologists and geologists described the earthquake as a phenomenon with local, regional, and 
global relevance—shifting scales of analysis and explanation in an effort to draw the appropriate 
lessons from the disaster. Discussing the earthquake as a kind of natural experiment, they 
transformed destruction into useful data that could be reapplied to the new city or made relevant 
 
571 William Mitchell, “Reconstruction After Disaster: The Gediz Earthquake of 1970,” Geographical Review 66, no. 
3 (1976), 303. 
572 Segalla has elaborated on how “the earthquake made [Agadir’s] built environment central to transnational 
struggles over the Cold War, decolonization, and culture.” Segalla, “Natural Disaster, Globalization, and 
Decolonization,” 102. 
573 Rabinow, French Modern, 3; Ministère des travaux publics, Agadir plan directeur, Rabat: 1960, BMHPV, 43; 
“La reconstruction étudiée à Rabat hier soir en conseil des ministres avec l’aide de techniciens,” Le petit marocain, 
March 5, 1960, 1. 
 216 
to other seismically vulnerable settings.574  
Experts conducted their studies in an atmosphere of emergency. Only days after the 
earthquake, Mohammed V ordered a total evacuation of city.575 Citing the dangers of an 
epidemic, the authorities quarantined the site and ushered survivors into emergency tent cities on 
the periphery.576 Demolition work to prepare the terrain for field studies and eventual rebuilding 
began almost immediately—even before rescue efforts had officially ended.577 The 79th 
Engineer Battalion of U.S. Army arrived on March 3 with bulldozers and other heavy 
equipment—accelerating the work of clearing debris.578 During the early days of reconstruction, 
military authorization was required to enter the city, and the authorities granted almost exclusive 
access to groups of foreign scientists, engineers, and architects. For experts studying the region’s 
geological structure or proposing building regulations, the partially destroyed, partially 
demolished site functioned as a kind of crime scene—an unruly space that could be mastered and 
made to speak through forensic techniques. 
Robert Ambroggi was one of the first scientists to arrive on site and carry out a geological 
and seismological analysis in coordination with engineers from the Ministry of Public Works. In 
his account as in those that followed by Rothé, Debrach, Choubert and Faure-Muret, the goal 
was less to determine the ultimate causes of the earthquake than to establish the stratigraphic and 
tectonic context in which it occurred. These authors linked distinct geological features of the 
local site, the region, or both to the unfolding of seismic destruction in Agadir. Ambroggi 
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assigned particular importance to the local tectonics of the former city site, suggesting that the 
Tildi and Lahouar faults acted like a dam to contain the force of seismic waves emanating from 
the epicenter. For Debrach, analyzing the geological structure of the region as a whole, rather 
than studying local fault patterns provided a more accurate picture of the Agadir earthquake’s 
origin. He was quick to note, however, that while a regional investigation could help explain the 
intensity of the earthquake’s effects, it revealed little about its causes. Rothé also avoided 
interpreting the earthquake purely in terms of the local or regional geological structure. Instead 
he emphasized the need to deepen the historical understanding of the nation’s seismicity.579 
Instruments played a defining role in rendering Morocco’s seismicity legible according to 
the conventions of modern seismology. Seismographs and their increasing technical complexity 
during this period had allowed the discipline to become less reliant on direct observations and 
witness accounts.  Prior to 1937, there were no seismograph stations in Morocco and “most of 
the seismic activity [was] too weak to be recorded outside the country.”580 The founding of the 
Averroes seismic observatory near Casablanca represented the first attempt to transform 
Morocco’s earthquakes into instrumentally visible phenomena. In Agadir, post-quake 
investigations into the region’s historical seismicity maintained a firm division between 
instrumentally and human-observed seismic events. Rothé’s report distinguished between 
earthquakes known from historical sources alone—including lists of earthquakes compiled from 
Arabic manuscripts dating as far back as the thirteenth century—and those detected by 
seismographs, even when seismographic data proved too sparse to accurately locate the 
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epicenters.581 When mapping the seismicity of Morocco and neighboring regions, Rothé included 
only earthquakes that occurred after 1910, or roughly the date that European seismographs 
became capable of detecting seismic events in Moroccan territory.582 While instrumentally 
visible, the precise epicenters of these earthquakes, especially those before the late 1930s, 
remained “doubtful”—a fact that did not prevent Rothé and Debrach from including them when 
determining the level of seismic risk in large swaths of the country.583 While seismographs in 
Europe or the Casablanca region could make Agadir’s earthquake instrumentally visible, their 
distance from the site meant that their measurements were insufficient for calculating the 
location of the epicenter.584 As a result, experts relied more heavily on direct observation and 
witness accounts to construct a basic, geophysical description of the earthquake. 
As opposed to the magnitude of the earthquake—an instrumentally-generated value on 
the Richter scale obtained by correlating readings at different seismograph stations—the term 
intensity signifies the relative, felt impact of the shaking. While theoretically separate from the 
description of the earthquake as a discrete geophysical occurrence, intensity entered into 
seismologists’ attempts to locate the epicenter in the absence of reliable seismographic data. To 
measure intensity, experts deployed hybrid definitions of destruction, creating equivalencies 
between physical changes in the terrain, structural damage, and human fatalities. Once 
formulated, calculations of the 1960 earthquake’s intensity laid the groundwork for the category 
of seismic risk.   
As the AISI team acknowledged, studies of the region’s tectonics had only limited value 
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for predicting the scope, scale, and location of future earthquakes in Agadir given that “the entire 
coastal region near the end of the Atlas Mountain Range must be considered seismically 
active.585” Geological structure alone offered an understanding of seismic vulnerability on a 
regional scale that was ill-suited to legitimizing reconstruction on the former city site or 
providing guidelines for rebuilding. In an effort to extract useful data from the rubble, teams of 
experts analyzed the distribution of seismic damage, producing isoseismal maps, hundreds of 
photographs, and countless structural analyses. The overarching goal of these studies was to 
create a local geography of seismic risk, one in which the most vulnerable sectors of the former 
city could be identified, sequestered, and subjected to the necessary constraints during 
rebuilding. Detailed descriptions of seismic damage transformed the political necessity of 
Agadir’s rapid reconstruction on roughly the same site into a viable, scientifically sanctioned 
project.   
A local geography of seismic risk emerged from isoseismal maps of the earthquake drawn 
by Rothé, Debrach, and Ambroggi. Based on the Modified Mercalli-Cancani-Siedberg (MCS) 
Scale, with values ranging from I to XII, their maps indicated the relative intensities and the 
distribution of damage resulting from the shaking. The categories of MCS scale blended human, 
technological, and environmental reactions to calculate intensity.  The criteria for a ranking of 
IX, for example, included descriptions such as “General Panic….General damage to foundations. 
Frame structures, if not bolted, shifted off foundations….Conspicuous cracks in the ground. In 
alleviated areas sand and mud ejected, earthquake fountains, sand craters.” Normally, 
seismologists expected the highest intensity zone to be located directly around the epicenter and 
the degree of damage to decrease in more or less regular patterns that could be mapped with 
 
585 American Iron and Steel Institute, 82-83. 
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isoseismal lines. Applying this method in Agadir, however, proved difficult. Drastic differences 
in construction quality led to widely varying levels of destruction in areas equidistant from the 
presumed epicenter.586 Many calculations even placed the epicenter in zone IX, rather than in 
zone X where the shaking leveled the city’s poorest neighborhoods. This contradiction suggested 
the extent to which material disparities—differences in the quality and amount of material used 
to construct the city’s poorer and wealthier, Moroccan and European neighborhoods—had led to 
a highly unequal distribution of seismic damage.587 
 
 
Figure 14: “Agadir Earthquake: Epicentral Zone” in Jean-Pierre Rothé, “Le séisme d’Agadir et la 
séismicité du Maroc” in Notes et mémoires du Service géologique (Rabat: Éditions du Service 
géologique du Maroc, 1962). 
 
 
586 Rothé, 10. 
587 Jean Duvergé, Le séisme d’Agadir et la protection paraséismique, (Casablanca: Service de la métérologie 
nationale, 1969), 32. 
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To create his isoseismal map, Debrach made extensive use of witness accounts—
traveling from village to village to interview residents. He was quick to undercut his witnesses, 
however, noting that the “low density of inhabited centers where inquiries could be carried out” 
and “the obvious influence of newspaper articles on many of the responses” diminished the 
reliability of their accounts.588 In contrast, Rothé drew mainly on his own examinations of 
collapsed structures in the city to determine the distribution of intensity. Constructing a “view 
from above,” he also carried out an aerial observation, a technique that elicited criticism from 
Choubert and Faure-Muret.589 Citing the difficulty of assessing seismic damage from the air, 
Choubert and Faure-Muret adopted an alternative method—redefining destruction and measuring 
the impact of the earthquake not in terms of collapsed buildings but by the number of human 
fatalities in surrounding villages. Reproduced in Rothé’s report, this list of causalities by village 
performed the same function as charts showing percentages of collapsed buildings by 
neighborhood. Lists and charts rendered different forms of destruction commensurable and 
quantifiable for experts and administrators, paving the way for the construction of seismic risk. 
 
 
588 Debrach, 32. 
589 Georges Choubert and Anne Faure-Muret, “Le séisme d’Agadir, ses effets et son interprétation géologique,” in 
Notes et mémoires du Service géologique (Rabat: Éditions du Service géologique du Maroc, 1962), 64;  For a study 
of aerial photography and its role in shaping diverse expert knowledges see Jeanne Haffner, The View from Above: 
The Science of Social Space (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003). 
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Figure 15: “Isoseismal Map of Agadir and its Extra-urban Zone” in Robert Ambroggi, Séisme 
d’Agadir (29 février 1960 à 23h41): Rapport géologique. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de 
l’économie nationale, Direction des mines et de la géologie, 1960. 
 
Ambroggi adopted similar methods to create his isoseismal map—conducting an eight-
day field survey of Agadir’s fractured landscape. The position of his isoseismsal lines resembled 
Rothé’s despite their disagreement over the maximum level of intensity attained during the 
quake. Ambroggi’s main innovation was to utilize this isoseismic data to estimate varying levels 
of "danger” across the former site of the city.  In his report, this transition from intensity and 
risk—from past to future—was seamless.  Dividing the site into four zones of decreasing danger 
(A-D), Ambroggi mapped a vision of seismic susceptibility that approximately paralleled the 
contours and divisions of his isoseismal map. He identified, for example, an area “not 
recommended for rebuilding” that clearly corresponded to the zone of intensity IX-X590. Other 
 
590 Ambroggi, Séisme d’Agadir, 25. 
 223 
experts would later support this proposal, suggesting that the entire area north of the Oued Tildi 
be transformed into a green zone.591 The HCRA would ultimately adopt Rothé’s map and 
Ambroggi’s recommendations.592 Their city-scale visions of destruction supported the 
postcolonial administration’s aim to rebuild Agadir in approximately the same location. Despite 
their acknowledgement that the local tectonics of the site provided little reliable indication of 
where exactly a future earthquake would occur, it was the local tectonic vision underlying Rothé 
and Ambroggi’s city-scale maps that would influence reconstruction policy.593 
 
Figure 16: “Map of the Distribution of Agadir’s Zones by Decreasing Danger” in Robert Ambroggi, 
Séisme d’Agadir (29 février 1960 à 23h41): Rapport géologique. Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de 
l’économie nationale, Direction des mines et de la géologie, 1960. 
 
591 Rothé, 19. 
592 Haut-Commissariat à la reconstruction d’Agadir, “Agadir,” BMHPV. 
593 Communications between the French Embassy in Morocco and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reference Rothé’s 
influence on the reconstruction policy eventually adopted by the Moroccan government. L’Ambassadeur de France 
au Maroc, “Reconstruction d’Agadir,” 19 May 1961. Box 365, 15P0/1, Archives Postal Agadir, CADN. 
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The local vision of seismic risk, graphically rendered in Ambroggi’s map, was reinforced 
and expanded in a regional map from the same period. Working together, Rothé and Debrach 
charted the “Zones of Probable Seismicity” for Morocco and parts of Western Algeria.594  
Though not the first reflection on Morocco’s historical seismicity, their map was the first to 
combine a vision of the nation’s seismic past with predictions about its seismic future—carving 
up geographic space through a territorialization of risk. Partitioning Moroccan territory 
according to three categories of earthquake susceptibility supported a radically simplified 
representation of risk that removed the multi-causal complexity of seismic events from view.  
Rothé and Debrach’s risk map, like Ambroggi’s, provided a visual framework for the extension 
of expert oversight and bureaucratic management in the most vulnerable areas (Zone B). At the 
same time, the map linked Morocco to other “earthquake nations,” strengthening a global vision 
of seismic risk and scientific mastery.595 
 
 
594 Debrach, 40. 
595 Clancey, 4. 
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Figure 17: “Zones of Probable Seismicity” in Jean Debrach, “Rapport préliminaire du service de 
physique du globe et de météorologie sur le tremblement de terre du 29 Février 1960 à Agadir” in 
Notes et mémoires du Service géologique (Rabat: Éditions du Service géologique du Maroc, 1962). 
 
Through mapping techniques, historical readings of Arabic manuscripts, interviews with 
villagers from the Sous, instrumental data, calculations, and direct observations, seismologists 
enacted Morocco’s seismicity. Once combined with a concept of risk and translated into maps 
and lists, seismicity became a way to “colonize the future.”596 Rendering Agadir legible as a 
seismic city enabled administrators and inhabitants to envision its reconstruction as an 
antiseismic city—a triumphant legitimation of the scientifically supported Moroccan state.597 
 
596 Beck, 3. 
597 Beginning in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, Mohammed V also made a concerted effort to 
rhetorically link Agadir’s rebuilding to Morocco’s independence and the strength of the Alaouite dynasty.  The royal 
family’s symbolic involvement in the reconstruction was only one of the monarchy’s many strategies of legitimation 
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Re-engineering Local Building Practices  
While seismological studies created local and regional geographies of natural risk, 
engineers produced a vision of risk that strove to isolate the technological—locating 
vulnerability in particular construction methods and materials. If seismologists territorialized 
risk, then engineers materialized it. Isoseismal maps graphically linked high death tolls with 
proximity to the epicenter, and structural analyses attributed excessive fatalities to local building 
practices. Engineers condemned “traditional” construction methods as the root cause of 
inordinate levels of death and destruction. Assigning responsibility for human and monetary 
losses to building practices, however, obscured the role of material inequalities between 
European and Moroccan neighborhoods of the formerly colonial city in shaping the distribution 
of fatalities. The sequestered site also provided engineers with an ideal experimental space to 
elaborate their own definitions of risky methods and materials—definitions that allocated blame 
and reconfigured authority during reconstruction. 
According to the AISI report, “an earthquake in a populated area may be considered as a 
mammoth structural test program in which the performance of various types of construction and 
of different forms of structural details may be compared.” 598 Reports linked structural analyses 
of the city’s destruction to the development of antiseismic construction techniques 
internationally. Connected by a global geography of seismic risk, Agadir served as a laboratory 
for professionals from Portugal to New Zealand.599 To make destruction meaningful for fellow 
practitioners, engineers proposed a variety of classificatory systems for categorizing types of 
 
during Hassan II’s early rule.  Reports recognizing the monarchy’s participation also invoked the multiple scientific 
studies that had been carried out to ensure the safety and security of the rebuilt city. Such reports portrayed the 
reconstruction effort as a triumph of scientific progress and bureaucratic efficiency. Wizārat al-anbāʼ, “Agādīr baʻda 
al-zilzāl” (Rabat, not dated, c. 1966), 10; 17-19. 
598 American Iron and Steel Institute, 32. 
599 Borges, 19; F.F. Evison, “Lessons from Agadir,” 370. 
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constructions in Agadir according to their seismic vulnerability. Despeyroux, for example, 
divided buildings into three types: “1. traditional houses or those of poor quality masonry, 2. 
small, urban-looking constructions built with little attention to technical concerns, 3. modern 
European constructions.”600 The German team’s report labeled structures in the Kasbah, Founti, 
and Yachech simply as “primitive buildings.”601 The Kasbah became the standard example of 
“poor quality masonry” with other “poor Moroccan suburbs” ranked in relation to Agadir’s 
oldest neighborhood.602 Other classificatory systems, such as the one included in the MCS scale, 
focused on the quality of masonry and designated materials such as adobe as inherently 
vulnerable to seismic destruction.  
Surveying the landscape of collapsed and crumbling structures, one engineer described 
local building practices as a kind of “seismic pathology,” which the experimental qualities of the 
earthquake rendered visible to the expert eye.603 This “pathology” demanded a particular 
treatment: the total reorganization of space and building practice in Agadir. While enumerating 
the symptoms of structural failure, engineers assigned blame to local methods and materials. The 
Portuguese Mission, for example, described how “in neighborhoods at a lower economic level, 
they sometimes employed a mortar of clay mixed with sand”—a technique identified as the 
cause of widespread destruction in the city’s poorest areas.604 The AISI report adopted similar 
language, suggesting that “the stone masonry structures in the Kasbah, Founti, and Yachech 
districts were responsible for a large share of the deaths and injuries which resulted from the 
earthquake.”605 By diagnosing local building practices as the source of seismic destruction, 
 
600 J. Despeyroux, “The Agadir Earthquake of February 29th 1960,” 522. 
601 Lehmann, 2. 
602 American Iron and Steel Institute, 12. 
603 F. Vialet, Séisme du 29 février 1960 à Agadir résistance séismique des constructions, 1960, BISR, 15. 
604 Borges, 4-8. 
605 American Iron and Steel Institute, 33. Emphasis added. 
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engineers labeled them as targets of administrative intervention. 
 
 
Figure 18: “View of the Talborjt Neighborhood” from the photographic section of Júlio Ferry 
Borges, Estudo do comportamento das construções quando do sismo de Agadir, (Lisbon: 
Laboratóratorio nacional de engenharia civil, 1960). 
 
Beyond generalizations about the role of unsophisticated techniques or poor quality 
materials in generating most of earthquake’s causalities, engineers devoted little attention to 
analyzing the “seismic pathology” that plagued Agadir’s “traditional” neighborhoods.606 In 
engineering reports as a whole, the vast majority of studies dealt with the structural flaws of 
reinforced concrete buildings in the Administrative Quarter or the New City.  It is possible that 
experts regarded the failure of concrete structures as an anomaly that had to be explained, 
 
606 Vialet, Séisme du 29 février 1960 à Agadir résistance séismique des constructions, 1960, BISR, 10-15. 
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whereas the devastation of low-cost housing in the Kasbah, Yachech, Founti, and Talborjt 
appeared inevitable. While minor damage to hotels or administrative buildings led to complex 
calculations of force and resistance, the total collapse of houses in Talborjt elicited observations 
such as “the stones simply fell apart.”607 For engineers, the behavior of “mediocre 
constructions…teaches nothing unknown” and thus possessed little value as data that could be 
applied elsewhere.608 As a result, the disaster inspired only minimal reflection on the possibilities 
of low-cost, antiseismic housing, a fact that would contribute to the unequal redistribution of risk 
in the reconstructed city.  
   
 
Figure 19: “Rupture of the Frame in a Store Near the Port” from the photographic section of Júlio 
Ferry Borges, Estudo do comportamento das construções quando do sismo de Agadir, (Lisbon: 
Laboratóratorio nacional de engenharia civil, 1960). 
 
 
607 American Iron and Steel Institute, 34. 
608 Despeyroux, 526. 
 230 
Photographs reinforced the distinction between inevitable technological failure in 
resource-poor areas and the unexpectedly mediocre performance of certain European-style 
buildings. Post-quake images of “traditional” neighborhoods depicted vast, unvariegated 
landscapes of collapsed or crumbling edifices, while photographs of the New City, the Industrial 
Quarter, and the Port tended to isolate components of a specific building, rendering certain 
structural flaws visible. Differences in the visual scale and content of images of disaster 
naturalized the destruction of “traditional” buildings and individualized the destruction of 
“modern” ones. One photograph of the Yachech district portrays a shapeless mass of rubble that 
blends almost indistinguishably with the surrounding countryside. Aerial photographs in 
particular suggested the total, undifferentiated, and anonymous nature of destruction in the 
poorest neighborhoods. Between narrow visions of technological failure and images of wide-
spread collapse, photographic evidence performed a diagnostic function. Whether revealing a 
technical mistake in the execution of a reinforced concrete structure or exposing the 
“pathological” construction practices of entire neighborhoods, photographs framed an expert 
critique of ways of building and being in Agadir. 
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Figure 20: “Typical Street Scene, Yachech District” from American Iron and Steel Institute, The 
Agadir, Morocco, Earthquake, February 29, 1960 (New York: Committee of Structural Steel 
Producers of American Iron and Steel Institute, 1962). 
 
Drawing on the work of structural engineers and planners, the Ministry of Public Works 
also circulated maps classifying different levels of structural damage. By dividing buildings into 
two categories, reparable and non-reparable, such maps offered a simplified framework for 
action, one which guided the demolition and reconstruction process and would have a major 
impact on how administrators reorganized the urban land tenure system.609 These maps also 
revealed how the distribution of damage inversely corresponded to the distribution of resources 
in colonial-era Agadir. Red figures designated Yachech, Founti, and the Kasbah as beyond repair, 
while black squares demarcated the New City as a space for rebuilding and development. The 
 
609 Pierre Mas, “Plan directeur et plans d’aménagement,” A+U Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme 4 
(1966), 8; The archives of the French Foreign Ministry also contain multiple examples of maps produced by the 
Moroccan Ministry of Public Works that divided the city’s buildings into categories based on the level of structural 
damage they sustained. The administration used these maps to determine which areas to demolish, which to repair, 
whom to expropriate, whom to indemnify. Box 365, 15P0/1, Archives Postal Agadir, CADN. 
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overall message was clear: traditional designs, materials, and methods would have no place in a 
reconstructed Agadir. Reinforced concrete, despite a few catastrophic collapses, constituted the 
only conceivable path to a modern urban future in which the risk of structural failure could be 
calculated and controlled.610 
 
  
Figure 21: “Quartier central de Talborj [sic]”,  Photographie, Service de l’urbanisme au Maroc, 
March 1960 in Notes et mémoires du Service géologique. Rabat: Édition du Service géologique du 
Maroc, 1962. 
 
To secure this future, the mostly foreign experts in Agadir elaborated the first antiseismic 
construction codes in Morocco. Without exception, engineers recommended relying on 
 
610 Agadir’s post-quake architects did, however, produce a handful of exceptions to this directive, most notably the 
CHU Evolving Housing project which aimed to adapt rammed-earth construction methods to fit the requirements of 
the antiseismic codes. Chaouni, “Depoliticizing Group GAMMA,” 79. 
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reinforced concrete and modern design principles while at the same time incorporating lessons 
learned from the unexpected failure of certain European-style structures during the earthquake. 
The AISI team proposed adopting the building regulations of the Structural Engineers’ 
Association of California, which were formulated to resist earthquakes of a much higher 
magnitude than those experienced in Morocco.611 One French polytechnician, recommended 
taking the AS 55 code—established in Algeria after the 1954 earthquake in Orléansville—as the 
basis for developing a set of norms suited to Morocco’s terrain and seismicity. He also reflected 
on the consequences of adopting these codes given Morocco’s current labor system:  
It must be especially noted that in most under-developed countries, it is common to build 
with masonry, using a minimum of modern materials, by taking advantage of a workforce 
that is abundant, but sometimes insufficiently qualified and supervised. “Seismic” 
security can only be obtained by abandoning these construction techniques for more 
modern methods, whose cost is undoubtedly much higher.612 
While engineers had little to say about the colonial forms of displacement and dispossession that 
had rendered Moroccan labor cheap and “abundant,” they cast unsupervised workers as a source 
of seismic danger. In contrast to late-colonial crisis technologies that sought to harness and 
regulate local forms of skill and knowledge in the slums of Casablanca, risk management in 
Agadir aimed to expel local practices from the construction process entirely. As reconstruction 
progressed, however, cinder blocks, housing cooperatives, and low-interest loan packages—
technologies like those deployed during slum removal campaigns in Casablanca at the end of the 
Protectorate—came to undergird expert-driven visions of Agadir’s rebuilding and modernization.  
Reconstructing Property and Postcolonial Governance  
In a review celebrating Agadir’s reconstruction, King Hassan II expounded his vision of 
 
611 American Iron and Steel Institute, 83. 
612 Vialet, Séisme du 29 février 1960 à Agadir résistance séismique des constructions, 1960, BISR, 27. 
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the “total city” based on a “harmony between Nature and Man” and achieved through the work 
of scientists, engineers, and urban planners—a city “remade by Man and for Man, by the 
Moroccan for Moroccans and for Morocco.”613 Harmony in this context meant the reshuffling of 
risk. Pursing Hassan’s vision of Agadir’s antiseismic future, the Haut-Commissariat à la 
Reconstruction d’Agadir (HCRA)—the administrative body charged with rebuilding—adopted a 
variety of measures to limit the potential damage of the next major earthquake. Construction 
codes, building bans, and land expropriations aimed at managing seismic risk created new 
vulnerabilities and extended the state’s technical, aesthetic, and political influence over local 
building practices and the built form of the city to a greater degree than ever before.  
The HCRA’s organizational structure was inscribed with a vision of the relationship 
between decolonization and technical governance. The Commission was divided into three 
sections: planning (in the Department of Studies and Projects), implementation (in the 
Department of Public Works), and administration (in the General Administrative Office).614 
Mapped out in a 1961 report, the HCRA’s organigramme was aspirational in a dual sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
613 “Message de S.M. Hassan-II,” A+U Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme 4 (1966), 1. 
614 P. Philippon, “Étude préliminaire à la reconstruction d’Agadir,” Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, 1961, 
BMHPV, 19. 
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Figure 22: The “Organigramme” of the HCRA 
  
P. Philippon, “Étude préliminaire à la reconstruction d’Agadir,” Direction de l’urbanisme et de 
l’habitat, 1961, BMHPV. 
 
The document outlined an ordered framework for the extension and multiplication of the 
Commission’s different offices and performed the functional separation of its tasks: planning, 
building, and governing. Distinguishing the last two from the former maintained the distinction 
between planning—the supposedly rational, cognitive, abstract, production of knowledge—and 
practice—knowledge’s messy implementation.  At the same time, dividing the first two 
activities—planning and building—from the latter—governing—suggested the apolitical nature 
of technical assistance. French technical assistants participated in and oversaw the activities of 
the first two departments but played no role in the third.  According to the logic of the HCRA’s 
organigramme, if French experts were to act in Morocco’s new post-independence 
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administrative order, they had to act technically. They could not govern directly. In structure and 
in practice, the HCRA asserted that colonial continuities—in terms of regulations, techniques, 
and even personnel—were acceptable after decolonization as long as they were confined to 
domains and activities designated as “technical.”     
During the French Protectorate, the primary concern of the Ministry of Public Works in 
Agadir had been the construction, improvement, and maintenance of the city’s port, rapidly 
becoming the most important in southern Morocco.615 Colonial engineers also oversaw the 
construction of a few large hotels and administrative offices, but everyday practices of building 
and dwelling remained largely unregulated for the majority of the population. As a mobile 
technoscientific object, seismic risk allowed the Haut-Commissariat to extend its influence over 
these practices. As one report claimed, “geological studies made it possible to locate [safe] zones 
for building. Antiseismic regulations elaborated by a group of specialist technicians were strictly 
applied to all repaired or reconstructed buildings.”616 The “Normes d’Agadir 1960”—Agadir’s 
new antiseismic building codes—were the first of their kind in Morocco. The Ministry of Public 
Works charged a group composed of members from a variety of administrative branches and 
professional organizations with formulating these regulations. While, the group included 
participants from the Order of Architects, the Union of Moroccan Entrepreneurs, and the 
construction industry, representatives of Morocco’s leading labor unions and the earthquake’s 
victims were notably excluded. The authors of the code cited the American and German missions 
to Agadir as well as research conducted under Rothé’s supervision as the primary sources of site-
specific data. In addition, members of the group studied antiseismic regulations in Algeria, Chile, 
Greece, Japan, Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S and strove to align the “Normes” with international 
 
615 “Port Agadir aménagements divers, 1935-1947,” box E92, AM. 
616 Al-mandūbiyya al-sāmiyya li-l-ʿādat al-binā’, “Agadir 1383,” 1963, BMHPV, 1. 
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standards. Large sections, however, were drawn directly, almost word for word, from French 
construction codes of the period.617 
Within the code itself, authors regimented every aspect of the construction process from 
the choice of terrain to the variety of gravel used in concrete production. Work that previously 
would have been the prerogative of the individual laborer, such as the choice of rubble stone for 
a masonry wall, now fell under the code’s purview. The fabrication of concrete, the methods for 
selecting stones in masonry constructions, the practices for treating and moistening bricks were 
all subjected to regulation and standardization. The code required that builders provide frequent 
written reports to architects and the administration, assuring their influence over every step of the 
construction process. Regulations mandated the technical minutia of the main d’oeuvre but were 
relatively silent about the work of architects. A particular interpretation of the 1960 earthquake 
supported this hierarchy of knowledge. According to the code’s authors, “the experience [of the 
earthquake] essentially proved that in Agadir and elsewhere construction projects executed in 
conformance with the rules of art [i.e. by professional architects] performed much better, for the 
most part, than those in which these rules were more or less neglected.”618 Through these 
measures, the code circumscribed the movements and technical decisions of workers and masons 
and made architects, engineers, and the municipal authorities jointly responsible for their 
supervision. 
Regulations also blended technical and aesthetic judgments, mandating simple forms and 
banning excessive ornamentation in design. Authors discouraged the use of lathwork, balconies, 
 
617 “Normes d’Agadir 1960,” Bulletin officiel 2516 (January 13, 1961), 6-24. 
618 “Normes d’Agadir 1960,” 16. For a detailed study of the links between reinforced-concrete construction 
techniques and the reorganization of occupational risks and labor hierarchies see Amy E. Slaton, Reinforced 
Concrete and the Modernization of American Building, 1900-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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and acroteria.619 According to the code, these measures insured the seismic security of the city’s 
structures and supported the dominant aesthetic vision guiding reconstruction. Inspired by Le 
Corbusier and based on the CIAM charter’s principles of uniformity, separation, simplicity and 
functionality, Agadir’s new architectural and urban forms equated safety with unadorned 
exteriors. Monumental architecture in unfinished concrete exemplified the building practices 
mandated by the code. In the new courthouse designed by Elie Azagury—one of the first French-
educated, modernist architects from Morocco—the line blurred between technical and aesthetic 
considerations. The period’s planners found “the rough, béton brut frame…very assertive and the 
antiseismic norms reinforce this, the columns and beams have large sections giving a very 
noticeable impression of security.”620 Unfinished concrete and thick, solid columns gave 
architectural form to the new administrative ethos of seismic risk management.   
The administration also enforced Rothé and Ambroggi’s recommendations, prohibiting 
rebuilding in the area to the north of the Oued Tildi—an area including the former 
neighborhoods of Founti, Talborjt, the Kasbah, and Yachech. This zone was then reforested as 
part of an urban policy of creating green spaces to encourage the return of the tourism industry to 
Agadir. The ban also inspired the HCRA’s decision to reform the city’s land tenure system. As 
one report remarked, “when it was decided, following seismological and geological studies, to 
move the center of the city toward the South in order to distance it from the dangerous zone, it 
became obvious to planners that it was impossible to imagine a plan that was logical, rational, 
and adapted to the terrain given the existing fragmented mosaic of private property.”621 
To “rationalize” this mosaic, the administration expropriated nearly all privately held 
 
619 “Normes d’Agadir 1960,” Bulletin officiel 2516 (January 13, 1961), 7-15. 
620 Claude Beurret, “Architecture et aménagements publics,” A+U Revue africaine d’architecture et d’urbanisme 4 
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property, declaring this move an essential step in the rebuilding process.622 During the French 
Protectorate, Agadir’s colonial municipal government had already established the precedent of 
seizing private lands considered “essential for the public interest” (d’utilité publique).623 The 
earthquake provided the opportunity to radically extend this principle. Around 400 hectares, or 
approximately four fifths of the usable land in the city, came under the state’s control at this time. 
Only those property owners whose structures the HCRA labeled “slightly damaged” retained the 
right to keep their land.624 The administration intended to redistribute seized properties through a 
system of compensation in which victims were assigned plots according to city’s new urban plan. 
Government compensations, however, did not apply to individuals who lacked the official title to 
the homes they inhabited before the earthquake, a group that included a large percentage of 
residents from the Kasbah, Founti, and Yachech. Since these victims remained outside the 
redistribution system, the HCRA envisioned accommodating them in public housing projects 
instead.625 Ultimately many of the titleless survivors’ dossiers simply remained unprocessed at 
the time of the High Commission’s dissolution. Some were eventually given access to low-
interest loans for purchasing small plots of land from the city.626 For survivors themselves, 
however, this process was far from transparent. One resident, Lahcen Roussafi recalled 
submitting a dossier to the HCRA in 1960 and not receiving an indemnity until 1972.627 His own 
family and many others from the former Ichache neighborhood initially assumed that land 
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granted to them by the HCRA was compensation for properties they had ceded immediately after 
the earthquake. It was only later officials informed them that they would need to reimburse the 
administration for their plots in the new city.  
Land expropriations and construction codes were mutually reinforcing. Inhabitants whose 
property was seized had to follow building regulations in order to receive compensation from the 
state and the right to rebuild in the new city.628 If property owners failed to meet the requirements 
established by the HCRA, which involved obtaining a series of authorizations for different stages 
of the construction process, they “risked losing the benefit of the state’s aid” and the right to their 
plots.629 The extensive demolitions carried out by the HCRA during the first year of the 
reconstruction also established a precedent that would intensify the precarity of Agadir’s urban 
poor. Throughout the reconstruction period, the threat of demolition hovered over homes that 
failed to meet the city’s new building and zoning regulations.630 The HCRA’s authority to issue 
residential permits (permis d’habitation) had even more wide-ranging implications. Following a 
peaceful protest of survivors at the provincial seat in early 1962, officials dispatched the police to 
round up participants in a number of Agadir’s temporary neighborhoods. After detaining dozens 
of suspected protesters, the police demanded to see their residential permits. None could produce 
them. These individuals were then expelled from temporary housing and forcibly returned to 
their “cities of origin.”631 
New building codes also created an elevated demand for concrete. Only a year after the 
earthquake, with the nearby plant in Anza already producing approximately 70,000 tons of 
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cement annually, the administration envisioned opening new quarries in the area to keep pace 
with reconstruction. By 1974, cement production had risen to 310,000 tons annually. In the early 
years of the reconstruction, much of this demand was driven by the stylistic choices of modernist 
architects in Agadir. Members of Morocco’s group GAMMA carried out a number of high-
profile construction projects for apartments and government buildings in the new city center. 
Azagury as well as Jean-François Zevaco, Mourad Ben Embarek, Henri Tastemain, and others 
opted for a locally adapted style of brutalist architecture that pushed the association of 
monolithic concrete forms and seismic security to its logical extreme. As the chief architect for 
the HCRA, Ben Embarek encouraged the reliance on béton brut as a means to reassure anxious 
and traumatized survivors. Only twenty-six years old at the time of his appointment, Ben Emarek 
and his team also aimed to avoid the assertion that the city had been rebuilt by Europeans or was 
in any way a continuation of colonial urbanism. In the reconstructed city, however, much of the 
new Ichache neighborhood was built using the trame Écochard and other models and techniques 
adapted from postwar Casablanca.632  
Ultimately, the administration recognized the impossibility of providing concrete-panel 
apartment blocks to all of the city’s inhabitants. As an alternative to “traditional” stone 
masonry—deemed too seismically risky—engineers suggested cinder blocks, a weaker but 
cheaper material, for more economical construction projects.633 The preference for cinder blocks 
in low-cost housing construction was firmly ingrained within the Moroccan administration by 
this time. Many of the difficulties with new low-income housing in Agadir, however, arose not 
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simply from the materials themselves but also from cost-cutting construction methods that 
rendered many structures simply unlivable during the summer months. Cinder blocks provided 
extremely poor thermal protection compared to brick or rammed-earth constructions that were 
common in the region prior to the earthquake. In Agadir—as elsewhere in Morocco—insulation 
for cinder block structures was often no thicker than 3-6cm compared to the requirement of 
25cm in many French construction codes.634 Uncomfortably hot and humid interiors were the 
inevitable result of such methods.    
These measures had a number of unforeseen consequences. The demand for expert 
oversight and expensive materials created a prohibitively high cost of living in the city, pushing 
Agadir’s poorest inhabitants to the periphery where building codes were less stridently enforced. 
In many cases, this placed residents dangerously close to centers of cement production exposing 
them to toxic substances and increasing their susceptibility to respiratory diseases. Ahmed 
Belkadi has suggested that accelerating cement production and an explosion in the number of 
quarries near the city have also caused severe damage to the local soil and vegetation. Land 
expropriations and the system of compensation also tended to favor speculators, leaving many of 
the earthquake’s victims permanently displaced. Agadir also became a staging ground for the 
1975 Green March, and a number of the March’s unpropertied participants returned to the city 
and settled in its expanding bidonvilles following the annexation of the Western Sahara. A little 
more than a decade after the official end of reconstruction over a quarter of the city’s population 
resided in slums.635 
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Responding to Reconstruction 
Agadir’s new risk regime made the technical offices of HCRA the conduit through which 
reconstruction—the reorganization of space, land, and labor—had to pass. The category of 
seismic risk fashioned by scientists and engineers made these projects and policies possible—
paving the way for an increasingly unequal distribution of land and resources in the post-quake 
city. At the same time, technoscientific work in Agadir legitimatized the territorial priorities of 
the postcolonial Moroccan state by sanctioning the city’s rapid reconstruction near its former 
site.  
Agadir’s residents reacted to these new directives for designing and building their homes 
in complex and (at least for the administration) unexpected ways. During the early days of the 
reconstruction as minor aftershocks in the area continued, many survivors refused to move into 
the emergency housing provided by the administration, preferring instead to remain in tents. One 
engineer described a “general psychological state of mind that was hostile to urban renovation” 
among the populace.636 Critics of reconstruction policy leveled charges of corruption against 
bureaucrats and planners. One journalist from the newspaper of Morocco’s largest labor union, 
the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), described the arrival of two carpenter-artisans, either 
friends or relatives of two administrators, who received 4.5 and 12 million francs respectively for 
their piecemeal work.637 The workmen then presumably returned a large portion of these funds to 
the officials who had granted them these generous contracts. During a strike carried out by 
Agadir’s low-level state employees, another organizer asserted that members of the government 
had surreptitiously seized portions of the national solidarity tax intended for the earthquake’s 
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victims.638 
During the reconstruction process, survivors were grouped into neighborhood blocks on 
parcels of land that the HCRA had redistributed and slated for rebuilding. Each block had a 
representative—in some cases selected by the residents themselves—whose task was to approve 
the plans produced by a Commission architect. One ex-official, Mohamed Mounib, who worked 
for Agadir’s governor at the time described how this system led to frequent abuses with local 
representatives often designating the best parcels as their own.639 In one case, Mounib recounted 
how a neighborhood representative used his status to claim the entire block as his personal 
property and advance his case with the HCRA. Another survivor, Abdelkarim Abou El 
Mahassine, recalled how a frustrated Moroccan veteran of WWII in one neighborhood block 
complained to the HCRA, “why did we fight in the war for French architects to put us and our 
children in rooms that are like prison cells.”640 Criticism of the HCRA’s policies was not limited 
to the architectural features of the simple one or two story houses designed by commission 
architects. Former shopkeepers and merchants especially found it difficult to reestablish their 
livelihoods under the new land tenure system. Mounib noted that this group had a profound 
aversion to the taking out mortgages, which at the time were still extremely rare in southern 
Morocco. Rather than go into debt to finance the rebuilding of their homes and businesses, many 
of these ex-merchants chose instead to sell off their land titles, in some cases at less than a 
quarter of their estimated value. Speculation intensified while large investors were able to gain 
access to much of the coastal land in the reconstructed city by buying out survivors who hoped to 
avoid the new mortgage system. Agadir’s post-quake tourist industry was born out of this context 
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of speculation as sites like the Hotel Camelot and Club Med were built on land acquired from 
survivors at a fraction of its value.641 
In late 1961, dissatisfied residents of the tent cities and temporary housing projects 
formed a Victims’ Committee to participate in decision-making on matters related to the 
reconstruction. Lahcen Roussafi suggested that the Committee was loosely linked with leftist 
politics in Agadir at the time.642 In spite of early organizing successes, they were largely shut out 
of the planning process. Among their initial suggestions, the Committee proposed creating an 
independent cooperative that would study individual construction projects and purchase building 
materials in bulk. By envisioning a cooperative that “would take steps to obtain all of the 
materials [necessary for individual rebuilding projects] under the best conditions,” the Victims’ 
Committee criticized the HCRA’s failure to adequately provision building supplies.643 The 
proposed cooperative, in contrast, articulated a vision of material equality among victims. 
Though limited in scope, the project cast the creation of new structures “up to code” as a 
collective endeavor. As a rival strategy for planning and provisioning, the Committee’s proposal 
directly challenged the HCRA’s authority over reconstruction and gestured toward an alternative 
political future for the city.  
Housing cooperatives, like those established in Casablanca during the final years of the 
Protectorate, held an ambiguous status in the plans of the HCRA. On the one hand, cooperatives 
continued to offer a relatively inexpensive means of rebuilding by harnessing the skill and labor 
of local residents. The engineers who developed the Normes d’Agadir, however, had already 
singled out such local methods as a dangerous source of seismic insecurity. Moreover, 
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cooperatives, even those established by state officials, appeared to threaten the HCRA’s unified 
planning vision and gradually came to be associated with oppositional politics. Following the 
official end of reconstruction, the newly appointed Minister of Housing, Hassan Zemmouri, 
expanded the use of the cooperative system both in the Agadir region and elsewhere. Zemmouri 
had been a moderate member of the UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces)—a leftist party 
that emerged after independence as the main electoral opponent of Istiqlal while advocating for 
limits to royal authority. After the 1971 attempted coup in Skhirat, Zemmouri, was given the 
ministerial portfolio for housing and urbanism as a kind of conciliatory gesture. Zemmouri’s 
ministry, however, was allotted a skeletal budget and tasked with the resolution of the “housing 
crisis” across the country.644 Without adequate funding for public housing, Ahmed El Allali, 
Zemmouri’s representative in the south opted to create cooperatives that would provide technical 
supervision for state employees who pooled their resources to construct their own homes.645 
Land held by the ministry was granted to these cooperatives who adapted the standardized 
designs of state architects. Eventually, however, the cooperative model and Zemmouri himself 
fell out of favor and were replaced by a series of regional public-private entities known as 
ERACs (Etablissements régionaux d'aménagement et de construction). Like the CIFM before 
them, and their present-day successor, Al Omrane, the ERACs effectively acted as a technical 
supervisor and intermediary between low-income borrowers and Morocco’s banks. El Allali 
implied that such public-private initiatives won out over cooperatives, because high officials in 
Rabat became suspicious that residents might extend the practice of organizing without direct 
state oversight beyond the domain of housing construction. 
Not all local responses to reconstruction highlighted the oppressive character of Agadir’s 
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new antiseismic architecture and policies. In a brief autobiographical text about her childhood 
during the reconstruction, the historian Mina El Mghari recalled the prefabricated shelter that her 
parents initially resided in after the disaster and the gradual, piece by piece, construction of their 
new home “en dur.”646 El Mghari characterized the city as “certainly a Moroccan architectural 
production, but with new specificities, traits of…modern architecture.”647 She described visiting 
the Rada Barnen clinic, designed by Azagury—a building that “offered light and serenity, and to 
break up the monotony of the exterior forms, the architect provided each part with an original 
structure where concrete was the authoritative feature.”648 For El Mghari, Agadir’s reconstruction 
remained a marker of national solidarity and technical achievement in the aftermath of 
decolonization. Concrete, the antiseismic material of choice, was at the center of this vision. 
“Concrete, widely used in Agadir, signified this desire to build solid and resistant structures. An 
extraordinary emblem of force and sophistication.”649 What is striking in both critical and 
celebratory accounts of Agadir’s reconstruction is the constant equation of concrete construction 
with notions of security. Whether the bodily containment of the “prison cell” or the mastery of 
seismic nature in “solid and resistant structures,” Agadir’s new concrete forms restricted and 
regulated the movement, techniques, and livelihoods of residents. Debates continued within and 
outside of the administration about whether this new architecture—designed by both Europeans 
and Moroccans—was culturally suited to the needs of the local population or a thinly veiled 
colonial imposition. Yet behind these debates, a form of technopolitics emerged almost 
unquestioned, an unstated assumption about who could determine the concrete future not just of 
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Agadir but of all Moroccan cities. 
Conclusion 
During Agadir’s post-quake reconstruction, the technoscientific project of risk 
management was inscribed with debates about the nature of decolonization. The mostly French 
geologists, seismologists and engineers who installed Agadir’s seismic risk regime attempted to 
ban local construction practices while designating their own involvement in the rebuilding as a 
purely technical endeavor. These experts navigated disciplinary requirements, material 
constraints, and the political directives of a newly independent Moroccan polity. The Moroccan 
administration’s vision of a seismically secure modernist city built “by Moroccans for 
Moroccans” was entwined with a vision of decolonization that downplayed the political nature of 
French technical assistance.650 Both visions also continued to rely on colonial crisis 
technologies—designed to deal with the financial and political complexities of slum clearance in 
postwar Casablanca—to fill in the gaps of ambitious modernization projects aimed at achieving 
seismic security. 
Nearly a decade after the earthquake, leftist observers of the reconstruction process had 
begun to articulate the links between anti-seismic architecture and what was effectively a 
massive land grab. One article in the literary and political review Souffles-Anfās foresaw that 
“the new Agadir, created in its entirety by real estate magnets, will remain a living contradiction, 
a monumental farce, a concrete trap destined for the exploitation of man.”651 The author, 
identified only as M.R., saw in the administration’s promises of modernization, harmony, and 
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seismic security a reinforcement of preexisting political structures. “We return to Agadir by way 
of the new Mosque in concrete and iron symbolizing the survival of the established order, the 
past dominating the present. Nothing has changed. And yet, everything has been done to create 
this illusion: a hastily imported and deliberately avant-garde architecture.”652 The claim that 
nothing had changed in a reconstructed Agadir, however, ignored how risk management had 
become the vehicle for the articulation of new forms of politics. At a moment when the official 
process of decolonization provoked questions about the role of French expertise and the presence 
of French experts within the project of postcolonial development, the eradication of “local” 
construction methods in Agadir is striking. Beyond debates about the identity of experts and the 
architectural forms they produced, however, Agadir’s risk management regime placed new limits 
on the technical and political agency of residents while creating new opportunities for 
dispossession, exposure, and the rise real estate capital. As the following chapter will show, 
elsewhere in the Moroccan administration debates about decolonization and the relationship 
between “French” expertise, international modernist architecture, and local knowledge and 
technologies would take a sharply different turn.
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CHAPTER 5 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AND THE POSTCOLONIAL URBAN ORDER
 
June 25, 1975 marked the beginning of the third National Environmental Colloquium, the 
culmination of three years of attempts to implement new environmental policies in Morocco. The 
conference opened with a speech by Hassan Zemmouri, the highest ranking official present with 
a growing ministerial portfolio that had come to include urbanism, housing, tourism, and finally 
“the environment.” A Protectorate-era graduate of the Collège d’Azrou—a training ground for 
future members of Morocco’s civil and military elite—Zemmouri had previously held a number 
of administrative posts under Mohammed V and his son Hassan II.653 He had presided over the 
country’s first two Environmental Colloquia, but unlike previous years, in 1975 Zemmouri 
elected to deliver his opening remarks in Arabic. During the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called 
“technical” branches of the postcolonial Moroccan state continued to produce the majority of 
their reports in French in spite of growing support for Arabization among various groups of 
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actors within the administration. In his introduction, Zemmouri argued that “environmental 
problems are not theoretical problems with varying philosophical perspectives but rather 
concrete, practical problems…[whose] solution will not be found by following the environmental 
programs of the international community.654” The King, he suggested, had made clear that the 
project of both urban and rural development—“the building of homes, schools, and clinics” in 
cities and villages—must take priority over abstract considerations like environmentalism.655  
This juxtaposition of construction and environmental conservation—referred to as al-
muḥāfaẓa ʿalā al-bīʾa—was not unique to Morocco, but part of an ongoing international debate 
among postcolonial nation states in the aftermath of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment.656 The apparent tension between environmental protection and 
postcolonial development, however, took on a peculiar form in the Moroccan context. The 
concept of the environment provided experts and administrators with a new set of arguments and 
rationalities for imagining and managing the country’s urban crisis. The late 1960s and early 
1970s presented a set of distinct technopolitical problems that officials attempted to address by 
combining earlier crisis technologies with new “environmental” logics. 
The international context for debates about environmental policy in Morocco includes the 
postwar rise of institutions of “global governance” such as the United Nations.657 The extent to 
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which such institutions enabled forms of continuity or rupture with the formal structures of 
European empire has been the subject of much debate.658 Recent scholarship has tended to 
suggest that spaces within the UN provided a venue—albeit an asymmetrical one—for an array 
of actors to debate the problems and promises of decolonization and the Cold War as well as 
emergent issues such as population growth and environmental degradation.659 One striking 
example of how such debates worked in action was the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 
various responses it produced from the “developing world.” In one standard narrative, “Third 
World governments” saw the conference’s proposed environmental programs as an attempted 
infringement on their capacity to industrialize and raise their people out of poverty.660 Though a 
highly reductive reading of both the conference and its critics, this juxtaposition of 
“environmental protection” and “development”—and by extension the need for “sustainable 
development” to address this supposed impasse—was in fact one of the core lessons that national 
governments like Morocco’s and later conferences would draw from Stockholm.  
Some of these “Third World” critiques were later incorporated into the 1976 UN 
Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat I) in Vancouver which affirmed the “concern over 
the extremely serious condition of human settlements, particularly that which prevails in 
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developing countries.”661 The architects of the Vancouver Conference went to great lengths to 
recognize international inequalities and their impact on both environmental degradation and 
housing conditions. The conference’s “Action Plan” called for a more equitable distribution of 
urban resources within national contexts and internationally, acknowledging at the same time 
that “foreign models must not dominate planning decisions which should be…implemented by 
local people making the best possible use of indigenous resources, within the context of local 
culture and environment.”662 This notion—that “indigenous resources” or “local culture” could 
somehow resolve the tension between environmental protection and development—was a 
position that urban experts in Morocco had articulated since at least the late 1960s.   
While debates staged by international experts at UN conferences resonated in Morocco—
shaping much of the official discussion about which environmental policies and programs should 
be adopted—this chapter is not primarily concerned with the relationship between international 
institutions and approaches to governance in Morocco.663 Instead, it considers how international 
debates about environmental protection helped frame, and at times to obscure, a shifting 
relationship between urban experts, the technologies they relied upon, the nature of urban unrest 
after independence, and the place of “local knowledge” within the construction economy. Most 
of the actors advocating for new “environmental” policies in the kingdom were not international 
experts working for the UN, but rather individuals employed directly by the Moroccan state. 
Many of them were coopérants from France or other European nations who worked within 
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ministries and municipal governments in the kingdom through bilateral accords. Some of these 
coopérants, like the colonial officials who preceded them, made their careers in various parts of 
the former French Empire, while others took up long-term posts in Morocco. Moroccan officials, 
architects, and planners composed another group—many of whom advocated for policies and 
programs to the left of those supported by the country’s monarchy and the Istiqlal Party. Some of 
these local experts and officials promoted a process of “Moroccanization” that would see 
coopérants removed from key positions within the state and replaced by qualified Moroccans. 
While not necessarily sharing the same interests, both groups adopted a shared language, 
deploying terms like “environmental protection,” “pollution,” “development,” “crisis,” and 
“local” to sketch out a new role for urban experts—whether European or Moroccan—within the 
postcolonial state.  
Like the French Protectorate before it, the urban initiatives of the postcolonial state were 
largely inspired by popular resistance. The first two decades of Morocco’s independence 
witnessed a series of profound political disruptions. The eventual result of the student uprisings 
and attempted coups of this era was an aggressive reassertion of monarchical power and a 
dramatic intensification of state violence and surveillance. In October of 1958, two years after 
Morocco’s independence and the territorial integration of the Spanish Protectorate in the North, 
violence erupted in the Rif, a mountainous, primarily Berber-speaking region in the formerly 
Spanish zone. While officially professing loyalty to the king, the rebels challenged the authority 
of Istiqlal and were subject to violent retaliation from the army and the palace. In spite of its 
failure, the uprising marked the Rif as a space of resistance and its residents as opponents of the 
centralizing tendencies of the makhzan. 
At a national level, the late 1950s to early 1960s witnessed the emergence of the UNFP 
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(National Union of Popular Forces), headed by Mehdi Ben Barka, as the primary critic of the 
monarchy and the network of advisers, officials, and institutions coalescing around the core of 
the old makhzan. The party’s repression during 1963 and 1964 culminated with the eventual 
abduction and death of Ben Barka in Paris in 1965.664 Earlier that year, what began as a student 
protest in Casablanca morphed into a broad-based urban uprising—the largest since December of 
1952. The UMT (Moroccan Workers’ Union) and the UNEM, the national student union, both 
played a significant role in organizing the protests. After three days of violent clashes between 
protesters and security forces, hundreds were left dead. In the immediate aftermath, Hassan II 
declared a state of emergency that would last five years and would be shortly followed by two 
attempted military coups. Leftist political organizing continued during this period but was 
eventually curtailed by the campaign of disappearances that initiated the period known in 
Morocco as the “years of lead.”665 
Following the marginalization of the UNFP and the attempted military coups in 1971 and 
1972, Hassan II set about recalibrating the Moroccan political system.666 During the “years of 
lead” (sanawāt ar-ruṣāṣ, années de plomb), the monarchy harnessed and expanded informational 
infrastructures of urban surveillance whose groundwork had been laid in the final decades of the 
French Protectorate. Police, prisons, networks of informers reporting to the Minister of the 
Interior—these were the instruments of coercion aimed at creating a new kind of urban order. 
They were not, however, the only means through which the new makhzan solidified its place 
within an independent Moroccan polity. Hassan II worked to shore up support with both urban 
 
664 Zemmouri himself was briefly arrested in 1963. Maurice Buttin, Ben Barka, Hassan II, De Gaulle: Ce que je sais 
d’eux (Paris: Karthala Éditions, 2010), 158. 
665 Miller, A History of Modern Morocco, 166-171. Miller suggests that the period known as the “years of lead” lasts 
roughly from 1975-1990. 
666 William Zartman, The Political Economy of Morocco (New York: Praeger, 1987), 27. 
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and rural notables—in part by brokering access to capital.667 As one of the country’s largest 
private investors, the king could enable or obstruct participation in Morocco’s “market 
economy”—tying the economic interests of the country’s elite to the fate of the monarchy. 
Policies such as “Moroccanization” and documents such as the 1973-1977 Five Year Plan also 
represented attempts to build support for the central state among an emerging middle class of 
managers and technicians.668 Observers of the period have paid much attention to the Hassan’s 
attempts to revitalize the symbolic trappings of authority associated with the king’s role as 
“commander of the faithful.”669 Scholars seeking to explain the “success” of the Moroccan 
monarchy during this period have emphasized its policies of patronage and divide and rule, its 
continued religious and cultural legitimacy for many Moroccans, and its willingness to deploy 
spectacular and subtle forms of violence to contain dissent.670   
This chapter will suggest, however, that all of these strategies unfolded in relation to a 
new set of concepts and arguments that bolstered forms of expert authority upon which the 
makhzan continued to depend. By de-centering the monarchy’s role in the transformation of 
Moroccan politics in the late 1960s and 1970s, I examine how novel “environmental” 
interventions produced forms of agency, vulnerability, and control that under-girded the violence 
of the years of lead. Throughout this period of states of emergency and unrest, Moroccan cities 
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remained “in crisis,” but the contours of this crisis began to shift to include new types of 
environmental problems and technological solutions. The total percentage of Moroccan city-
dwellers living in slums peaked during this period and rural migration to urban areas continued 
largely unabated. The Ministry of Interior’s intensified investment in urban security networks 
proceeded alongside discussions of al-muḥāfaẓa ʿalā al-bīʾa—formulated in conversation with 
emerging international definitions of environmental pollution. New environmental framings of 
Morocco’s urban problems also borrowed from late-colonial definitions of urban crisis and built 
upon crisis technologies.  
Scholarship on North African environments since decolonization has tended to argue that 
intensifying degradation was the result of either the continuation of extractive colonial policies 
or the persistence of colonial “misreadings” of Maghribi landscapes.671 While these approaches 
usefully highlight postcolonial continuities, both have overlooked debates surrounding the 
concept of the environment itself and conflicts over how to claim knowledge over it. Ultimately, 
the studies, debates, and projects of the late 1960s and early 1970s failed to coalesce into a 
coherent collection of environmental policies. This apparent “failure,” however, belies the lasting 
impact of al-muḥāfaẓa ʿalā al-bīʾa on the role of urban experts in a postcolonial Morocco.  
The introduction of environmental logics into state housing policies followed a subtle but 
significant shift in how officials and experts mobilized “local knowledge.” Moreover, the 
category of the “local” adopted in planning circles grouped together a surprising collection of 
forms, materials, and practices—from earthen architecture in the Draa valley, to urban bricolage 
 
671 For examples of arguments about the persistence of colonial misreadings see Diana K Davis and Edmund Burke, 
eds., Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011); Diana 
K Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North 
Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007). For an approach based more on the analysis of changing state 
structures and land use practices see Will Swearingen and Abdellatif Bencherifa, eds., The North African 
Environment at Risk (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).
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in the slums of Casablanca, to regionally available clays or minerals with possible industrial 
applications. Moroccan housing officials and European technical assistants imagined the “local” 
as a reservoir of potential solutions to persistent housing shortages as well as a bulwark against 
the dangers of environmental degradation. Some in the Ministry of Housing and the CERF 
(Centre d’Expérimentation, des Recherches et de Formation) went as far as to describe their 
efforts as part of the ongoing process of decolonization. The “experimental” strategies elaborated 
by architects and urbanists working for the CERF ran parallel to the Ministry of Housing’s 
deepening reliance on crisis technologies like those developed during the final years of the 
Protectorate. During the early 1970s, ministry officials continued to depend on state-backed loan 
packages, cooperatives, and prefabrication to address housing shortages and expanding slums.672 
Pollution was not simply added to the growing list of urban problems. The focus on 
environmental management— the expert identification of risks and resources—offered a new 
way of linking political security, technical surveillance, and approaches to development based on 
the appropriation of local forms of skill, knowledge, and matter. In the process, Morocco’s urban 
experts cast themselves not as agents in state modernization projects but as intermediaries—
navigating the tensions between development and conservation and, more importantly, between 
risks and resources.  
Protection and Pollution in Postcolonial Planning 
In the aftermath of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, state 
planners across the former colonial world adopted the language and techniques associated with 
the “environment” as a multi-disciplinary object of knowledge and a resource to be managed. 
 
672 “Pour une nouvelle approche des problèmes de l’habitat,” Maghreb information, August 30, 1972, 558PO/1/188, 
CADN. [no page number] 
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Morocco sent a delegation to participate in the conference and began holding its own 
environmental colloquia in the years following. The introduction of the concept of 
“environment” into expert and official communities working on housing and development in the 
country precipitated new definitions of and approaches to urban crisis. In some cases, this 
involved repackaging colonial assumptions about who was to blame for degradation and 
contamination. 
Inaugurated one year after Stockholm, Morocco’s first Colloquium on Environment and 
Development brought officials from the Ministries of Housing, Agriculture, Public Works, and 
others together with international experts in disciplines from architecture to ecology. As the head 
of the recently created Ministry of Housing, Urbanism, and the Environment, Hassan Zemmouri 
opened the conference in a speech that identified Morocco’s cities as sites of striking 
environmental degradation.673 Zemmouri suggested a close connection between Morocco’s urban 
crisis and its emerging environmental issues. For the minister, many of the country’s ecological 
problems had architectural roots. “Our traditional architecture,” he lamented, “so well adapted to 
our way of life, our climate, our culture, is being demolished by a flavorless international 
architecture. Introduced under the cover of modernism and functionalism, it [international 
architecture] denatures urban landscapes, cuts us off from our origins, and makes us foreigners in 
our own agglomerations.”674 Against the backdrop of Morocco’s degraded “built environment,” 
Zemmouri juxtaposed the country’s still relatively pristine “natural environment.”675  
Environmental protection, he argued, should be both submitted to the principles of urbanism and 
 
673 Hassan Zemmouri, "Discour d'overture," in Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de l’environnement, 
“Journée mondiale de l’environnement: Colloque national : « Environnement et développement »,” June 6, 1973, 
R347, BMHPV, 9. 
674 Zemmouri, 10. 
675 Zemmouri, 12. 
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subordinated to the imperatives of development. While working to situate the notion of the 
environment within earlier logics and forms of practice, Zemmouri still cited the “radical 
questioning” that the term’s introduction had provoked within a matter of years—sparking new 
international debates and a renewed humanism.676  
For French and Arabic speaking Moroccan officials in the 1970s, the adoption of the 
word “environment” itself raised questions of translatability. The Colloquium’s participants 
identified the term as an “Anglo-Saxon” import, a synonym for the French word milieux, but one 
that had a precise technical definition.677 The term encompassed the totality of physical and 
biological factors in a given setting—factors that could be enumerated and analytically isolated 
by different categories of scientists: geologists, ecologists, biologists, etc. As a new object of 
study, the “environment” opened up previously indistinct risks and resources to a community of 
experts working through different disciplinary paradigms to craft a composite image, an 
environmental whole. Within this vision, the degree to which the environment was determined 
by either human labor or nature was directly proportional to the “technical capacity of 
civilization.”678 In cities, for instance, “natural processes are less perceptible in spite of the fact 
that they condition the consequences of human intervention…the drama results from what 
human action, whether voluntary or not, is capable of provoking in terms of mutations, 
disrupting existing rhythms, putting in place new systems of physical relations, [etc.]….”679 This 
pressumed need to disentangle the effects of nature from human labor in Moroccan cities 
highlighted the central role of urban experts, who were supposedly adept at making such 
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678 Colloque national: Environnement et développement, R2487, BMHPV, 2. 
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evaluations.  
Within the conference proceedings, the Ministry of Urbanism, Housing, and the 
Environment complied a provisional dictionary of environmental terms based on the work of a 
group of Swiss and Soviet scientists whose definitions would be adopted by various branches of 
the Moroccan state. The term “pollution,” which Moroccan officials and French technical 
assistants had previously used flexibly and in a polemical sense, now acquired a narrow 
definition. While pollution occasionally appeared in state records from the colonial period, 
insalubrité was the primary category deployed by Protectorate officials to convey the notion of 
harm—whether toxic, sonic, or moral—emanating from a given setting and affecting individual 
bodies. Originally a product of 19th century public health campaigns that targeted the moral and 
physical deterioration of medieval urban cores in modernizing French cities,  insalubrité in 
colonial Morocco singled out both precolonial mudun and the emerging forms of slum housing 
on the peripheries of cities like Casablanca.680 Unlike the concept of insalubrité, in which forms 
of harm are rooted in the milieu itself, pollution now signified the “addition to the environment 
of any substance (solid, liquid or gas) or form of energy (such as heat, sound or radioactivity), in 
quantities that exceed the environment’s capacity for absorption.”681 As an “addition to the 
environment,” pollution could be made visible only through precise calculative techniques. It 
was no longer a matter of public perception but of expert estimation.682 
The concept of pollution as a measurable, and not necessarily perceptible, “addition” to 
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the urban environment represented a departure from the work of Protectorate urbanists who used 
the term infrequently and in a far more general sense. With this shift, establishing the presence or 
absence of potential harm in a given urban setting came to depend less on the senses and 
impressions of either officials or residents. The quality of housing and other urban amenities was 
no longer in and of itself a defense against contamination or degradation. Instead pollution relied 
on expert analysis of potentially invisible forms of harm.683 At the 1973 Colloquium, the novelty 
of this definition—based on the work of an international community of scientists—encountered 
the messy realities of postcolonial rule and resilient Protectorate-era assumptions about the types 
of objects and people who could become the target of a future environmental policy.  
During the early 1970s the Commission Nationale du Développement Régional (CNDR) 
produced a series of studies outlining Morocco’s “environmental problems.” This list included, 
erosion, deforestation, the distribution of water, sanitation, and the degradation of coastal zones. 
Explicitly excluded from this list of “environmental problems” was the issue of industrial 
pollution.684 Officials at the CNDR noted that with the rare exception of sugar refineries in the 
Gharb and the substances they released into the Sebou River—a problem classed under “water 
distribution”—it was still too early to speak of industrial pollution in Morocco.685 Situating the 
kingdom as an underdeveloped country occluded certain categories of risk and exposure 
associated with the industrialized world.686  
 
683 This is not to suggest that earlier forms of public health practice rooted in the concept of insalubrité disappeared, 
but rather that they were joined by new ways of measuring and managing potential harm that assumed the basic 
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Beyond reproducing definitions of pollution that excluded Moroccans from full 
modernity, the postcolonial administration’s list of environmental problems also reinforced 
Protectorate-era strategies for managing impoverished urban and rural communities. By 
identifying erosion, deforestation, and sanitation—processes that had been severely legislated by 
Protectorate officials—as the core environmental problems facing the nation, the CNDR 
effectively repackaged colonial conceptions about who was at risk and who was to blame for 
degradation. By declaring industrial pollution a non-issue, the Commission dismissed the 
possibility that the urban and rural poor could become victims of toxic exposure. Instead, 
villagers and slum dwellers were cast as the primary perpetrators of pollution. CNDR studies 
singled out farmers in the restive Rif and their practices of inclined agriculture on the 
mountainous slopes for contributing to erosion in a region still being punished by the central 
state for its uprising against the crown in the late 1950s.687 The CNDR also envisioned an 
ambitious reforestation project— comprised mostly of eucalyptus trees—that bore a striking 
resemblance to colonial environmental interventions in Algeria and Morocco.688 These 
eucalyptus, which tended to further desiccate already dry soils in Morocco, also served a 
disciplinary function. Tree planting aimed to “transform mentalities” and to “raise the 
population’s awareness about the need to respect nature in general.”689 Discussions of water 
pollution in the kingdom, while they did not entirely ignore industrial factors, tended to focus on 
the public health risks of poor sanitation. Fears about a reemergence of typhus, typhoid, or 
cholera echoed Protectorate-era arguments that cast the bodies of the urban poor as sources of 
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contamination rather than victims of disease.690   
The CNDR report’s conclusion made these points explicit:  
Rural poverty, urban poverty are the real great environmental problems that confront all 
developing countries….In the case of developing countries, development becomes 
essentially the remedy for their principle environmental problems….In the same spirit, it 
is essential to admit that it would be ineffectual in a country like Morocco to focus on 
problems of atmospheric pollution by combustion motors, first because the danger is still 
minimal, second and especially because such problems are becoming critical in wealthy 
countries and will inevitably be studied by them.691 
Not only did the CNDR’s planners cast industrial pollution as a non-issue, they harnessed 
assumptions about the essential difference of Morocco’s environmental problems to argue for 
maintaining a global distribution of knowledge production rooted in the colonial order. For 
Moroccan experts and officials, constructing pollution as technical category was a matter of 
reproducing partial legibilities and zones of non-knowledge.692 An internationally imagined 
division of technoscientific labor between rich and poor countries under-girded the visions of the 
environment promoted by French and Moroccan experts. Following the strategies of postcolonial 
elites in other contexts, Moroccan officials attempted to portray development and environmental 
protection as non-contradictory principles—a move that relied on rendering certain forms of risk 
invisible and unknowable.  
The effects of the postcolonial government’s calculated ignorance of risks related to 
industrial pollution were not merely discursive. For Moroccans living in close proximity to 
cement plants and other manufacturing centers, the erasure of certain categories of harm from 
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policy discussions translated into new forms of exposure. During the 1970s for instance, the 
Lafarge cement plant lay practically at the center of Hay Mohammadi, the site of the former 
Carrières centrales and one of the largest working-class neighborhoods in Casablanca at the time. 
Since independence the neighborhood had remained a central site of urban protest, particularly 
during the 1965 uprising. One of the period’s most notorious prisons, Derb Moulay Cherif, was 
also located in Hay Mohammadi not far from the cement plant. One former resident, Hamid 
Berghout, recounted how during the OPEC crisis the factory shifted from burning oil to burning 
coal to operate the cement kilns. He described how the entire neighborhood was rapidly coated in 
soot. It became impossible to sit outdoors in cafés—a prime space for masculine sociality—
without being covered in a thick layer of black film.693 Such experiences disrupt the accounts of 
urban planners who cast industrial pollution as a non-issue in Morocco. 
In the absence of policies, techniques, and instruments for making atmospheric pollution 
visible, both experts and local residents who broached the subject had to rely on sensory 
perceptions and observational methods. One study published in Maroc medical in 1973 claimed 
that without a reliable means of measurement the general increase in atmospheric pollution in 
Casablanca, Agadir, and Safi could be tracked through changing weather patterns over the course 
of the past forty years. Taking 1931 as the start point and Essaouria—a city that had experienced 
virtually no industrial development—as a control, the technical assistant, Claude Calvet argued 
that the growing presence of fog in Morocco’s coastal cities was a sign of an increasingly 
polluted environment. Agadir provided further evidence for this claim as the city witnessed a 
marked drop in the number of foggy days after the destruction of the industrial sector in the 1960 
earthquake. Citing these variables, Calvet suggested that “urban atmospheric pollution is far 
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from inexistent in Morocco.”694 Casablanca with its large number of industries and automobiles 
presented a particularly dangerous case.695 Beyond such observations and comparisons, however, 
there were few means available to either urban experts or local residents for rendering 
environmental exposures legible. 
Slums and "Environmental" Problems 
Official discussions of pollution and environmental protection also reshaped debates 
about the desirability of different forms of urban construction in Morocco. The turn to the “local” 
as a potential solution to environmental degradation (the focus of the following section) 
provoked a subtle shift in the status of slums within models of urban development proposed by 
the Moroccan planners and European technical assistants who staffed the kingdom’s ministries 
and municipal institutions. Postcolonial urban professionals in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
were not the first to regard bidonvilles as a resource to be tapped. The crisis technologies 
developed to deal with anti-colonial unrest in the final years of the Protectorate similarly sought 
to harness forms of skill, labor, and sociality associated with life in the slums while enacting 
forms of financial and technical surveillance to contain what appeared threatening [Chapter 3]. 
Unlike Protectorate urbanists, however, who continued to regard bidonvilles as a kind of 
aberration, an uncomfortable blend of modernity and tradition, some postcolonial planners 
sought to incorporate slums into their vision of development—a kind of “Moroccanized” 
modernization. New notions of “protection,” “pollution,” and “precarity” provided a framework 
for identifying precisely which elements of Morocco’s urban environments represented forms of 
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risk and of value. Postcolonial planners also seized on these concepts to assess the afterlives of 
French urbanism in Morocco.  
 Bidonvilles or mudun al-safīḥ—slums or forms of informal and precarious housing—
were at the center of these debates. Moroccan administrators continued to single out poor 
sanitation in bidonvilles as the primary source of contamination in the urban environment. In 
certain cases, officials went so far as to identify mudun al-safīḥ not just as a cause but as a form 
of “pollution.”696 The architect and urbanist, Jean Hensens critiqued this view, which he 
described as reducing the bidonville to a “profanation of another form of housing imagined as 
pure and clean, a visual and aesthetic intolerance.”697 A Belgian technical assistant, Hensens was 
initially recruited by Ben Embarek to the Moroccan Ministry of Public Works before joining the 
CERF. Inverting the formula, “bidonville = pollution,” Hensens argued that bidonvilles 
represented an advanced form of “anti-pollution.”698  As a type of dwelling based on the re-
purposing of industrial debris, Moroccan slums functioned simultaneously as mechanisms for 
recycling and for the production of cheap housing. In a report included in Colloquium based on 
the 1960 housing census, the Service central des statistiques (SCS), deployed similar arguments. 
The SCS suggested that rather than a profanation of existing urbanism, “the bidonville follows 
economic development as it is practiced in Morocco, it is part of the model of development.”699 
Other members of the CERF argued that the problems of substandard housing and of 
economic development more broadly had their origins in real estate speculation. Portraying 
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Morocco as a liberal market economy, planners accused urban speculators of channeling the flow 
of capital away from more productive sectors such as industry.700 As a result of speculation and 
rising prices in zones of Casablanca labeled for extension in the master plan, really existing 
urban construction had proceeded informally in prohibited areas, creating an inverted version of 
the plan.701 At the same time, municipal construction codes that forbade the use of “traditional” 
construction methods led to the proliferation of cheap and unreliable cinder-block housing. 
Given this intractable situation, the CERF argued that the goal should be not to eliminate 
bidonvilles but rather to “bring them out of clandestinity, to arrange and utilize their dynamism 
for the greater good of the collectivity.”702 CERF planners envisioned regularizing the legal 
status of slums and standardizing the construction practices within them as a means of combating 
speculation. 
The bidonville’s ambiguous status within new discussions of environmental policy in 
Morocco re-articulated—in the context of the postcolonial state’s intensifying investment in 
urban security networks—colonial-era practices for approaching slums as both threat and 
resource. Whereas late colonial urbanists such as Pierre Mas had imagined bidonvilles as 
reservoirs of cultural dynamism, Hensens and other technical assistants working for the 
postcolonial state linked continuing forms of urban precarity to emerging notions of 
environmental and cultural appropriateness, a Moroccanized path toward modernization and 
development. In contrast with colonial planners, however, state experts in the early 1970s were 
far more concerned with standardizing and classifying forms of substandard housing. French and 
Moroccan architects and urbanists at the CERF suggested that the term “bidonville” applied to 
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“the totality of summary and precarious housing, judged as such by the local specialists of the 
D.U.H. (Direction de l’Urbanism et de l’Habitat).”703 Such reasoned judgments on the part of 
“local specialists” were based not on the appearance of structures, but on expert evaluations of 
the materials and techniques used in their construction. 
In the 1971 housing census, "precarity" was defined as a quality—inherent in certain 
forms of labor (the shoddy execution of a project), in inappropriate uses of construction 
technologies, or in certain types of matter.704 Precarity was observable to the trained eye, but not 
all forms of precarity were created equal. Postcolonial planners classed various types of 
substandard housing in accordance with the differing degrees of danger and potential they 
presented. The housing census distinguished bidonvilles as an “effect of modernism” from what 
were identified as “traditional constructions” built of rammed earth or masonry.705 When the 
latter appeared in urban areas, it represented “rural influences” rather than a distinctly urban 
form.706 Different categories of housing were arranged according to greater and lesser degrees of 
precarity: with shacks, shanties, tents separated from dry stone, rammed earth, masonry, and the 
obligatory “other” category.707 Organizing different types of substandard housing by their 
proximity to “modernity” or “tradition,” by their urban or rural origins, and by their level of 
precarity were all means of separating what was threatening for state planners from what was 
potentially a source of value. While many members of the Ministry of Housing continued to 
regard slums as sites of pollution and urban disorder, institutions like the CERF turned toward 
 
703 Centre d’expérimentation, des recherches et de formation, "Habitat sommaire urbain," 1972 in Colloque 
national: Environnement et développement (Rabat: Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de l’environnement, 
June 6, 1973) R2492, BMHPV, 1. 
704 Service central des statistiques, "Maroc-bidonvilles: Resultats partiels du recensement 1971 de l’habitat" in 
Colloque national: Environnement et développement (Rabat: Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de 
l’environnement, June 6, 1973) R2492, BMHPV, 2. 
705 Service central des statistiques, "Maroc-bidonvilles: Resultats partiels du recensement 1971 de l’habitat,” 3. 
706 Service central des statistiques, "Maroc-bidonvilles: Resultats partiels du recensement 1971 de l’habitat,” 3. 
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classifying and systematizing aspects of informal building that could be of use for an 
environmentally informed national housing policy. In the vision of development promoted by the 
CERF, even materials such as rammed earth or reeds—if properly standardized—had a role to 
play the construction of low-cost housing.708 
 
 
Figure 23: Service central des statistiques, "Maroc-Bidonvilles," in Colloque national: 
Environnement et développement (Rabat: Ministère de l’urbanisme, de l’habitat et de 
l’environnement, June 6, 1973) R2492, BMHPV. 
 
Environmental framings of Morocco’s urban problems also extended the politics and 
practices of risk management developed during Agadir’s rebuilding to other urban settings 
[Chapter 4]. At the 1975 National Environmental Colloquium, Mohamed Daoudi, an engineer 
with the Ministry of Urbansim, suggested that taking measures to secure the construction process 
 
708 Centre d’expérimentation, des recherches et de formation, “Pour un urbanisme opérationnel,” 35. 
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was essential for ensuring urban security in general.709 Reflecting on the legacies of Écochard’s 
policy of “housing for the greatest possible number,” Daoudi argued that it was no longer enough 
simply to build cheaply and rapidly.710 Instead state planners and private investors must take 
various forms of risk into account to create a resilient and reliable urban environment. Daoudi 
acknowledged that engineers in most contexts continued to rely on French norms for structural 
calculations while Agadir alone had adopted construction codes designed with Morocco’s 
distinct environmental conditions in mind. He envisioned new institutions for developing and 
enforcing construction codes at a national level. Even this call for national standards could be 
cast as a kind of return to the “local,” a form of decolonization, a departure from French norms. 
More broadly, Daoudi’s suggestion—though not enacted until decades later—represented yet 
another way of deploying the notion of the “environment” to reframe preexisting urban problems 
as risks.  
In the early 1970s, the introduction of environmental pollution as a new “matter of 
concern” for urban policy dovetailed with a renewed interest in “rural” and “traditional” forms of 
housing as well as in the potentially valuable features of urban slums.711 At the same time, this 
revalorization of “tradition” as a resource for development was accompanied by a revaluation of 
colonial urbanism. In a 1972 essay, Hensens argued that environmental protection was 
fundamentally a question of social cohesion. The difficulties of containing pollution or of 
instilling a sense of civic responsibility in a country like Morocco stemmed not from an innate 
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Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 114-115. 
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lack but from the experience of colonialism.712 By disrupting local social structures and 
introducing an extractive “Western ideology of colonization,” the French Protectorate, including 
Protectorate urbanists, had weakened the pull of local environmental practices and modes of 
conservation.713 According to Hensens, the solution to this dilemma—“the recalibration of the 
relationship between nature and society that will bring an end to [these] skillfully orchestrated 
environmental psychoses”—resided in the regeneration of local, communal structures and 
practices.714 Formerly colonized people, for Hensens, had to assert both their “collective 
knowledges and technical capacity” alongside the “right to their own culture.”715 In this vision, 
local construction practices—including, in some cases, the same bidonvilles identified elsewhere 
as a source of pollution—constituted a means of environmental protection and even a path to 
decolonization. 
Reports produced by the CERF, the CNDR, and the various environmental colloquia 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s reveal the intersection of two processes within planning 
circles in Morocco. On the one hand, the recognition that slums—regardless of the socio-
economic conditions that produced them—represented not just a consequence but potentially a 
vehicle for development as conceived by high officials within the postcolonial state. On the 
other, the recasting of problems previously associated with slums as “environmental problems.” 
The following section will examine in more detail how these two trends drew upon new visions 
of rurality, as urban professionals and technical assistants sought solutions to Morocco’s urban 
crisis in the very forms of precarity identified as its symptoms. 
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Remaking Local Knowledge and Expert Authority at the CERF 
While discussions of environmental problems in the 1970s reinvigorated Protectorate-era 
framings of urban problems and colonial knowledge hierarchies, they were also informed by a 
set of debates about the materiality of construction work in Morocco that had been brewing since 
the late 1960s. The renewed interest in local and especially rural forms of dwelling—
institutionally enshrined in the CERF—intersected with official arguments about environmental 
protection.716 Founded on August 8, 1968 within the Ministry of the Interior, the Centre 
d’Expérimentation, des Recherches et de Formation (CERF) sought to categorize and 
systematize local knowledge about construction in Morocco on a grand scale.717 The Moroccan 
engineers, planners, and architects who staffed the CERF along with European technical 
assistants claimed a mandate to study, improve, and disseminate information about low-cost 
building technologies in the country.718 The center’s efforts to mobilize “tradition” for the 
purposes of development paralleled attempts during the “years of lead” to reinvigorate the 
political symbols of the monarchy while extending state networks of surveillance and security. 
As CERF architects and planners worked to capture and operationalize local, rural approaches to 
construction, they highlighted certain gendered forms of technological labor and marginalized 
others. While acknowledging the skill of Moroccan craftsmen when it came to building, the 
CERF crafted a definition of “local knowledge” that excluded practices of repair and 
 
716 Centre d’expérimentation, des recherches et de formation, "Habitat rural traditionnel du sud Maroc," Ministère de 
l’intérieur, Direction de l’urbanisme et de l’habitat, 1972, R2490, BMHPV, 1. 
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maintenance responsible for rendering the rural built environment habitable.  
The revalorization of local construction expertise during this period represented a 
fundamental shift in the way experts imagined the categories of the urban and the rural in 
relation to one another. In essence, the rural went from being the root of urban problems (i.e., 
references to slums as rural forms, the importation of incompatible modes of life from the bled) 
to being the solution—an injection of rural values into a degraded postcolonial city. The 
European and Moroccan professionals who staffed the center dubbed themselves “ruralists” 
rather than “urbanists”—giving pride of place to the countryside as a source of knowledge for 
postcolonial development.719 At the same time, the CERF adapted a strategy that had been 
proposed but never fully implemented by the Protectorate’s housing administration. By studying 
and improving rural housing, the center’s planners aimed to “root populations in the countryside 
and thus discourage the rural exodus.”720  
Members of the CERF positioned themselves as arbiters of local knowledge in two 
respects. Unlike their Protectorate predecessors who sought to harness the skill and labor of 
Moroccan craftsmen by enrolling them into construction cooperatives, CERF planners aimed to 
systematize, regulate, and adapt “traditional methods and materials” to the conditions of urban 
expansion.721 At the same time, the center echoed late colonial anxieties about how urban 
residents would make use of technologies like cinder blocks and sheet metal, and advised the 
Ministry of Housing on how and where to implement “new,” low-cost techniques and 
materials.722 French architects like Bernard Hamburger and Gérard Bauer presented designs for 
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“new villages” to be built by cooperatives on the urbanized Atlantic coast along with 
“experimental” structures that blended rammed-earth, concrete, and prefabricated elements.723 
 
Figure 24: New Village of Ellouizi (Mohammedia), DAU 10 133 Ifa, AAXXS. 
 
Beginning in the late 1960s, foreign and Moroccan members of the CERF became 
involved in a series of rural development projects, initiated in part with an eye to shoring up 
support for the monarchy in the countryside following urban unrest in Casablanca and elsewhere. 
One prototypical initiative, The Draa Valley Housing Renovation Project was conceived in 1968 
as part of the Ministry of the Interior’s five-year rural development plan with the support of the 
World Food Program. In broad terms, the project aimed to preserve, repair, and if necessary 
demolish housing in a series of southern quṣūr as the first step in a process of rural 
 
723 Bernard Hamburger, "Ellouizi, nouveau village," Atelier de recherche et d'études d'aménagement, 1968, DAU 10 
133 Ifa, AAXXS; Bernard Hamburger and Gérard Bauer, "Étude et réalisation de constructions expérimentales," 
Atelier de recherche et d'études d'aménagement, 1968, DAU 10 133 Ifa, AAXXS. 
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modernization.724 The initial study was carried out between November and December of 1967 by 
a group of technical assistants including Jean Hensens as well as a local urbanist from Marrakesh 
and a technical adjunct from the Ouarzazate province. In addition to Hensens, another Belgian 
architect Jean Dethier as well as Bauer and Hamburger, composed the final report. The Draa 
Renovation project was an exemplar of “ruralism”—an attempt to describe, systematize, and 
eventually transform local constructions practices in agrarian communities still responding to the 
shock of the rural exodus and the arrival of new construction technologies.  
Settlements in the Draa River Valley, an arid agricultural region to the south of the Atlas 
mountains, had long depended upon a series of carefully regulated local irrigation systems to 
supply water for date and grain cultivation. The CERF described the Draa as socially complex—
a region populated by “Arabs, Berbers, and Blacks (Harratines)” as well as both sedentary and 
nomadic groups.725  A network of small, Amazigh villages along the river and near oases, all 
approximately the same size, developed a distinctive style of earthen architecture. The majority 
of these villages, known as quṣūr (sing. qṣar), had been densely populated and surrounded by 
defensive walls and fortifications—features the CERF architects described as remnants of an era 
of “inter-tribal warfare.”726 The report’s authors read the tightly packed multi-story houses, 
narrow alleys, and “quasi ‘subterranean’” streets of the qṣar as forms of environmental 
adaptation—means of assuring shade and ventilation in an inhospitable climate.727 According to 
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Hensens’s team while the environmental functions of this architecture remained relevant, the 
social conditions that gave birth to this built form had largely disappeared. The end of regional 
warfare, the demographic expansion of the region, and large-scale labor migrations to other parts 
of Morocco had not only disrupted village socialities but also led to the deterioration of the built 
environment. For the CERF, revitalizing the seemingly degraded landscape of Draa Valley 
villages involved conceptually separating noxious modern influences from traditional 
knowledges—extricating authentic, local methods from the social and economic conditions of 
postcolonial Morocco and restoring their status as environmentally appropriate practices.  
To calculate the renovation project’s cost and prioritize renovations, CERF planners 
elaborated a system of classification—dividing rural houses according to degrees of 
"repairablity.” They designated homes in the quṣūr as either “new or well maintained”, “to be 
protected,” “irreparable but inhabited”, or “ruins.”728 These categories—based on expert 
evaluations of a building’s stability and appearance—were accompanied by sociological 
explanations of how structures arrived at their present state. A well-maintained qṣar indicated a 
community’s affluence; a weathered but inhabited qṣar signaled an oasis economy fallen on hard 
times. Ruins represented troubling manifestations of the rural exodus, homes abandoned by 
migrants seeking work in Moroccan cities. Degraded buildings with absentee owners created 
technical, aesthetic, and juridical problems for the project’s planners. They therefore sought to 
create legal mechanisms through which local jamaʿat could take possession of these ruined 
properties, in spite of the resistance of migrants who typically asserted claims of ownership to 
both the structures and the plots themselves.729  
The CERF study’s members brought with them a vision of construction work as a 
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hierarchical process—with sharp divisions between intellectual and manual labor. The forms of 
work-site organization they encountered, however, frequently clashed with this vision. The figure 
of the muʿallim—understood here as a specialist in traditional construction methods—occupied a 
central position in the Draa Valley Housing Renovation Project. The muʿallim performed a dual 
function for the project’s planners. He (see discussions of gender below) was at once a reliable 
demi-expert, a guarantor of the technical efficacy and cost effectiveness, and a potentially unruly 
form of labor, an artisan whose skills varied and whose work depended on local environmental 
conditions and seasonal rhythms. Moreover, the position of muʿallimūn—their degree of 
embeddedness within local communities—had supposedly shifted with the introduction of a 
money economy in the Draa.730 As currency replaced forms of payment in kind, cash-strapped 
families in the region had less recourse to the technical skills of muʿallimūn. One result, the 
CERF noted, was the generalized deterioration of the built environment—a sign that traditional 
knowledge itself had begun to lapse under pressure from the economic changes sweeping the 
Moroccan countryside.731  
In the qṣar, muʿallimūn were responsible for overseeing the organization of the 
construction site, directing “non-specialist” laborers as well as local women who brought in the 
quantities of water necessary for mixing earthen bricks. They also performed the technical labor 
of producing the earthen blocks that were the base material in housing construction using 
specialized wooden formwork known as taboutes. The compacting and drying of these blocks, 
which involved minute evaluations of the time and pressure required given the humidity, 
temperature, and season, represented the most delicate technical operation of the traditional 
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construction process.732 This system had permitted what Hensens described as a historically 
elevated degree of technological sophistication and standardization for earthen architecture.733 
Enamored with this process and the forms of dwelling it enabled in a hostile desert environment, 
the report’s authors noted that “earthen houses generate a remarkable level of thermal comfort 
that no simple, modern technique can rival.”734 They were quick to assert that when degradation 
did set in, it was the result of sociological conditions—the introduction of the money economy, 
the rural exodus, overpopulation in the remaining quṣūr —rather than any flaw in the 
“conception” of “traditional housing.”735 The immediate cause of structural breakdown in the 
Draa, however, was generally the brief, rapid, and violent rains that threatened to erode earthen 
houses. The need for regular, seasonal repair and maintenance was literally built into the material 
form of the quṣūr —a point the CERF architects acknowledge while still downplaying these 
forms of labor at the expense of the initial construction.  
The maleness of the muʿallim, indeed of all construction work in the Draa, was not lost 
on the project’s planners who remarked on the strict gendered division of labor in the quṣūr. 
While women participated in the construction process by bringing water to the work site, a fact 
acknowledged but quickly glossed over by the CERF, they were also typically responsible for the 
day-to-day, maintenance of rammed-earth households. In spite of the report’s emphasis on 
maintenance as the core problem of renovation in the Draa, its authors systematically 
emphasized the one-time expenditures of building at the expense of daily upkeep. Marginalizing 
maintenance was not only a way of rendering the gendered labor of reproducing the qṣar 
invisible, it also removed the most compelling argument against rammed-earth earth housing 
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from the equation. Calculations of the cost of the renovation project—while they included the 
initial repairs to damaged structures—made no provisions for daily upkeep. The labor of 
demolition, while referenced numerous times in the report was also written out of the final 
budgetary calculations with a note stating that “the work of dismantling [ruins] costs nothing in 
cash.”736  
The gendered division of construction labor did not necessarily hold at all times 
everywhere in Morocco. Lahsen Roussafi recounted, for instance, how his mother built their 
family home in the Ichache neighborhood of Agadir. Acting as the “head of the family” after the 
death of his father, Roussafi described his mother as a skilled mason who mixed and dried the 
earthen bricks used to construct their Icache dwelling. Only when the structure was nearly 
completed and it was time to add the roof did she request help from a group of male 
neighbors.737 That the technological labor of earthen construction could fall to women or to 
wider communities was a fact that might have troubled the CERF’s vision of the muʿallim as 
essentially their analog—an autonomous, male expert of traditional architecture.  
The erasure of forms of labor that failed to fit this narrow definition of expertise under-
girded the entire “ruralist” project—permitting a particular vision of postcolonial development 
and modernization to take root within various branches of the Moroccan bureaucracy. 
Systematically downplaying the problems of rural housing—the arduous, gendered labor of 
maintenance—or attributing them solely to the noxious influences of modernity was a way of 
continuing to overlook the gap between acceptable and desirable forms of life for Moroccan 
residents in the Draa and elsewhere. CERF planners were wary of the spread of “modern” low-
cost construction technologies into rural areas. Cinder-block constructions, for all of their 
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supposed lack of climatic suitability and cultural appropriateness, however, enabled forms of 
rural life—higher elevations and less daily upkeep—that many inhabitants of the Draa Valley 
found appealing. 738 
To counter the supposedly inappropriate use of new construction methods, the CERF 
encouraged the Ministry of Housing to exercise more direct control over rural construction while 
celebrating the built forms local inhabitants had created in the absence of standardized materials. 
They acknowledged that residents of the Draa or the Middle Atlas built homes “that were 
cheaper and better adapted to local conditions than any technical unit could,” while 
simultaneously asserting that experts and state officials should to act as intermediaries, protecting 
and reforming the traditional construction process. Engineers or architects from the Ministry 
were to give “practical advice on how to improve, if necessary, the conception and the comfort of 
new houses.”739 This focus on improving the forms of life and comfort possible in earthen 
housing did not always extend to the construction of new infrastructures. Though the rural 
development projects of the 1960s and 1970s included some plans for provisioning running 
water to individual homes, electrical connections were exclusively for public lighting, not 
personal consumption, and sanitation “would be limited in most cases to the digging of dry 
wells.”740 
In addition to rural housing in agricultural communities, the CERF also created 
typologies to describe the forms of “mobile housing” prevalent among Morocco’s pastoral and 
nomadic groups. A 1970 report noted that while “there is no modern version of mobile traditional 
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housing in Morocco. One could imagine it in the form of a ranch, with towable modern homes 
that can be disassembled, etc.…”741 Alongside the different forms of “archaic” housing built 
using traditional materials—whose quality, according to CERF researchers, diminished with the 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions and technical skills of nomadic and pastoral 
communities—the report identified a new and more troubling phenomenon, “the rural-
bidonville.”742 Unlike the sometimes precarious forms of “traditional housing,” the “rural-
bidonville” resulted from “new socio-economic relations and new [construction] materials and 
techniques.”743 The report’s authors went to great lengths to emphasize the “modern” nature of 
this “paradoxical situation,” which afflicted rural zones that in colonial times had been known as 
“le Maroc Utile”: “the hinterlands of the coastal economic axis running from Tangier to Safi, 
stretching across the Taza corridor to the east, briefly touching the phosphate-rich plateau of the 
Tadla, the pre-Rif and the Sais, covering the Chaouia and the Gharb.”744 
Beyond classifying types of rural housing, one of the CERF’s central missions was to 
categorize and investigate the different types of construction materials deployed by local 
specialists. This involved collecting material samples from across the kingdom and shipping 
them back to the Laboratoire Public d’Essais et d’Études (LPEE) in Casablanca for detailed 
analysis. Gathered from quarries near Aïn Regada and Saïdia, samples of yellow and red 
maaden—a type of soil that local masons used to mix primer—were submitted to laboratory 
tests.745 A locally abundant material in the Moulouya River Basin, maaden served as an “easier 
to use and more resistant” alternative to whitewash for local masons.746 In this region, maaden 
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was also the base component in earthen blocks known as toubia. CERF planners marveled at the 
thermal resistance of walls built using toubia while voicing discomfort about the spread of 
reinforced concrete construction in nearby areas. Describing “traditional” housing in Lower 
Moulouya, the CERF noted that: 
Thermal comfort is fulfilled here, a fact that can be appreciated by an immediate 
comparison with Chouyaya. Within new housing projects in this adjacent area, a portion 
of the rooms are built using an architectural plan and are covered with reinforced 
concrete slabs, another portion of the rooms are built by the beneficiaries themselves 
using traditional methods. The users [inhabitants] claim that they cannot live in the 
“modern” rooms during the summer while the other [rooms] provide good protection 
[against the heat].747 
In this reading, hybrid houses—half concrete, half earthen architecture—appeared to prove the 
superiority of “traditional” techniques to “modern” methods. Other readings are possible, 
however. The recourse to concrete construction and housing typologies approved by the Ministry 
of Housing also represented a means for rural residents to access public resources. Concrete in 
the countryside signaled participation in the modernizing projects of the central state while 
earthen additions embedded rural homes within local economies of construction—economies 
that were fundamentally shaped by migration and rural development projects like those studied 
by the CERF. Still, CERF members attempted to reassert sharp lines between modernity and 
tradition by tying each to particular technologies and values.  
Planning communities in Morocco today repeat stories of local residents seasonally 
shifting between concrete and earthen housing. Abdelilah Laslami, an ex-director of the Agence 
Urbaine in Agadir provided one example of this trope:  
To be modern is to build with modern materials. Moreover, we see this…in Ouarzazate. 
The disfigurement of the urban landscape by those who work abroad [and send back 
remittances], because it [building with modern materials] is a way of expressing material 
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and economic as well as intellectual success. “I build with bricks and concrete slabs.” 
And when the weather becomes too hot, he is going to go to his grandfather’s house.748  
The figure of the successful migrant, sending back remittance payments to build climatically 
inappropriate “modern” housing in the bled—this image is reproduced in literature and popular 
culture as well as among former urbantists. Moving between the unlivable concrete home and the 
undesirable traditional dwelling—this figure expresses something of the gap between 
expectations of decolonization—development with dignity—and its reality.    
The CERF’s fascination with local construction materials ran parallel to a growing 
interest within Morocco’s Geological Service in locally available forms of sand, clay, and 
various minerals that could be used in the production of cement, bricks, and other construction 
materials.749 At the country’s third National Environmental Colloquium, two geologists, Nataf 
and Hilali, summarized years of research into the presence of valuable minerals in Morocco. 
Their study portrayed a complex cartography of material mastery—identifying relevant resources 
for the production of specifically Moroccan forms of cement or ceramics. Once again, the LPEE 
was instrumental in testing locally available sources of gypsum or pozzolan to determine their 
particularities and industrial applications.750 The geological project of mapping Morocco’s 
mineral resources complimented the CERF’s sociological mission of classifying its technological 
and architectural resources. Both involved crafting cartographies of value that could tapped at a 
national level by state and corporate actors.  
I am not suggesting that the European technical assistants and low-level Moroccan 
officials who staffed the CERF somehow “misread” social, political, and environmental relations 
 
748 Interview, Abdelilah Laslami, August 14, 2017. 
749 E.A. Hilali and M. Nataf, "Recherches et études des matières premièrs minérales dans la domaine de la 
construction," in Comité national de l’environnement : 3ème Colloque national (Rabat: Ministère de l’urbanisme, de 
l’habitat, du tourisme et de l’environnement, 1975), 558PO/1/188, CADN. 
750 Hilali and Nataf, 10. 
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in the Draa Valley or the Moulouya River Basin.751 Rather they enshrined earthen construction as 
“local knowledge” while simultaneously remaking the technologies, institutions, actors, and 
infrastructures upon which such “local knowledge” depended. Labeling practices as  
“traditional” or “local” was not simply a discursive act, but a process of inscribing them within 
institutional and infrastructural networks—networks that in Morocco of the 1960s and 1970s 
continued to revolve around logics of perpetual crisis and enhanced security. The juxtaposition of 
modernity and tradition was of course not unique to the CERF studies of this period. Their 
novelty lay in the way that debates about the relative value of modernity or tradition became 
entwined with the new sociotechnical concept of “the environment.” This concept enabled the 
CERF to elevate the muʿallim as a master of environmentally appropriate technology, to recast 
the role of the expert as a shield against the dangerous influences of modernity rather than an 
avatar of modernization, and to systematically overlook calls for greater infrastructural 
attachment, higher elevations, and less labor intensive forms maintenance. In other words, “the 
environment” was the vehicle for reproducing colonial austerity within postcolonial approaches 
to what would eventually come to be known as sustainable development. 
Environmental Absences 
Expert and official efforts to repackage colonial conceptions of urban crisis under the 
heading of “environmental problems” such as pollution had an uneven impact when applied on 
the ground. Rural renovation programs may have held up local architecture as an antidote to the 
dangers of modernization, but this did little to halt the spread of concrete construction in the 
 
751 In other words, this is not an argument about the colonial or postcolonial misrecognition of local social and 
environmental practices.  For an example of a “misrecognition” arguement see James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, 
The Making and Misreading of an African Landscape: Society and Ecology in the Forest-Savanna Mosaic 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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countryside. While references to the environment became de rigeur among high officials in 
Morocco, few tangible policies coalesced for the protection of urban green spaces or municipal 
water sources.752 Calls for al-muḥāfaẓa ʿalā al-bīʾa did, however, bolster legal mechanisms that 
allowed the Ministry of Housing to more rapidly expropriate land on the urban periphery without 
waiting for courts to set the cost of indemnification.753 In spite of emerging arguments within 
institutions like the CERF that local knowledge and materials if properly managed and regulated 
could provide an alternative path for urban development, most studies of regional architecture 
were, in Laslami’s words, “consigned to the closet.”754 Instead, Zemmouri’s ministry adopted a 
series of urban plans that continued to rely on crisis technologies to remake urban environments.  
As official focus shifted from rural areas back to Morocco’s urban crisis in 1973, city’s 
like Casablanca and Rabat witnessed a relaunch of the lot économique, as the primary financial 
mechanism for replacing slums with minimum housing and transforming slum dwellers into 
indebted homeowners [Chapter 3].755 Zemmouri’s ministry promoted various types of housing 
cooperatives including the Castor model [Chapter 3]—still referred to as “new approach” in the 
early 1970s—as a means of harnessing the labor and skills of displaced residents.756 One 
innovation to the Castor model involved the production of a simplified construction manual 
“based on the practical knowledge commonly held by all squatters.”757 Such manuals would 
 
752 Laslami suggested that among planners and architects in Morocco environmental considerations were absent not 
only in practice but even at the level of the conception of their projects. Interview, Abdelilah Laslami, LaSlami, 
August 14, 2017. 
753 “Recommendations,” in Comité national de l’environnement : 3ème Colloque national (Rabat: Ministère de 
l’urbanisme, de l’habitat, du tourisme et de l’environnement, 1975), 558PO/1/188, CADN. 
754 Interview, Abdelilah Laslami, August 14, 2017. 
755 “M. Hassan Zemmouri procède à la distribution de lotissements économiques,” Le matin, November 12, 1972. 
[no page number]; On this shifting emphasis toward cities see Pascale Philifert, “Urban Planning in Morocco: 
Historical Legacy, Approaches to Urban Policies, and Changes in Urban Planners’ Roles and Practices, 1960–
2010,” in Urban Planning in North Africa, ed. Carlos Nunes Silva (New York: Routledge, 2016), 59. 
756 “Pour une nouvelle approche des problèmes de l’habitat,” Maghreb information, August 30, 1972, 558PO/1/188, 
CADN [no page number]. 
757 “Pour une nouvelle approche des problèmes de l’habitat,” [no page number]. 
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presumably be prepared by housing officials with experience cataloging forms of slum 
housing—experts like those at the CERF who could separate “low-cost solutions” from 
dangerous technical shortcuts. Another method involved the distribution of prefabricated housing 
kits, which cooperative members could assemble with the aid of another manual and “under a 
certain [amount] of technical surveillance.”758 Prefabrication with its promises of regularity and 
speed, continued to occupy a central place in the urban imaginaries of postcolonial planners. 
While turning to the investigation of local construction practices, Zemmouri also dispatched 
delegations abroad to Germany and Italy to study the use of prefabricated methods 
internationally.   
The fact that these responses to Morocco’s continuing urban crisis resembled planning 
strategies pioneered under the Protectorate was not lost on observers. As a 1973 article from 
Maghreb Information argued:  
The housing crisis has reached two thirds of the urban population who are compelled to 
devote two thirds of their budget to rent….Here as elsewhere the colonial legacy has not 
only remained in place but “developed,” our cities remain divided between madina, ville 
nouvelle, and bidonville, each sector with its own way of life. Segregation, which 
continues to be cultivated, in no way restricts speculation in “clandestine housing 
developments” which on the contrary expand endlessly….759  
“Segregation,” however, was not the only persistent colonial legacy in Moroccan cities. Debates 
in the 1970s over the problems and solutions to continuing crisis reproduced the same 
oppositions and compromises as those in the tumultuous final years of the Protectorate. Tensions 
between local and transferable knowledge, between harnessing value and containing 
vulnerability, continued to play out in housing policies that targeted the urban poor. On the one 
hand, the presumed links between bidonvilles and environmental pollution provided a new set of 
 
758 “Pour une nouvelle approche des problèmes de l’habitat,” [no page number]. 
759 “L’héritage colonial en matière d’habitat maintenu,” Maghreb information, May 8, 1973, 558PO/1/188, CADN. 
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arguments in favor of outright slum clearance, at a time during the years of lead when urban 
disorder had once again become a central administrative anxiety. On the other, the suggestion 
that slums represented forms of anti-pollution could justify the deferral of infrastructural 
connections and other public resources to Morocco’s bidonvilles. Urban experts positioned 
themselves as enlightened intermediaries equipped to navigate these two seemingly contradictory 
approaches—whose role was not to transform the urban order, but to evaluate and separate 
security threats from sources of value.  
On the surface, official interest in the “environment” did not provoke major policy shifts 
in Morocco. Instead, environmental logics and languages produced new arrangements of 
authority—foreclosing certain categories of harm in favor of others, reanimating colonial debates 
about the potential profitability of the “local,” and offering another avenue for assessing the 
afterlives of Protectorate urbanism. All this, as state security networks began to tighten and 
proponents of more radical forms of decolonization found themselves “disappeared” or 
imprisoned. The project of environmental conservation was from the start subordinated to and 
blended with the imperatives of urban surveillance.760  
Conclusion 
During the 1970s, expert and official arguments about “environmental problems” 
provided opportunities for new practical and discursive approaches to Morocco’s urban crisis—
articulations of crisis that re-inscribed and in some cases extended colonial definitions of who 
and what was vulnerable and valuable. Attempts to harness and regulate rural construction 
 
760 The link between technical and political security in the management of Morocco’s “natural resources” would 
become even more apparent in the struggle over phosphates in the Western Sahara after 1975. See Lino Camprubí, 
“Resource Geopolitics: Cold War Technologies, Global Fertilizers, and the Fate of Western Sahara,” Technology 
and Culture 56, no. 3 (September 2015): 676–703. 
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techniques went hand in hand with discussions of urban slums as sites, forms, and even antidotes 
for environmental pollution. As part of the postcolonial project of al-muḥāfaẓa ʿalā al-bīʾa, 
urban experts—whether European technical assistants or Moroccan planners—took on the role 
of arbiters between risk and resource, precarity and profit. Within official planning circles, the 
presumed tension between conservation and development played out in debates about the nature 
of pollution and the status of slums at National Environmental Colloquia and in institutions like 
the CERF. Questions about the materiality of the built world—the presence or absence of 
industrial pollution, the precise qualities and properties of local construction materials—
remained central to the work of architects, urbanists, and other experts. The project of 
environmental protection became, like earlier colonial hygienic and urban interventions, 
essentially a matter of how and by whom matter could be managed. 
The legacies of postcolonial environmental framings of Morocco’s urban problems 
continue to reverberate in the present. At a time when the country’s administration has positioned 
itself as a regional leader of renewable energy and sustainable development, tensions remain 
over whose knowledge and whose vulnerability take center stage. Recent megaprojects like the 
Noor Power Station near Ouarzazate—the largest concentrated solar power plant in the world—
reflect a centralized, expert-driven vision of sustainability. This vision has depended upon the 
displacement of local residents and occluded struggles over water rights and infrastructural 
access in the region.761 In 2004, Morocco’s adoption of the World Bank supported “Cities 
without Slums” initiative shortly after the 2003 Casablanca bombings, represented yet another 
instance of slum clearance being deployed to manage urban unrest. The program’s vast rehousing 
campaign has affected every major Moroccan city. “Cities without Slums” has built upon various 
 
761 Hamza Hamouchene, “The Ouarzazate Solar Plant in Morocco: Triumphal ‘Green’ Capitalism and the 
Privatization of Nature,” accessed May 7, 2019, http://www.cadtm.org/The-Ouarzazate-solar-plant-in. 
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Protectorate-era crisis technologies—from cinder blocks to low-income loan packages—while 
also laying claim to the mantle of sustainability. Moreover, the program has relied heavily on 
public-private housing companies like Al Omrane that characterize their efforts as a sustainable, 
“holistic” approach to slum resettlement and also boast initiatives for the rehabilitation of 
traditional architecture.762 Whether criticized for authoritarian greenwashing or fêted as a leader 
of sustainable development, Morocco’s current administration has incorporated arguments about 
environmental protection into nearly every facet of urban governance. This continuing affinity 
between environmental management, the appropriation of “local” knowledge, and the regulation 
of urban precarity relies in part on the practical and discursive work of urban experts during the 
1960s and 1970s, who carved out a role for themselves by promising to resolve the tensions 
between risk and resource, value and vulnerability. This role, as well as the technologies and 
arguments upon which it depends, is among the most deeply rooted legacies of colonial and 
postcolonial approaches to Morocco’s urban crisis.
 
 
762 Al Omrane Group, “Al Omrane: Leading Actor for Settlements Upgrading” (UN Habitat, July 2010), 
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/Al_OmraneGroup_Morocco.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION
 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, planners and architects articulated a bold vision for 
Morocco’s urban future: culturally and environmentally appropriate housing technologies 
imported from rural communities to urban slums and adapted by experts to conditions of crisis. 
Le Maroc inutile could reinvigorate le Maroc utile. The failure of this vision to materialize 
during the 1970s set the stage for the continued investment in low-cost, concrete construction 
and debt-driven forms of housing finance. Throughout the period sometimes referred to as “state 
developmentalism” in Morocco, the monarchy’s redistributive policies remained limited, 
especially compared to states like Algeria or Egypt.763 By the late 1970s, even the modest 
trappings of Morocco’s welfare state were under siege, culminating in the adoption of IMF 
austerity measures in 1981.764 
In response to these measures, the country’s leading labor unions organized a general 
strike that morphed into a series of riots on Casablanca’s urban periphery. As in 1952, 
participants in the uprising were largely young inhabitants of the city’s qaryan. Officials 
answered with spectacular violence—deploying the army to put down the revolt and arresting 
around 8,000 protestors.765 Mass graves in the bidonvilles held unknown numbers killed by 
security forces, as the full weight of the informational infrastructures created under the 
 
763 Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism, 70. 
764 Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism, 71. 
765 Jean-François Clément, “Les révoltes urbaines,” in Le Maroc actuel: Une modernisation au miroir de la 
tradition?, ed. Jean-Claude Santucci (Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1992), 393–
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Protectorate was brought to bear on Casablanca.766 In the aftermath of the uprising, the language 
of crisis was omnipresent in analyses of the violence.767 Continued unrest during the 1980s in 
Casablanca, Marrakesh, and the North, sparked renewed efforts on the part of state planners to 
seek technological solutions to crisis that would run alongside the more overt forms of repression 
that characterized the years of lead. Hassan II brought the French architect, Michel Pinseau, to 
Casablanca in 1981 to design a new security-centered urban plan for the city.768 Pinseau’s plan—
like Écochard’s interventions during the colonial period—aimed to signal a point of rupture with 
preexisting urbanism.769 As in the late 1940s and early 1950s, rehousing slum residents became a 
major focus of urban policy during this period of unrest.770 While state officials in the 1980s 
certainly reshuffled their priorities —changing the permitting process, placing urbanism under 
the Ministry of Interior, creating local urban agencies to oversee implementation—the arsenal of 
techniques available to planners remained remarkably consistent with earlier periods. Not only 
did urban policies in the 1980s continue to apply principles elaborated in the early 1970s, as 
Abderrahmane Rachik has argued, but they also relied on the crisis technologies developed in the 
final years of the Protectorate—specifically on low-cost construction technologies like cinder 
blocks and public-private, debt-driven finance strategies.771  
 
766 Susan Slyomovics, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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The 1990s witnessed two parallel processes of “liberalization”: the loosening of the 
state’s repressive security apparatus in the final years of Hassan II’s reign and a wave of 
privatization efforts that aimed to attract global capital to the kingdom.772 While the former 
process was partially curtailed by the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the later has proceed 
unchecked. Today the Cities without Slums Program has redeployed notions of urban crisis—
along with its accompanying networks of experts, technologies, and institutions—to address the 
same essential configuration of problems: the growth of slums, popular unrest, and the 
imperative to render low-cost housing profitable. Concerns over sustainability and architectural 
preservation have also been included in the program’s aims. New technologies have been added 
to the equation as well, such as the use of OBIA (object based image analysis) and VHR (very 
high resolution) satellite imagery to track the expansion of slums from outer space and target 
neighborhoods for demolition.773 Neoliberal policies in Morocco have given birth to new forms 
of state space and future accumulative hubs like the Casa-Anfa business district. Resistance to 
rehousing and protests over the disproportionate investment of public resources in the coastal 
regions connecting Casablanca and Rabat at the expense of the rest of the country remain central 
 
attention given to overt forms of coercion during the 1980s obscures the ways in which technical artifacts like 
cinderblocks and debt-driven housing finance constituted subtler forms of surveillance and control, strategies that 
worked in part by continuing to separate technical or economic concerns from obviously political ones. 
772 Bogaert, Globalized Authoritarianism, 74-76. Miller, A History of Modern Morocco, 204-207. From 1980s to the 
present the core target of the security apparatus gradually shifted from leftist dissidents to Islamists. Susan 
Slyomovics, The Performance of Human Rights, 165-187. 
773 For examples see Hassan Rhinane et al., “Detecting Slums from SPOT Data in Casablanca Morocco Using an 
Object Based Approach,” Journal of Geographic Information System 3, no. 3 (2011): 217–24; Dejrriri Khelifa and 
Malki Mimoun, “Object-Based Image Analysis and Data Mining for Building Ontology of Informal Urban 
Settlements,” in Image and Signal Processing for Remote Sensing XVIII, 8537 (Image and Signal Processing for 
Remote Sensing XVIII, International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2012); Rachid Dahmani, Abderrahman Fora, 
and A. Sbihi, “Monitoring the Proliferation of Slums through GIS and Satellite Image Processing in the Rural 
Common of Sidi Taibi,” International Journal of Engineering Research and Development 10 (August 2014): 8-17; 
Ministère de l’habitat, “Le programme villes sans bidonvilles système suivi par imagérie satellitaire,” 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activities/2007/morocco/presentations/4-5.pdf; Rachid Dahmani, 
Abderrahman Fora, and A. Sbihi, “Extracting Slums from High-Resolution Satellite Images,” International Journal 
of Engineering Research and Development 10 (September 2014): 1–10. 
 294 
nodes of political struggle in the kingdom.  
In light of this contemporary situation, what is at stake in insisting that construction 
technologies—the financial, organizational, and material of means building, demolishing, and 
maintaining the urban environment—are both Moroccan and colonial? Why does the concept of 
crisis continue to constitute such a compelling rubric for urban experts and others who aim to 
remake Moroccan cities today? How have colonial and postcolonial modernization projects 
remained such meaningful markers for imagining possible futures in spite of their failures? How 
can a more precise attention to the different notions of materiality at play in these modernization 
projects offer a partial answer to these questions—a way of thinking through oppositions in the 
history of technology and the history of colonialism between agency and constraint, success and 
failure, creativity and appropriation, continuity and rupture? 
Making Matter Moroccan 
 
This final question returns to the problematic concept of materiality itself, a category 
characterized by contemporary scholars alternatively as a form of affordance—how material 
properties enable or inhibit certain forms of use and meaning making—or as a type of excess—
how matter constantly overruns its apparent boundaries, introducing new uncertainties and 
complexities into technopolitical arrangements. This project has drawn together moments from 
Morocco’s twentieth-century urban history in which these and other variegated notions of 
materiality became meaningful for the actors involved. When colonial and postcolonial experts, 
Moroccan laborers, urban insurgents, and residents treated matter as vibrant or inert, politically 
meaningful or purely technical, open or closed to interpretation, homogenous or heterogenous, 
etc., they tacitly engaged with variegated concepts of materiality. Juxtaposing excess and 
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affordance demonstrates how both could operate simultaneously in the projects and projections 
of actors involved in construction work. For example, post-quake engineers in Agadir treated 
seismic risk as something that could be contained through concrete constructions techniques that 
enabled stability, security, and hygiene. When it came to local building practices, however, they 
cast these as an unruly collection of excessive forms—an unmanageable materiality that had to 
be banned outright. In contrast, the European technical assistants and Moroccan officials of the 
CERF, framed the very same local building practices in terms of their affordances—their 
superior thermal insulation and embeddedness within rural economies and societies.  
Multiple conceptions of materiality were always at work in the construction of colonial 
and postcolonial housing projects. By strategically shifting between these different concepts, 
engineers, architects, and officials—who invoked their mastery of matter as their primary claim 
to expertise navigated the continuities and ruptures of decolonization as well as the failures and 
successes of modernization. This dissertation has admittedly offered more examples of this 
strategic shifting among expert communities than for workers or residents. I maintain, however, 
that laborers and inhabitants’ tacit engagement with materials also constituted a kind of 
technopolitics. When Casablanca’s protestors weaponized cinder blocks or Agadir survivors 
refused to reside in concrete emergency housing, they brought their own understandings of 
materiality, as both affordance and excess, to bear on expert-led construction efforts.  
Attending to practices of strategic shifting between different notions of materiality also 
helps to clarify what it means to describe construction technologies as both Moroccan and 
colonial. These two terms are not opposed or mutually exclusive categories but are better 
thought of as distinct but occasionally overlapping qualities that groups of actors attributed to 
matter. For urban experts in the 1950s, building technologies were often colonial in terms of their 
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affordances, and Moroccan in terms of their excesses. Cinder blocks enabled the remaking of 
Casablanca’s slums—the rapid, cheap reconstruction of the Carrières centrales—in ways that 
opened the neighborhood up to enhanced colonial surveillance. At the same time, local 
environmental factors—from the salt content of the water mixed with cement to the humidity 
that complicated the pouring and setting of concrete in standardized molds—introduced qualities 
into the finished product that threatened to disrupt the very affordances that led colonial experts 
to invest in these methods in the first place. The labor of Moroccan masons who produced cinder 
blocks and of residents who used them to wall in the terraces of modernist housing projects 
constituted forms of excess from the perspective of colonial officials. For inhabitants, however, 
cinder blocks offered ways of opening up the floor plans of their apartments to reinterpretation. 
At other moments, urban experts considered the Moroccan qualities of certain construction 
technologies as affordances, such as CIFM housing cooperatives that enrolled “builders in the 
soul” to take out small personal loans for the construction of low-cost housing.   
Ultimately, the suggestion that the particularities of local environments, labor forces, and 
political struggles made construction technologies Moroccan is an observation that could apply 
to many other contexts.774 The more novel claim is that Moroccanness came to be defined at key 
moments in terms of materiality—as alternatively an excessive quality or an affordance. In 
colonial housing projects, simplistic visions of Moroccan culture found expression in 
architectural features such as the terrace or the courtyard, enabling forms of gendered seclusion 
that officials and local notables considered necessary. The same underlying assumptions about 
the visibility and vulnerability of Moroccan women’s bodies led the same elites and officials to 
 
774 It would be possible, for example, to investigate how concrete construction technologies in France were made 
French during the later part of nineteenth century as they became interwoven with the social issues and political 
struggles of the day. 
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cast stairways in modernist apartment buildings—spaces of potential mix-gendered contact—as a 
site of threatening excess. In each case, matter was made Moroccan and Moroccanness made 
material through this interplay of excess and affordance.  
Continuations of Colonial Crisis  
 
This dissertation has argued that colonial conceptions of crisis were materialized through 
construction technologies. These crisis technologies arranged Moroccan natures and Moroccan 
forms of skill, labor, and social organization in ways that enabled them to be brought into 
colonial modernization schemes without necessarily stripping them of what made them 
threatening to colonial experts. The notions of crisis that took center stage during the 1920s and 
1930s were first and foremost about defining relations between different actors within colonial 
society— experts, artisans, workers, officials, and residents—while also reallocating the 
technological labor of construction between these different categories (Chapter 1). During the 
first decades of the Protectorate, many colonial engineers lauded concrete construction not only 
for its presumed efficiency or the stability it enabled, but because of the status it afforded their 
professional community. Engineers and officials positioned concrete construction as the 
inevitable solution to crisis in cities like Casablanca—arguing that better building technologies 
could address hygienic concerns, labor shortages, housing deficiencies, and other problems 
grouped under the rubric of “crisis” while also providing a model for harmonious relations 
between workers and experts in colonial society. Yet the technologies they trumpeted never 
operated in a smooth or straightforward fashion. Concrete was from the very start inscribed with 
the contradictory projects of multiple sets of actors—the supposedly unruly labor of Moroccan 
workers, whether at the cement plant or on the construction site, and the unpredictable 
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characteristics of local environments.  
During and after WWII, references to urban crisis—while they remained embedded with 
assumptions about expertise and labor from the 1920s and 1930s—extended to a new matter of 
concern: how to simultaneously navigate frictions within colonial society and scarcity within the 
colonial economy (Chapter 2). Cement grants to political allies, practices of infrastructural delay, 
demolition campaigns requiring residents to dismantle structures themselves, and new low-cost 
housing for Moroccans all constituted strategies designed to address this particular framing of 
crisis. At the same time, however, the intensification of anti-colonial violence and the gradual 
move toward decolonization led officials and experts to push for a new set of crisis technologies. 
In the last years of the Protectorate, experts and officials presented prefabrication, public-private 
housing finance, and construction cooperatives—technologies tied to new policies of “flexible 
planning”—as strategies for reorganizing relations between the state, private capital, Muslim 
elites, and the urban poor (Chapter 3).  
These technologies spanned the process of decolonization only to be put to different ends 
during Agadir’s reconstruction after the 1960 earthquake (Chapter 4). As seismologists and 
geologists formulated a notion of seismic risk to describe of how damage and danger were 
distributed in the pre- and post-quake city, engineers and planners harnessed this concept to 
remake construction practices and the urban property market. Cinder blocks, housing 
cooperatives, and small, low-interest loans to survivors—techniques used during Casablanca’s 
housing crisis in the 1940s and 1950s became an integral part of the post-quake reconstruction 
effort. As a kind of postcolonial “crisis,” the earthquake prompted officials to take extreme 
measures to ensure the city’s rebuilding as means of reinforcing Moroccan sovereignty in the 
South. Reconstruction also provided an opportunity for European technical assistants to define 
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their role and demonstrate their usefulness within the postcolonial polity. During the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, these debates about postcolonial expertise and the place of local knowledge 
played out in reference to a loosely connected set of issues: the decline of “traditional” 
architecture, the place of slums within models of urban development, and new designation of 
“environmental” problems such as pollution (Chapter 5). These debates drew upon earlier 
conceptions of Morocco’s urban crisis to define particular building practices as risky or 
reliable—valuable or threatening—in the context of intensifying state surveillance and an 
increasing reliance on overt violence to deal with dissent in the run up to the years of lead.  
Since the founding of Protectorate then, references to crisis have included a shifting array 
of urban problems and a wide variety of proposed technical solutions. Each new formulation of 
crisis left behind layers, both literal material sediment (concrete structures) and practical 
accretions of technological labor. These accretions are observable by following materials 
themselves— considering, for instance, how an organizational technology like housing 
cooperatives depended upon cinder blocks made from cement distributed through municipal 
institutions and manufactured through industrial processes that relied on economies of resource 
extraction. Each phase of this process was characterized by political conflicts and contingent, 
creative technological choices. These conflicts and choices also had long-term consequences. For 
instance, the rise of concrete as the modern construction material par excellence in colonial 
Casablanca during the 1920s and 1930s when other possible alternatives still existed—steel-
frame architecture or the modernization of local construction techniques—allowed French 
engineers to engage in a kind of “double-boundary work” against architects and Moroccan 
skilled workers.775 Whatever affordances concrete provided to Morocco’s community of 
 
775 Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science, 40. 
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professional engineers, it also engendered forms of excess as a substance that in practice could 
be moved, mixed, and manipulated by essentially anyone. Yet the very possibility for excess, for 
unregulated concrete construction, is part of what gave weight and urgency, a sense of crisis, to 
engineers’ claims to authority over the trajectory of colonial modernization projects.  
In the present, intermittent slum removal followed by low-cost housing construction 
through public-private partnerships is a basic feature of urban life in Morocco. Critics of these 
programs might call for less violent displacements or greater equity and transparency in the 
allocation of housing resources. It is rare, if not impossible, to question who has the authority to 
decide which forms of building and dwelling belong in the postcolonial city. This is not simply 
an ideological or conceptual impossibility. It is the result of a history of compromises and 
conflicts that have produced an urban environment in cities such as Casablanca where only 
certain technologies and forms of expertise appear safe, hygienic, or secure. This urban 
environment is a direct legacy of colonial approaches to managing urban crisis.     
Modernist Failures and Decolonization 
 
How safe, hygienic, and secure is Casablanca’s urban environment today? When the 
Ministry of Housing commissioned a study in 2012 after a series of catastrophic apartment 
collapses in the city, the LPEE identified some 6,338 at risk structures.776 The distribution of 
danger is not even across urban space but is often remarkably consistent across time. In the 2012 
study, Derb Ghallef, not far from the site of a late-1930s demolition campaign, and Derb Moulay 
Cherif, part of the former Carrières centrales, were two of the sites with large concentrations of 
 
776 A.T., “Effondrement à Casablanca : 3 victimes, à qui la faute?,” Medias24, November 8, 2018, 
https://www.medias24.com/MAROC/SOCIETE/187413-Effondrement-a-Casablanca-3-victimes-a-qui-la-
faute.html. 
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substandard housing.  
These spatial continuities are one of the reasons I refer throughout this dissertation to the 
making of a colonial “urban environment” that to a large extent persists in the present. This 
environment is the product not only of ecological factors, but also of technologies, built forms, 
and sustained institutional and communal practices—as well as interactions between each of 
these categories. Some of the buildings in Derb Moulay Cherif are part of former corporate 
worker housing projects. Many of their walls have begun to wear down. The paint has chipped, 
and their foundations are no longer secure as additional floors have been added to the initially 
one-story structures. In the 1950s, this was a Moroccan neighborhood, logistically separated 
from the European city center with perhaps a few European workers living in close proximity. 
The not quite totalizing divisions that gave the Carrières centrales a distinct place within colonial 
Casablanca’s racialized landscape continue to resonate in Derb Moulay Cherif today. The 
neighborhood’s weathered façades and rectilinear streets still speak to the mixture of neglect and 
anxiety with which Protectorate officials treated its residents. The colonial urban environment is 
still a lively presence here, nestled within the postcolonial city.777    
Describing the afterlives of the colonial urban environment also means reckoning with 
the legacies of modernist failures. This dissertation has contended that colonial modernization 
schemes were in a certain sense designed—both intentionally and unintentionally—to fail. Crisis 
technologies might have achieved particular political ends, such as cementing the authority of 
urban experts in the contested domain of colonial construction, but they did not offer permanent 
solutions to any of the problems grouped under the label of “crisis.” Undoubtedly some of these 
failures were epistemological, such as colonial planners’ inability to predict and prepare for the 
 
777 These reflections are largely based on the time I spent in and around Derb Moulay Cherif where I conducted 
most of the oral histories for this project. 
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spectacular demographic growth of Moroccan cities. At the same time, however, irresolution, 
delay, and deferral were baked into the very designs of colonial modernization projects. During 
the postwar period, even the largest, most ambitious low-income housing developments for 
Moroccans aimed only to stave off hygienic collapse and temporarily appease restive residents. 
Michel Écochard’s program for the Carrières centrales offered “housing for the greatest possible 
number”—a formulation that implicitly acknowledge that housing could never be provided for 
all. The seemingly more robust postcolonial promise of universal home ownership rested on 
introducing new forms of personal debt to Morocco’s urban working classes and further linking 
their fate to state and public-private creditors. Even Lyautey’s original associationist model for 
the Protectorate—with policies designed to preserve Moroccan social and cultural forms while 
modernizing particular spaces and domains—ultimately showed that modern construction, the 
building of housing, ports, roads, and bridges, was thoroughly reliant on harnessing Moroccan 
forms of skill and labor. On the one hand, attempts to prop up craft guilds and defend a distinct 
professional domain for muʿallimūn proved piecemeal; on the other, Moroccan skilled and 
unskilled workers became essential for carrying out concrete construction and began by the 
1930s to exercise their collective strength through labor organization.  
This dissertation has suggested that had urban experts been able to deliver on promises of 
a hygienic, well-ordered, and harmonious colonial city—had they been able, in other words, to 
fully resolve any iteration of the country’s urban “crisis”—they would have confronted 
obligations that they were unprepared to meet. Had they provided stable, permanent housing for 
all, or even most, Moroccan residents, extended water and electrical infrastructures to their 
neighborhoods, created possibilities for stable employment, and somehow reformed the colonial 
system in ways that diminished unrest, they would have undermined the very foundations of the 
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Protectorate. Instead, the colonial history of managing crisis through construction technologies 
left behind light, cheap structures that were designed to be easily demolished, strategies for 
shifting the cost of housing construction directly onto the urban poor, and sociotechnical 
hierarchies between experts and workers that remain nearly impossible to question. The 
continuation of the colonial project in Morocco depended upon the partial failures of 
modernization, upon its excesses.  
Concrete itself has remained an ambivalent signifier for Moroccan modernization—its 
promises and its failures. In Abdelilah Laslami’s words “to be modern is to build with modern 
materials.”778 Today, however, concrete is under fire from environmental activists concerned 
with the immense quantities of carbon released globally through cement production and the 
building industry. New advocates of sustainable architecture are once again turning to the Draa 
Valley, in search of local knowledge, to find alternative materials to concrete.779 But, who can lay 
claim to these materials—not only to the capacity to master and manipulate their properties, but 
to define their qualities, associations, and desirability? The colonial legacy at issue here is not 
simply a matter of restricting Moroccans’ capacity to work with “technology.” At key moments, 
such as the cooperative movement of the 1950s or the CERF studies of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
technological abilities of Moroccans were presented as a resource to be tapped, harnessed, and 
exploited. The central question—since the first concrete constructions in colonial Casablanca—
was who possessed the authority to define how technological labor would be distributed in the 
making of urban futures.   
 
778 Interview, Abdelilah Laslami, August 14, 2017. 
779 For only a few examples see Eliana Baglioni, “Sustainable Vernacular Architecture: The Case Of The Drâa 
Valley Ksur (Morocco)” (Second International Conference on Sustainable Architecture and Urban Development, 
Amman, Jordan, 2010); Salma Slaoui et al., “Sustainable Architecture and Energy Efficiency a University Campus 
Project in Fez City, Morocco,” in Proceedings of 3rd International Sustainable Buildings Symposium (ISBS 2017), 
ed. Seyhan Fırat, John Kinuthia, and Abid Abu-Tair, Lecture Notes in Civil Engineering (Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, 2018), 65–79. 
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And what of the futures that have already passed, the modernist visions of an urban good 
life once made accessible only to Europeans? What has become of these visions as the 
materialities that supported them have fallen apart? The modernist poet, Mostafa Nissabouri, 
describes one collapse in the center of 1970s Casablanca, “a metallic structure in the middle of a 
pool, atop a vertical row of nickel tubing….One day the entire edifice disintegrated into a heap 
of twisted pipes and crumbling masonry, the delayed guarantees of the contractor having finally 
come due. Since then the urban landscape has ceaselessly undergone every sort of dis-
figuration.”780 Considering colonial architecture, Nissabouri ponders “its interpretive inclusions 
as a palliative measure for encountering the Other, its reminiscences in ornamentation that 
ceremonially perform the feeling of conquest. The city’s memory, as we gradually travel back 
through the course of time, spreads out in a conversation of rebellious and chaotic fragments; 
every stop reveals a multitude of unstable landscapes, streets and other sites of anecdotal 
mooring that—instead of consolidating the chain of events—only deepen the excesses of a 
downward spiral.”781 A fractured urban landscape within which the collapse of structures is not 
metonymic, for there is no whole to represent. Nissabouri questions the notion of postcolonial 
failure by disrupting the presumed unity of the colonial city itself. Narrative fragments and 
material fragments resist recomposition into a singular story of progress or decline. Through 
Nissabouri’s example, the challenge of envisioning an urban future beyond crisis comes into 
focus. It is the impossibility of imagining a future not grounded in a return to colonial visions of 
the good life that were themselves palliative, fractured, and unstable, not to mention 
exclusionary. 
 
780 Mostafa Nissabouri, “Casablanca, fragments d’une mémoire dispersée,” in Casablanca: Fragments d’imaginaire 
(Casablanca: Éditions le Fennec, 1997), 53-54. 
781 Nissabouri, 55. 
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Decolonizing the technologies and environments left behind by the modernist failures of 
the French Protectorate does not involve condemning them as colonial or laying claim to them as 
Moroccan. It is because concrete is both Moroccan and colonial, a product of “rebellious and 
chaotic fragments,” that it has to be reckoned with in the “multitude of unstable landscapes” 
were it resides. To decolonize the future means imagining forms of power and justice that can be 
lodged in structures as well as infrastructures, bodies as well as environments—in minute 
technical forms and in grand political projects. These acts of imagining begin in the often-violent 
place where invocations of crisis—that seek to define and constrain possibilities for revolt and 
refusal—fail to reach. 
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